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FOREWORD
Identity, Democracy, Communicative Power,
Inter/National Labor Rights and the Evolution
of LatCrit Theory and Community
ELIZABETH

M. IGLESIAS

*

INTRODUCTION

This symposium marks and celebrates the proceedings of the

LAT-

CRIT THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE, which took place on Miami Beach in
May 1998. Preceded by LATCRIT I in La Joya and LATCRIT II in San
Antonio, the LATCRIT III gathering marked a watershed event in the

evolution of the LatCrit movement, both as the most recent intervention
in outsider jurisprudence and as a community of scholars and activists.I
* Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Hispanic and Caribbean Legal

Studies, University of Miami School of Law. Thanks to Sam Thompson for unfailing support,
both financial and personal; to the University of Miami Law Review and the Texas Hispanic Law
Journal; and particularly to the two University of Miami Law Review editors-in-chief, Tad Dee,
for his good faith and, Sabrina Ferris, for seeing this project through at the end. Thanks also to
Max Castro, Drucilla Cornell, Kevin Johnson, Guadalupe Luna, Athena Mutua, Dorothy Roberts,
Celina Romany, Greg Stewart and Robert Westley, for discussions that have in one way or
another enhanced the thoughts expressed in this Foreword. Special thanks to my friend and
colleague, Frank Valdes, for friendship, inspiration and solidarity.
I. LatCrit scholarship has virtually exploded in the last three years. In addition to the
published proceedings of LATCRIT I, see Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a
New Discourse of Critical Legal Scholarship, 2 HARv. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997) and LATCRIT I,
see Symposium, Difference, Solidarity and Law: Building Latinalo Communities Through
LatCrit Theory, 19 CHICANo-LATINo L. REV. 1 (1998), LatCrit scholars have also produced a
first-ever symposium exploring major issues in international law and international human rights
from a critical race perspective. See Symposium, InternationalLaw, Human Rights and LatCrit
Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (1997). LatCrit scholarship has also been published in
a stand-alone volume, see Symposium, LatCrit Theory, Latinas/os and the Law, 85 CAL. L. REV.
1087 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L. J. 1 (1998). For proceedings of the gathering of Latina/o Law
Professors that gave birth to the LatCrit project, see Colloquium, Representing Latinalo
Communities: Critical Race Theory and Practice,9 LA RAzA L. J.S 1 (1996). For a particularly
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If LATCRIT I reflected the enthusiasm of a new found commonality and
unprecedented dialogue among a diverse group of scholars coming
together for a first time, LATCRIT II demonstrated the profound challenges facing any movement seriously committed to exploring and transforming the realities of inter- and intra group injustices from an antiessentialist and anti-subordination perspective. If LATCRIT I marked
the excitement of a first encounter and the enthusiasm of a party, LATCRIT II demonstrated the speed with which any party can end. In a sudden crash or steady line of departures, a party based on suppositions of
solidarity and feelings of community can quickly unravel when confronted with substantive difference. When things "get too heavy," parties
tend to dwindle and disperse.2
From this perspective, LATCRIT III was a watershed moment
because it marked a key act of continuity and perseverence despite ruptures and disruptions. Viewed in hindsight, this act of continuity was a
definitive moment in the survival of the LatCrit movement as a community of scholars and collective political intellectual project.3 Viewed
against the backdrop of prior LATCRIT conferences, LATCRIT III also
offers a welcomed opportunity to reflect anew upon the objectives and
methods of our community-building efforts. If LATCRIT II counsels the
need to remain ever-vigilant lest we be confused, seduced and ultimately
insightful overview of the purposes and commitments of the LatCrit movement, see Francisco
Valdes, Under Construction: LatCrit Consciousness, Community and Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV.
1087, 93-96 (1997), 10 LA RAZA 1, 7-10 (1998) [hereinafter Valdes, Under Construction]. For
proceedings of the LatCrit IV conference, see Symposium, Rotating Centers, Expanding
Frontiers: LatCrit Theory and Marginal Intersections, 33 U.C. DAVis L. REV. (forthcoming
2000).
2. For a sense of the substantive issues that triggered the eruptions at LatCrit II, see Elvia R.
Arriola, Foreword: March!, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 26-7 (1998) [hereinafter Arriola,
Foreword: March!]; Nancy K. Ota, Falling From Grace: A Meditation of LatCrit II, 19
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 437 (1998); Reynaldo Valencia, On Being an Out Catholic:
Contextualizing the Role of Religion at LatCrit11, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 449 (1998); Emily
Fowler, Disturbing the Peace, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV 479 (1998); Margaret E. Montoya,
Religious Rituals and LatCrit Theorizing, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV 417 (1998); Elizabeth M.
Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Afterword: Religion, Gender, Sexuality, Race and Class in
CoalitionalTheory: A Critical and Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit Social Justice Agendas, 19
U.C.L.A. CHICANO-LATINO L, REV. 503, 539 (1998) (declining to engage in retrospective
accounts of events, in favor of reflecting instead on the substantive issues raised by the clash of
perspectives).
3. The eruptions at LatCrit II raised substantial doubts about the continuity of the project.
Communities may form spontaneously, but they do not evolve automatically, particularly not
communities of choice and will that are little more than an imagined act of solidarity amongst
people separated by so many differences. The organization of appropriate venues for performing
community is critical to its evolution, but this also does not happen automatically. It falls to
particular individuals at specific points in time to create the venues that enable community. Thus
these communities are as fragile as the individuals upon whose energy, initiative and good will
they depend. LatCrit II drained us.
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betrayed by the human tendency to seek community in the sentimentality and pseudo-security of sameness, the intellectual and political
advances made at LATCRIT III show us the substantial pay-offs to be
gained by resisting the impulse to seek or settle for sentimentalist communities. By this I mean communities where solidarity is more an
image conjured through superficial feelings of identity and hence of
momentary closeness, rather than a lived commitment, in solidarity, to
relentlessly reveal and steadfastly dismantle relations of dominance and
subordination that subvert the potential for authentic human sharing and
connection - not just outside, but also within the LatCrit community
we aspire to construct.'
To recognize the limited life expectancy of sentimentalist communities is to take a first step down a long and difficult path that challenges
us, at every instance, to seek affirmatively and self-consciously to produce something different in our midst. That difference is a community
of scholars and activists that can intellectually engage, politically negotiate and collectively absorb the kinds of internal controversies and external assaults that have, in other contexts, shattered communities built on
the fragile bonds of sentimental feeling, strategic alliance, individual
careerism or simple self-interest, however mutual such interests may be
said to be - in short, on any bond other than an inter-subjective commitment to seek and manifest objective justice in a caring and careful
5
manner.
The excellent work and important advances, the conceptual breakthroughs, the interpersonal relationships and political solidarities that
were further strengthened or newly born at LATCRIT III are, indeed, substantively significant - as reflected in the proceedings of this symposium. The fact that none of these things might have ever seen the light
of day, at least not in their current configurations and certainly not, as
they are now, embedded in and enhanced by our memories of the shared
community and collegiality that made LATCRIT III such an enlivening
experience - this fact should give reason to pause. Indeed, the achievements of LATCR1T III offer ample evidence that LatCrit community4. See Elvia R. Arriola, LatCrit Theory, InternationalHuman Rights, Popular Culture, and
the Faces of Dispair in INS Raids, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-Am. L. REv. 245 (1996-97) [hereinafter
Arriola, INS Raids] (emphasizing the importance of LatCrit community building); Arriola,
Forward: March!, supra note 2 (same).
5. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, The Inter-Subjectivity of Objective Justice: A Theory and
PraxisforConstructingLatCrit Coalitions,2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 467-71 (1997); Elizabeth M.
Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersection of Title VII and the
NLRA. NOT!, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 395, 476-78 (1993) [hereinafter Iglesias, Structures of
Subordination] (the intersubjectivity of equals: moral imperative and institutional blueprint); id.
at 493 n.324 (intra-feminist solidarity must be based on more than "touchy-feely" sentiments); id.
at 475-78 (solidarity among women of color based on justice, not sentimentality).
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building must walk a careful path between the tendencies to rely, on the
one hand, on the feel-good emotions of superficial identifications and,
on the other hand, the tendency toward a kind of packing behavior that
is sometimes indulged because it appears to enable spontaneous, though
fleeting and often problematic, alliances to converge around a slash-andburn, hold-no-prisoners, hypercritical attack upon some unfortunate and
often unsuspecting target. Neither tendency serves the purposes of a
community determined to foster for the long-haul a collaborative project that continuously enables ever-more demanding engagements in the
sort of substantive critical analysis that was the aspiration and, to an
unprecedented degree, the achievement of LATCRIT III.
LATCRIT III definitively demonstrated that even highly controversial topics and proposals can advance our intellectual development and
strengthen our political and solidaristic commitments if organized and
actually conducted in a respectful and inclusive manner. Thus, while
there was significant controversy generated by a programmed event proposing to launch a jurisprudential intervention styled "BlackCrit theory"
as an experimental way of centering the particularities of Black Latina/o
and Caribbean peoples in and against the Black/White paradigm,6 this
pre-event controversy did not disrupt the conference, but was instead
identified and negotiated through extensive substantive discussions, conducted late into the evening, in good-faith and mutual concern to resolve
the misconceptions that might otherwise disrupt the next day's event.
The payoff was that rather than an explosive emotional disruption followed by the scrambling (of some) to mediate the hurt feelings and
unnecessary misunderstandings that routinely follow such explosions,
we had a very fruitful discussion that has since spawned substantial
advances by raising important questions about the relationship between
LatCrit and other critical jurisprudential movements, most notably Critical Race Theory,7 and about the particularities of Black experiences and
the significance of those particularities to the LatCrit project.8
6. See infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing objectives and drawing lessons
from the LATCRIT III focus group discussion entitled From Critical Race Theory to LatCrit to
BlackCrit? Exploring Critical Race Theory Beyond and Within the Black/White Paradigm, see

<http://nersp.nerdc.ufl.edu/-malavet/latcrit/archives/lciii.htm>).
7. See, e.g., Stephanie L. Phillips, The Convergence of the Critical Race Theory Workshop
with LatCrit Theory: A History, 53 U. MIAI L. REV. 1247 (1999); Francisco Valdes, Afterword:
Theorizing "OutCrit" Theories: Coalitional Method and comparative Jurisprudential
Experience-RaceCrits, QueerCrits and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265 (1999) [hereinafter
Valdes, "OutCrit" Theories].
8. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, BlackCrit Theory and the Problem of Essentialism, 53 U.
MIA I L. REV. 855 (1999) [hereinafter Roberts, BlackCrit Theory]; Athena Mutua, Shifting
Bottoms and Rotating Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and the Black/White Paradigm, 53 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1177 (1999); see also The Meanings and Particularitiesof Blackness in Latinalo
Communities, LATCRIT IV SUBSTANTIVE PROGRAM OUTLINE (reflecting the intellectual growth
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There is no doubt that solidarity, understood as an anti-essentialist
commitment to inter and intra-group justice, presents continual challenges and demands tremendous work. This work is not always fun. At
the same time, there is no question that LATCRIT III was fun. The conference was graced with the sunny springtime beauty, the pastel colored
sounds and Caribbean skies that make Miami beaches a tropical paradise
for wealthy tourists and gave us an opportunity to enjoy each other's
company and to share some sensual displacements amid much privilege
and luxury, even as we confronted the daunting challenges of our work.
In fact, the conference was a lot of fun, and the fun we had was a
positive energy in our efforts to build community across our differences.9 Thus, in myriad ways, LatCrit III demonstrated that the LatCrit
project can and should engage profoundly controversial positions and
proposals without indulging community-destroying disruptions that
undermine, rather than enable, our efforts to explore substantive disagreements and to learn from our differences of position and perspective
in the spirit and expectation of lively and lasting friendship.
In retrospect, it also bears noting that our collective efforts to selfconsciously build the LatCrit community, and by implication any community, upon a commitment to anti-essentialist anti-subordination politics, is an unprecedented project of millennial proportions. Questions
pending today on the LatCrit agenda will emerge tomorrow as definitive
questions of the 2 1 st century. This is because the human community
must find ways to construct identities that do not depend on the activation of essentialized differences or the reproduction of sociolegal hierarchies. There is no sustainable alternative. In the 2 1 st century,
controversies that today are triggered by LatCrit's theoretical determination to reveal essentialist assumptions and traverse, in solidarity, such
inherited boundaries as mark the distinctions of race, ethnicity, class,
gender, sexual orientation and nation will tomorrow erupt the discursive
and theoretical development generated by the BlackCrit focus group discussion), <http://
nersp.nerdc.ufl.edu/-malavetlatcrit/lcivdocslcivsubs.htm>.

9. To be sure, lounging on the pool deck of the luxurious Eden Roc Hotel, I did experience a
moment of cognitive dissonance, which I was quickly able to resolve because I've never bought
the line that our commitment to anti-subordination might be rendered any less authentic by
sharing some moments of privilege. To my mind, that view reflects a crabbed and myopic

misunderstanding of the ethical substance, political objectives and emotional dimensions of the
practice of liberation politics. See, e.g., JOsE MIRANDA, MARX AND THE BIBLE: A CRITIQUE OF
THE PHILOSOPHY OF OPPRESSION (John Eagleson trans., 1974) (distinguishing the structural
concept of "differentiating wealth" from the individual ownership of property). Like John
Hayakawa Torok, I think LatCrit scholars need to find ways to provide ourselves and each other

respite from the conflict and controversy to which our anti-subordination commitments routinely
expose us - precisely so that we never give up or burn out. See John Hayakawa Torok, Finding
the Me in LatCrit Theory: Thoughts on Language Acquisition and Loss, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1019 (1999).
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boundaries of sociolegal theory and confront the world community as
the wo/man-in-the-local/global streets, trodding the electronic highways
for news of how, when and where the human flows in motion will be set
or let to rest. Borders busted by new configurations of freedom and
compulsion are producing new social realities in need of new identities,
beyond the essential-isms of the modem that currently, and not so tenuously, still organize so much the conscious and unconscious of so
many. "o

It is precisely because LatCrit theory has taken up the challenge of
producing knowledge and performing community for the purpose of
manifesting and advancing an anti-essentialist commitment to anti-subordination politics that the LatCrit community stands as microcosm of
the many challenges that will face the global community in ever more
pressing degrees. Our in/ability to negotiate the differences amongst us,
to link identities to histories, histories to the articulation of an ethical
and future-oriented vision, and our visions to the consolidation of effective and transformative political coalitions - on this - the stuff of
dreams - depends the future of such weighty 2 1s' century imperatives

as world peace, social justice, and human liberation."1
With this in mind, this Foreword seeks to contextualize the LATCRIT III symposium essays in relation to four basic points of reference:
the first is LatCrit's evolving substantive agendas; the second is the
impact of our discourse and interactions on our community-building
objectives and on alternative trajectories for institutional development of
the LatCrit project; the third is the broad array of issues and many fields
of substantive inquiry that have not yet been addressed in LatCrit theory.
These three points create a dialectical frame of reference linking past,
present and future, thereby enabling us, more meaningfully, to assess
where we have been and to project a vision of where we should go. The
fourth point of reference refers back to the pre-conference objectives as
delineated in the substantive program outline;12 it injects a fourth
10. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (unconscious racism pervasive); Angela
J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion,67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13
(1998) (unconscious racism in criminal justice system); Sylvia R. Lazos-Vargas, Democracy and
Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role of the Judge in a Pluralist Polity, 58 MD. L. REV. 150,

263-64 (1999) (unconscious racism in interpretation of affirmative action); Susan Sturm, Race,
Gender, and the Law in the Twenty-first Century Workplace: Some Preliminary Observations, I
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 639 (1998) (unconscious racism in labor and employment policies and

practices).
11. See Francisco Valdes, Outsider Scholars and "OutCrit" Perspectivity:
PostsubordinationVision as JurisprudentialMethod, 49 DE PAUL L. REV. 3 (forthcoming 2000).
12. The LATCRIT III Substantive Program Outline can be found by visiting the LatCrit
webpage at <http://nersp.nerdc.ufl.edu/-malavet/latcrit/archives/lciii.htm>.
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dimension of intentionality into our understanding of LatCrit dynamics
because what we actually achieve at any LatCrit gathering means different things and offers different lessons depending on its coherence with,
departure from and/or expansion of the objectives we intended to
achieve. Using this four-part frame of reference to contextualize the
essays in this symposium enables us to assess the evolution of LatCrit
theory and praxis in ways that engage the multiple dimensions of a project that is always and everywhere both about producing knowledge and
about performing community.
The rest of this Foreword divides in three parts. This three part
structure reflects, but does not directly track the live-events of the conference, which are detailed both in the LatCrit III Substantive Program
Outline and the LatCrit III Program Schedule. 3 The live-events were
programmed to effectuate the conference planners' self-conscious and
concerted commitment to push LatCrit theory into new substantive
areas, to encourage dialogue across jurisprudential and disciplinary
boundaries, to bridge the gap between theory and practice, to experiment
with new discussion formats, to include newcomers, to accommodate
the many responses to our initial call for papers and to provide a forum
for works-in-progress. To this end, the program featured four plenaries,
two focus-group discussions, four keynote addresses, five concurrent
panels and a concurrent works-in-progress session. However, as in previous LatCrit conferences, the energy, richness and synergies of our discourse exceeded the pre-established structure of our program - a
phenomenon reflected, this time, in the many thematic interconnections
evidenced across the keynotes, plenaries and concurrent panels, as well
as by the fact that a number of essays submitted for this symposium
volume were inspired by, but not delivered at, the LatCrit III conference.
Organizing this abundance into a coherent final product has been a border-busting project in its own right precisely because the expedient of
tracking the live-events was simply untenable. Instead, the objective in
this symposium, and therefore in this Foreword, has been to cluster the
various essays around the substantive themes most directly salient to our
discussions at LatCrit III.
Part I, entitled Beyond/Between Colors: De/ConstructingInsider!
Outsider Positions in LatCrit Theory, takes up the essays in the first two

clusters. These essays demonstrate the continued centrality of identity
politics in LatCrit discourse, making questions of intra-group hierarchy
and inter-group justice of special salience in any LatCrit gathering and
13. See id. (for webpage address).
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their exploration a critical dimension of the continuity we seek to maintain. They also demonstrate that each time the LatCrit community takes
up these issues in our formal gatherings, we approach them with a
heightened awareness of the broader context in which we articulate the
political implications of Latina/o identity. Using a variety of critical
methodologies, including doctrinal deconstruction, policy-based political analysis of current affairs, personal narratives and social psychology, these essays take up the challenge of articulating how the antiessentialist anti-subordination aspirations of the LatCrit project are
implicated in struggles over such relatively theoretical matters as judicial power, interpretative objectivity and personal identity, as well as in
the more immediate political struggles over immigration policies, minority access to legal education, the delivery of legal services to the poor,
the ongoing expropriation of indigenous peoples in Latin American
countries and the particularities of intergroup relations in South Florida,
the site of the LatCrit III conference. 14
Both individually and cumulatively, these essays challenge LatCrit
scholars to deconstruct essentialist representations of the Latina/o condition by attending to the particularities of subordination as experienced
by different groups at different junctures of historical time and trans/
national space. As critical methodology, attention to the particular helps
unpack intra and intergroup hierarchies, enables critical analysis to resist
the suppression of intra-group diversities and exposes instances in which
representations of a common good or shared imperative are manipulated
and monopolized to configure relations of intra and intergroup privilege.
This attention to the particularities of subordination can, however, generate its own problems - most notably the problem of comparing subordinations both within and between groups. Such intergroup
comparisons activate identifications that can dis/organize alliances and
can therefore have profound and varied impact on the future viability of
any coalition project - depending on the kinds of political positioning a
particular mode of comparison tends to promote.' 5 At the same time,
14. This emphasis on the local politics in South Florida is consistent with prior practice of
planning LatCrit conferences to use the location of our conferences to increase our collective
knowledge of the particularities of Latina/o realities across geographical areas. See Iglesias &
Valdes, supra note 2, at 574 n.185 (discussing the economic tour of San Antonio as another
instance of engaging the particularities of the areas in which the conference is held).
15. Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Human Rights in InternationalEconomic Law: Locating Latinasi
os in the Linkage Debate, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 361 (1996-97) [hereinafter Iglesias,
InternationalEconomic Law] (exploring the way different intra-Latina/o collective identities and
political alliances - some more progressive than others - are triggered by the discourses of

development, dependency and neo-liberalism and the very different impact these alliances would
have on the project to link enforcement of human rights to trade and finance regimes regulated
by international economic law). My point here is that the configuration of collective identities and
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attention to the particularities of subordination makes intergroup comparisons practically inevitable.
LatCrit theory thus faces the formidable task of articulating an ethic
and politics through which the practice of comparing the different realities of subordination that are increasingly revealed through our particularized analyses can be made to foster, rather than destroy, the
possibilities for intergroup solidarity and genuine understanding across
our many differences of experience and position. We need to learn how
to articulate our intergroup comparisons in ways that energize new solidarities and promote more fluid and inclusive political identities by
revealing new interconnections and commonalities among the
oppressed despite and perhaps because of our differences. Indeed, understood specifically as a way of learning about and engaging our differences, intergroup comparisons can enable the affirmative valuation and
embrace of the differences that make us both ourselves and not each
other.' 6 The essays in these first two clusters provide a valuable point of
departure for this important task because their attention to the particularities of subordination across different contexts also illustrates a variety
of instances of intergroup comparison.
Part II, entitled Substantive Self-Determination: Democracy, Communicative Power and Inter/National Labor Rights reflects the rapidly
expanding agenda marked for LatCrit attention. This Part takes up three
clusters of essays. The first cluster seeks to articulate a LatCrit perspective on the disjunctures between reality and rhetoric in the transition and
practice of democracy. The second cluster focuses on communicative
power, and the third and final cluster focuses specifically on the way
LatCrit antisubordination theory and practice is implicated in and activated by the sociolegal structures of labor and employment in an
increasingly globalized society. Cumulatively, the essays in these three
clusters reflect a concerted and self-conscious effort to expand the substantive concerns of the LatCrit movement beyond the familiar fare of
political alliances is not "naturally" given. Nor do they flow directly from our position within any
particular "group." Instead, these identities and alliances are constructed in and through the
discourses we deploy. Historical comparisons are precisely the kinds of discourse that organize
political alliances and construct collective identities, for better or worse. It is therefore critical to
subject any inter-group comparisons to the kind of political alignment analysis I am again

suggesting here. For a different, but allied, vision of the kind of political impact analysis that is
needed, see Sumi Cho, Essential Politics, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 433 (1997) [hereinafter Cho,
Essential Politics].
16. See Catherine Peirce Wells, Speaking in Tongues: Some Comments on Multilingualism,
53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 983 (1999) (providing a clear and beautiful account of the way our ethic of
inter-group relations needs to progress beyond a level where mutual recognition and regard
depends on the identification of commonalities to a level where we learn to value difference
itself).
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"Latinalo issues." This is an appropriate and timely development
because the struggle to articulate an anti-essentialist theory and practice
of coalitional politics and transformative legal intervention implicates
LatCrit scholars in a project that must concern itself with issues not
peculiarly or exclusively of interest to Latinas/os in this country.
Until relatively recently, the trials and tribulations, for example, of
the international peace movement, the labor movement, the environmental movement and the international movement for human rights, like the
deconstruction of U.S. national security ideology or the critical analysis
of the legal regimes organized by antitrust, tax and corporate laws have,
for the most part, been cast as matters of universal concern, not particularly relevant to Latina/o and other minority communities, whose primary focus of attention has been thought to center on issues of
discrimination and the meaning of equal protection.' I LatCrit theory, by
contrast, claims an interest in matters of universal concern, precisely
because it rejects the metaphysical and epistemological assumptions that
underpin the bifurcation of universal and particular. 8 By taking up and
subjecting to critical anti-essentialist analysis such matters as the rhetoric and realities of the democratic project, the legal structures of communicative power and the future of the labor movement in and beyond the
United States, these essays demonstrate how attention to the particularities of Latina/o experiences and perspectives can produce a richer and
more contextual understanding of the broader contexts and multiple
dimensions of the human struggle for justice and peace.
Finally, Part III takes up the essays in the cluster entitled, Mapping
Intellectual/PoliticalFoundations and Future Self-Critical Directions.

Though only three years old, LatCrit theory reflects a rich and varied
intellectual inheritance because of the wide diversity of scholars who
have chosen to self-identify as LatCrit scholars or participate in LatCrit
conferences. Thus, LatCrit Theory finds its intellectual roots in Critical
Race Theory, Critical Race Feminism, Chicano/a Studies, Law and Society, and Critical Legal Studies precisely because these various strains of
critical discourse are the intellectual roots of the individuals whose
energy drives the LatCrit project and secures its continued evolution.
On the other hand, formations of scholarly communities do not spontaneously generate; and, in this respect, LatCrit theory is a project with a
particular institutional history that reflects the efforts and visions of par17. See, e.g., Alice Abreu, Lessons from Latcrit: Insiders and Outsiders, All at the Same
Time, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 787 (1999) (critiquing tendency to channel Latinas/os into fields
deemed particularly relevant to Latinas/os).
18. See infra notes 108-117 and accompanying text (reconstructing relationship between
universal and particular in the articulation of anti-essentialist critical legal theory).

1999]

FOREWORD

ticular individuals responding to and reacting against the perceived limitations of each of the various strains of critical discourse that precede it.
The essays in Part III reflect this rich and varied intellectual inheritance even as they raise important questions about the purpose, history
and future trajectories of the LatCrit project. In this vein, the one definitive lesson to be gleaned from the three years of LatCrit conferences that
culminated in LATCRIT III is that there are major differences between
the kind of intellectual work that aims at articulating new critical
insights in individually authored law review articles and the kind of
work required to operationalize new possibilities of thought and action
in ways that can effectively reorganize the dynamics of group interaction
and generate a shared theoretical discourse with common points of reference and principles of engagement. Learning to understand and negotiate the vast spaces between the individual conceptualization of new
possibilities and the collective processes that must be activated to translate these new insights into shared understandings, and to then manifest
these shared understandings in new forms of interaction and institutional
arrangements, is a crucial imperative in the further evolution of LatCrit
theory and community.
This learning is crucial and central precisely because the practice
of LatCrit conference organizing has been self-consciously and intentionally aimed, since its inception, at transforming the production of
legal scholarship from an experience of intellectual isolation into a practice of collective engagement and empowerment.' 9 Once this collective
project becomes the imagined purpose and desired objective of our gatherings, the value of our work can no longer be measured simply by the
breadth of any individual's vision or the depth of any one analysis, but
by the degree to which our gatherings are effective fora for communicating and operationalizing the abstract ideas we so ably articulate in our
individual work. Because the energies, efforts, errors, strengths, limitations and evolving visions of embodied human beings are such central
components of this collective learning process, this Foreword also takes
up the important challenge of recounting the historical development and
institutional trajectories of the LatCrit project.

19. Francisco Valdes, Latinalo Ethnicities,Critical Race Theory, and Post Identity Politics in
Postmodern Legal Culture: From Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 11-12 (1996)
(noting that the publication of LatCrit conferences serves "to build relationships among and
between Latina/o legal scholars and journals; [and] in this way ... foster the work and success of
both.").
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CONSTRUCTING INTER-GROUP

SOLIDARITY AND DECONSTRUCTING INSIDER/OUTSIDER POSITIONS IN
LATCRIT THEORY AND COALITIONAL POLITICS

A.

Centering Particularitiesand Comparing Subordinations:
Toward an Ethic of Inter-Group Comparisons

The four essays in this first cluster provide different perspectives on
the possibilities and obstacles confronting any project to promote intergroup solidarity.2" Professor Luna's opening essay seeks to identify
points of commonality between Blacks and Chicanos by forwarding a
deconstructive analysis of the legal doctrines through which judicial
interpretation facilitated both the institution of Black slavery and the dispossession Mexican landowners. The other three essays focus on the
particularities of inter-group relations in South Florida. Attorney Cheryl
Little's essay on intergroup coalitions, immigration politics and the Haitian experience uses the recently enacted Nicaraguan Adjustment and
Central American Relief Act (NACARA) as the point of departure for a
historical account of the discriminatory treatment Haitian refugees have
been singly and systematically subjected to over the last 30 years, in
contrast specifically to the treatment Cuban refugees have received during this same period. Attorney Lyra Logan provides a narrative account
of the intergroup conflicts and convergence of interests among Black
and Cuban-American political constituencies that enabled Florida to
enact this country's first and only statewide state-funded affirmative
action program aimed at increasing access to legal education for Black,
Latina/o and other minority groups, whose members are grossly underrepresented in the Florida State Bar. Finally, Attorney Virginia Coto
recounts the objectives and assesses the initial achievements of an innovative project to provide legal services to battered immigrant women in
the South Florida community.
Cumulatively, these four essays provide a rich and varied perspective on the role of law in mediating or exacerbating intergroup tensions
and divisions, as well as facilitating or obstructing the possibilities for
achieving intergroup justice. The narratives are of law and legal institutions. Though the deconstruction of white supremacist legal ideology
may initially seem far and away from the more immediate political
struggles for immigration relief, access to legal education and the prac20. Guadalupe T. Luna, On the Complexities of Race: The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691 (1999) [hereinafter Luna, Complexities of
Race]; Cheryl Little, Intergroup Coalitions and Immigration Politics: The Haitian Experience in
Florida,53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 717 (1999); Lyra Logan, Florida'sMinority Participationin Legal
Education Program, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 743 (1999); Virginia P. Coto, LUCHA, The Strugglefor
Life: Legal Services for Battered Immigrant Women, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 749 (1999).
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tice and politics of designing and running an alternative legal services
program, each essay provides a unique perspective on the challenge of
promoting inter-group solidarity in theory and practice. Theory without
practice is a hollow luxury only the privileged can indulge; however,
practice without theory too readily collapses complexity into a
unidimensional struggle that can be counterproductive in the struggle for
inter-group justice. Indeed, the complex social, political, cultural, economic and legal dimensions of the different struggles recounted in each
of these essays is precisely the reason why theory and practice must
remain in dialectical engagement.
BEYOND DIFFERENCE:

DECONSTRUCTING THE LEGAL STRUCTURES
OF SUBORDINATION

Professor Luna's essay on the complexities of race aptly opens the
first cluster of essays on inter-group solidarity by exploring points of
commonality and difference across two otherwise disconnected fields of
legal doctrine.2 1 The first is constituted by the antebellum legal struggle
of emancipated Blacks to obtain the status and privileges of U.S. citizenship, a struggle that culminated in the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford
decision of 1856, which propelled the United States into its bloody civil
war. In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court declared that all Blacks, whether
free or slave, were ineligible for U.S. citizenship because of the inherent
inferiority of the African race. The court also accorded the property
rights of southern slave owners a privileged constitutional status, denying both Congress and the free-states the legal authority to confine the
institution of slavery to the territorial boundaries of the slave-states. The
second field is marked by the legal struggles of Mexican-Americans to
retain their lands in the territories ceded by Mexico after the Mexican
War of 1846. These struggles generated a long line of cases in which
Mexican landowners were systematically dispossessed of their lands for
the benefit of white settlers, land speculators and gold-diggers.
By juxtaposing the historical tribulations of Blacks and Chicanas/os
across these two very different sociolegal contexts, Professor Luna
strikes three themes worth further comment and reflection. First, Professor Luna's essay makes historical reality a central concern in the articulation of anti-subordination legal theory. The history she recounts is of
legal interpretation. It is a history of the arbitrary and inconsistent adjudication of rights asserted by different outsider groups across different
21. Luna, Complexities of Race, supra note 20; see also Guadalupe Luna, ChicanalChicano
Land Tenure in the Agrarian Domain: On the Edge of a Naked Knife, 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 39
(1998).
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points in time and space.22 It is also a history, the telling of which is
designed to reveal how the internal coherence of legal doctrine has been
repeatedly subordinated to the external imperatives of white supremacy
- a history that can only be told by deconstructing the judicial decisions that constitute this history. Through this deconstructive analysis,
Professor Luna's essay is able to link the distinct histories of free Blacks
and Mexican landowners both to each other and to a critical analysis of
the legitimacy of legal interpretation and the role of law in the re/production of subordination. Second, her essay also opens new avenues of
critical analysis into the way white supremacist ideology articulates the
legal meaning of U.S. citizenship, a recurring theme in LatCrit scholarship and throughout this symposium.23 Finally, her analysis offers a valuable point of departure for developing an ethic and assessing the
political implications of intergroup comparisons.
Professor Luna locates her historical analysis in the field of legal
discourse. Her objective is to reveal otherwise invisible similarities,
demonstrating that free Blacks and Mexican land owners confronted a
common context of struggle despite apparent differences in their particular experiences of subordination within white supremacy. Professor
Luna reveals these similarities by deconstructing the interpretative strategies and legal arguments used to rationalize the judicial decisions that
produced these different experiences. The differential treatment of property rights across these two contexts provides a particularly valuable
point of comparison. By invoking the concept of due process, the Dred
Scott decision afforded slaveowner's rights of property a constitutional
status that simultaneously contracted Congressional power and projected
the legal effect of slave-state laws beyond their territorial jurisdiction.
The Dred Scott decision was so immediately explosive because it cast
slaves as property subject to constitutional protection everywhere in the
country. In then Chief Justice Taney's view, slave owners were entitled
to travel through and reside within the free states and territories with
their slaves and were further entitled to have their property rights in
slaves protected by due process despite the fact that slavery was illegal
22. 1 follow Professor Luna's terminology, which itself follows Professor Matsuda's earlier
rejection of the term "minority" in favor of the term "outsider" on the grounds that the former
terminology contradicts "the numerical significance of the constituencies typically excluded from
jurisprudential discourse." Luna, Complexities of Race, supra note 20, at 695 n.20 (citing Mari
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV.

2320 (1989)).
23. See Arriola, INS Raids, supra note 4; Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S.
Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Constructionof Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 263 (1997); Enid Trucios-Haynes, The Role of Transnational Identity and Migration, 28
U. MIAMI INTER-AM.

L.

REV.

293 (1997).
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in the free states and territories.24 Since Dred Scott's claim to U.S. citizenship was premised on his status as a freeman emancipated by the act

of residing in free territory, the Court's constitutional analysis stripped
him of his legal claim to freedom, and hence to the citizenship status
upon which his right to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction ultimately
depended."

Professor Luna contrasts the costly protection granted the property
rights of slaveholders to the treatment of Mexican property owners,
whose land title claims purportedly were protected by the Treaty of

Guadalupe Hidalgo. Read through the lens of legal precedent, the history of land adjudication in the ceded territories is a history of arbitrary
rulings and of blatant disregard for established precedent. It is a history
of nothing less than judicial lawlessness. While the United States was

treaty-bound to grant U.S. citizenship to Mexican nationals choosing to
remain in the ceded territories and to respect their property rights as
established under Spanish and Mexican law, neither the implementing
legislation, nor the process of land adjudication complied with these
obligations. Under the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Span-

ish and Mexican land titles were to be given legal effect in northamerican courts, yet reference to Hispanic law was, at best, inconsistent. In
some instances, courts applied Hispanic law, demonstrating their famili24. See Stuart A. Streichler, Justice Curtis'sDissent in The Dred Scott Case: An Interpretive
Study, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 509, 534 (1997) (noting Taney's position that "[aln act of
Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because
he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who
had committed no offence against the laws could hardly be dignified with the name of due process
of law.").
25. Dred Scott's substantive claim was that he was a free man by virtue of his years of
residency in Illinois, a free state, and in the territories of the Louisiana Purchase that were
designated free by the Missouri Compromise. Scott had traveled to these areas from his original
place of residence in Missouri, a slave state, in the company and with the permission of his owner,
John Emerson. Scott had married and resided in free territory for a number of years before
returning to Missouri with his wife and children at Emerson's request. Back in Missouri, Emerson
died and Scott sued for his freedom in state court. Settled precedents at the time held that slaves
who traveled to and resided within the jurisdiction of a free state or territory, with permission of
their owners, were automatically free. Residence within these jurisdictions effected this
emancipation precisely because slavery was not legally recognized in these areas. It was further
settled that once emancipated by residence in a free state or territory, the free individual was not
re-enslaved by mere act of returning to or residing within a slave state, but was rather entitled to
have her/his free status legally recognized within the slave state. When the Missouri Supreme
Court reversed the jury verdict rendered in Scott's favor and, in the process, reversed these
established precedents, Scott brought suit in federal court, invoking the court's diversity
jurisdiction, which applies to cases "between Citizens of different States." Scott asserted Missouri
citizenship in his suit against John Sanford, who was the brother of his owner's widow and was, at
the time of the lawsuit, a citizen of New York. See Jane Larson, A House Divided: Using Dred
Scott to Teach Conflict of Laws, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 577 (1996); Mark A. Graber, Desperately
Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT.
271 (1997).
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arity with its requirements and with their own duty to apply it; yet, in
other cases, Hispanic law was inexplicably ignored or blatantly misrepresented.2 6 In a similar vein, even a minimalist interpretation of due
process would eschew arbitrary and inconsistent adjudication; yet Mexican land title cases are rife with such inconsistencies as border the irrational. Cases applied shifting burdens of proof, in some instances
requiring documentary evidence of title, while, in others, mere parole
evidence was allowed to suffice. In some cases, actual physical residence on the claimed property was required to confirm title despite the
claimant's valid documentary evidence. In other cases, title was confirmed solely on the basis of documentation of doubtful authenticity.
Indeed, through this morass of arbitrary adjudication, Professor Luna
finds only one regular and predictable consistency: Anglo claimants
tended to win title to land, while Mexican claimants tended to lose.
Certainly, Dred Scott and the long line of Mexican land title cases
occupy very different sociolegal fields and might therefore be readily
distinguished. The Mexican land title cases might be read as just
another example of the United States repeated failure to respect customary international law and honor its treaty obligations. Dred Scott, by
contrast, might be dismissed as aberration, an idiosyncratic moment of
judicial lapse - like a handful of equally infamous Supreme Court decisions.2 7 However, the value of Professor Luna's analysis is that it nevertheless reveals a common context of struggle shared by Blacks and
Mexicans and otherwise obscured by the fact that these instances of dispossession are coded in the abstractions of legal discourse and articulated across very different sociolegal contexts. In particular, Professor
Luna's search for commonalities challenges LatCrit scholars to think
critically about the way the doctrinal evolution of Anglo American property rights regimes is directly implicated in the material dispossession
and economic marginalization of communities of color both within and
beyond the United States. 28 Her point, after all, is that the elevated con26. See Peter L. Reich, Western Courts and the Privatization of Hispanic Mineral Rights
Since 1850: An Alchemy of Title, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 57 (1998); Robert V. Urias, The Tierra
Amarilla Grant, Reises Tijerina, and the Courthouse Raid, 16 CHICANo-LATINo L. REV. 141
(1995).
27. See Symposium, The Long Shadow of Korematsu, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1; 19 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L. J. 1 (1999).
28. See, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum
Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999) (examining the impact of slave/master sexual relations
through lens of antebellum wills and estate cases); Margalynne Armstrong, Race and Property
Values in Entrenched Segregation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051 (1998) (exploring the impact of
racism on value of Black-owned property and the interpretation of the anti-discrimination mandate
in the struggle for fair housing); Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century
"Alien Land Laws" As a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37; 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J.
37 (1998) (laws barring agricultural land ownership by Asians); Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA
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stitutional status and due process protections accorded the property
rights of slaveowners in Dred Scott were nowhere seen when the prop-

erty rights at issue were the rights of Mexican nationals to retain the
lands to which they were entitled under customary international and federal treaty law, thus suggesting that the protection of property depends
more on the racial identity of the property owner, rather than the abstract
elements of property law.
LatCrit scholars can usefully follow Professor Luna's lead in many
directions, for example, by comparing the way abstract legal principles
requiring just compensation in instances of expropriation have been
applied when the expropriated are foreign direct investors in third world
countries as compared to indigenous peoples separated from their communal lands and livelihoods by forced relocation.29 Indeed, once the

search for commonalities leads us to center the interpretation of property
rights regimes in our critical analysis of white supremacy, a whole range

of familiar questions are rendered all the more compelling: we might
ask not only how relations of subordination have been historically constructed through the differential legal protection afforded white property
owners as compared to non-white property owners, but might also begin
to develop a critical analysis of the way some economic interests are
accorded the legal status of a property right, while others are not.3 °
Investment Chapter And Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259 (1994) (providing critical analysis of First/Third World battles over
scope of duty to compensate expropriation).
29. See, e.g., Jose E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade
Agreement's Investment Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 303 (1996-97) (critical
analysis of investor rights regime established by NAFTA reveals how economic and political
interests of privileged are given priority of over economic and political rights of poor); Keith
Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, And Biopiracy in The (Not-So-Brave) New World
Orderof InternationalIntellectual PropertyProtection,6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11 (1998)
(new wave expropriation of indigenous peoples through "biocolonialism"); Iglesias, International
Economic Law, supra note 15, at 386 (noting that the rights of property so centrally featured in the
Cuban Liberty and Democracy Act are not equally respected when the property rights at issue are
the rights of indigenous peoples displaced from their communal lands without just compensation).
30. For an analysis calling for critical legal scholarship that centers the legal structures of
political economy in the analysis of white supremacy, see Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Out of the
Shadow: Marking Intersections In and Between Asian Pacific American Critical Legal
Scholarshipand Latinalo CriticalTheory, 40 B.C. L. REV. 349; 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 349
(1998) [hereinafter Iglesias, Out of the Shadow]. To this end, a critical comparative analysis of
the way economic interests have/not been recognized as property rights across different sociolegal
contexts might provide significant insights in developing an anti-essentialist anti-subordination
analysis of the legal structure of American political economy. Compare, Reich, supra note 26
(recounting the doctrinal manipulations that integrated subsurface mineral rights into ownership of
surface lands), with Local 1330 United Steel Workers of America v. United States Steel Corp.,
631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir.1980) (refusing to recognize community property rights as basis for
enjoining management to sell factory it had decided to close despite evidence of profitability, and
devastating impact of closure on community that had assisted company with public subsidies and
other "giveback").
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BEYOND A DISCOURSE OF

ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE

Professor Luna's comparative analysis also provides important
insights into the way the search for commonalities through inter-group
comparisons can expand the opportunities for intergroup identification
and solidarity. For example, Taney's reasoning denied Dred Scott U.S.
citizenship on the grounds that he was Black and that Blacks were so
inherently inferior that they could never constitute a part of "the people
of the United States. 31 It is not hard to see how the brutal racism of this
decision might easily be configured around a discourse of fundamental
and irreconcilable difference. 32 Such a discourse would, however, offer
very little room for comparative projects of the sort Professor Luna has
forwarded here because, in a discourse of absolute difference, the only
thing that matters is that there is a fundamental difference between losing one's property through theft, corruption and racial bias and being
altogether denied the self-possession of one's own body and mind, one's
labor and sexuality.33 A discourse of absolute difference destabilizes
the search for intergroup commonalities, or rather rejects the project out
of hand. In this discourse, Black and Chicana/o histories are positioned
within a hierarchy of dispossession, with one group cast as "more dispossessed" than the other. Indeed, the experience of African American
slavery is cast as so profoundly unbridgeable - an abyss so separate
and apart from the experiences of Chicanas/os in the ceded territories that there is no meaningful point of reference or departure for constructing a common identity or forging a common agenda around these different histories of dispossession. The wrongs can never be compared;
therefore the boundaries of difference can never be traversed, and intergroup solidarity is that much more ephemeral.3 4
By contrast, in juxtaposing the Dred Scott decision to the Mexican
land title cases, Professor Luna challenges LatCrit scholars to seek the
commonalities of oppression without collapsing these two distinct histories into one false norm.35 The payoff is a new perspective on the way
31. Luna, Complexities of Race, supra note 20, at 710.
32. See CLAUD ANDERSON, BLACK LABOR, WHITE WEALTH: TFE SEARCH FOR POWER AND
ECONOMIC JUSTICE (1994).
33. See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, Racism and Patriarchyin the Meaning of Motherhood, I AM.
U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 7-10 (1993) (recounting brutality of slave system); see also Sumi K. Cho,
Multiple Consciousness and the Diversity Dilemma, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 1035, n.103 (1997)
(arguing for a unified racial critique of white supremacy based on commonalities in the racial
trauma of slavery visited upon indigenous peoples and Blacks).
34. See Angela P. Harris & Leslie Espinoza, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby: LatCrit
Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REv 1585; l0 LA RAZA 499 (1997) (exploring the
tensions between the rhetoric of Black exceptionalism and multiracial coalitions).
35. Luna, Complexities of Race, supra note 20.
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law is implicated in the present day configuration of white supremacy.
Read through the discourse of Black exceptionalism, Dred Scott is about
slavery - a form of oppression uniquely experienced by Blacks in this
country. Being about slavery, the decision is dead precedent, thoroughly
discredited and consigned to historical infamy. Read, by contrast,
through a discourse of common oppression, Dred Scott is about the configuration of state power around a citizen/non-citizen dichotomy.
Indeed, the language Professor Luna quotes from the Dred Scott opinion
makes it abundantly clear that the decision not only denied free Blacks
citizenship, but in doing so, transfigured a representative government of
limited powers into an imperial state. This is because the constitutional
framework of government underpinning the Dred Scott decision reveals
a state that claims the power to govern, without any legal limitations, 36a
class of persons whose interests it does not even pretend to represent.
These persons are the non-citizens, who do not constitute part of "the
people of the United States," do not "hold the power," do not "conduct
the government through their representatives," and therefore do not
"enjoy the rights and privileges" that the constitution secures only to its
citizens.37 Unlike slavery, the forms of oppression that have been organized around the citizen/non-citizen dichotomy and effectuated through
the exercise of imperial power, both domestically and internationally,
are common to many, including Blacks who have never been enslaved.38
36. See Ediberto Romin, The Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S.
Colonialism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1998); Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of
American Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225 (1996).
37. Luna, Complexities of Race, supra note 20, at 713, quoting Dred Scott opinion:
The words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are synonymous terms, and
mean the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our
republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct
the Government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the
"sovereign people," and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent
member of this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class of persons
described in the plea in abatement compose a portion of this people, and are
constituent members of this sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are
not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizen' in the
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the
contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of
beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated
or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but
such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them.
Id.
38. For example, a discourse of common oppression might reveal otherwise invisible
interconnections in the denial of political rights to non-citizens and the felony disenfranchisement
laws that operate defacto to construct many Blacks as non-citizens. Compare Nora V. Demleitner,
The Fallacy of Social "Citizenship," or The Threat of Exclusion, 12 GEO. IMMIcR. L. J. 35 (1997)
(arguing that permanent residents have a compelling claim to political representation and
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Read through this discourse, the reasoning of Dred Scott is still alive and
well in the present day configuration of white supremacy. Its present
day target is no longer the Black American, as such, but the foreign,3 9

the poor,40 and those who are cast as "national security" threats.41
TOWARD AN ETHIC AND POLITICS OF INTERGROUP COMPARISONS

By juxtaposing the struggles of Blacks and Chicanas/os across
these two very different sociolegal contexts, Professor Luna demon-

strates the potential value of inter-group comparisons. These comparisons reveal the kinds of structural interconnections that can help LatCrit
scholars articulate a common agenda despite the different histories of
dispossession. At the same time, she also recognizes that inter-group

comparisons can be dangerous. She is therefore, careful to disclaim any
essentialistic intent "to collapse the histories of people of color into one

false norm." Instead, her stated purpose is "to demonstrate how law
from one historical period established the[ ] subordinate status [of these
two different groups]." 42 For this reason, Professor Luna's essay provides a valuable point of departure for reflecting on the ethics and politics of intergroup comparisons.
participation), with Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal
Disenfranchisementof Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727 (1998) (noting that "[o]f a
total voting age population of 10.4 million Black men in the United States, approximately 1.46
million have been disqualified from voting because of a felony conviction. Of these, 950,000 are
in prison, on probation, or parole, and more than 500,000 are permanently barred by convictions
in the 13 states that disenfranchise prisoners for life.").
39. Thus, for example, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 1092, 110 S. Ct. 1839
(1990), the present-day court reasoned that the 4th Amendment did not apply extraterritorially to
U.S. enforcement activities taken abroad against non-U.S. citizens because the latter did not
constitute part of "the people" protected by the Constitution. Though the majority at no time cited
the Dred Scott decision, its reasoning reveals the legacy of Dred Scott: a discursive order that can
be readily reactivated to consolidate an imperial state. Because noncitizens are not part of "the
people," they can, at any moment, be made the objects of unlimited state power.
40. Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), illustrates another way the "dead hand" of the Dred
Scott decision reaches into present day legal controversies. In Saenz, a majority of the Supreme
Court struck down a California statue imposing durational residency requirement by limiting
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) benefits through the recipients' first year of
residence on the grounds it violated 14' Amendment right to travel. In dissent, Clarence Thomas
cites the Dred Scott decision to support his contention that the rights and privileges of U.S.
citizenship do not include welfare rights. Id. Cf Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of
Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L. REV. 1563 (1996) (exploring the implications of racism through
analysis linking welfare rights to a substantive vision of social citizenship).
41. See Gil Gott, A Tale of New Precedents: Japanese-American Internment As Foreign
Affairs Law, 40 B.C. L. REV. 179; 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 179 (1998) (arguing national
security ideology legitimates deployment of imperial power to enforce white supremacy both
within and beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States); Natsu Taylor Saito, Justice
Held Hostage: U.S. Disregardfor InternationalLaw in the World War I1 Internment of Japanese
Peruvians- A Case Study, 40 B.C. L. REV. 275; 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 275 (1998) (same).
42. Luna, Complexities of Race, supra note 20, at 711.
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The key objective, viewed through a LatCrit normativity, is to
ensure that our inter-group comparisons are performed in ways that promote the commitments and alliances that strengthen a community of solidarity. Indeed, my point is even more dramatic. Not only can different
group histories and lived realities be compared in many different ways,
but it is precisely for this reason that the value of any comparison turns
on the kind of collective identifications and inter-group alliances such
comparisons engender. Comparisons that undermine the possibilities for
anti-essentialist solidarity and derail the anti-subordination imperatives
of our theory and praxis ought to be rejected outright precisely because
they are not true in any way that matters. Conversely, comparisons that
promote these objectives ought to be embraced for further exploration
and centered in our collaborative projects.4 3
If this position seems to play fast and loose with inherited notions
of "historical truth," that too is untrue - in any way that matters. On
the contrary, this position simply attaches a political imperative to the
interpretative choices we make in telling our histories and comparing
our subordinations. One happy truth of our otherwise decidedly unhappy
era is that the once-upon-a-time illusion of a unitary history has been ohso utterly destabilized by a proliferation of our discourses and perspectives. Rather than bemoaning the fact that as finite social beings, we
each access history, like any other reality, through the contingencies of
discursive orders that are always in flux, 4" LatCrit scholars need to
understand this discursive flux - and the multiplicity of perspectives it
generates - as precisely the reason why the histories we should tell are
the histories of the future we are determined to create together.4 5
43. See Iglesias, Out of the Shadow, supra note 30 (calling for more collaborative projects
organized self-consciously around the exploration and comparison of particular histories). These
kinds of comparisons show us commonalities even as they challenge us to confront and overcome
our internal racisms, sexisms, etc. They do not constitute a war of positions because the point is
not to establish which group is more oppressed, but to understand how they are/were oppressed in
order to change the way we are in community.
44. See DAvID HARLAN, THE DEGRADATION OF HISTORY at xx-xxii (1997). Lamenting the
impact of postmodern thought on historical practice, Harlan asks "What now becomes of the
"historical fact," once so firmly embedded in its proper historical context - firmly embedded
rightly perceived, and correctly interpreted from a single immediately obvious and obviously
appropriate perspective? The overwhelming abundance of possible contexts and perspectives, the
ease with which we can skip from one to another, and the lack of any overarching metaperspective
from which to evaluate the entire coagulated but wildly proliferating population of perspectives all this means that the historical fact, once the historian's basic atomic unit, has jumped its orbit
and can now be interpreted in any number of contexts, from a virtually unlimited range of
perspectives. And if the historical fact no longer comes embedded in the natural order of things
... then what happens to the historian's hope of acquiring stable, reliable, objective interpretations
of the past? Id. at xx.
45. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Latinos, Blacks, Others & The New Legal Narative, 2
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 479 (1997); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, The Inter-Subjectivity of Objective
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Attorney Cheryl Little's essay provides a valuable counterpoint.
Her essay is based on years of committed advocacy on behalf of Haitian
refugees. Hers is a story of an uphill battle on behalf of a vulnerable and
disdained minority. Her point of departure is a critical analysis of
NACARA, otherwise known as the Victims of Communism Relief
Act.4 6 This immigration legislation provides substantial immigration
relief for nationals of Nicaragua, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, the
former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Haitians are noticeably
missing. Attorney Cheryl Little links their absence to a historical pattern
of discrimination and exclusion, dating back to the initial wave of Haitian refugees fleeing the right wing brutality of the Duvalier regime and
continuing through a series of instances in which Haitians have been
singled out for differential treatment. This differential treatment is all the
starker when juxtaposed against the treatment accorded Cuban refugees.
Though both groups came to the United States fleeing dictatorship in
their countries of origin, Haitians fleeing the political repression of the
Duvalier regime received a very different reception than Cubans fleeing
Castro in the freedom flotillas of the 1960s. This differential treatment
has also generated significant intergroup tension and unrest. Haitians,
subject to indefinite detention at Krome, have engaged in hunger strikes
to protest the double standard that keeps them imprisoned, even as
Cuban hijackers have been promptly released upon arrival in Florida.
Haitians, intercepted at sea, have been repatriated to Haiti despite their
claims of well-founded fear of persecution, while Cubans, rescued by
the Coast Guard, have been flown to Miami and paroled into the community. Attorney Little sums up the differential treatment like this:
In many ways, immigration practices toward Cubans and Haitians
have represented the extremes of United States policy. While immi-

gration policy toward Cubans tends to be generous and humanitarian,
even with recent repatriation, immigration policy toward Haitians
tends to be stringent and inhumane.47
Because so much of Attorney Little's argument is organized around
a juxtaposition of Haitian and Cuban refugee experiences, her essay provides an appropriate moment to reflect anew and with greater precision
on the political implications of the way intergroup comparisons are
Justice: A Theory and Praxisfor Constructing LatCrit Coalitions, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 467
(1997); George Martinez, African-Americans, Latinos, and the Construction of Race: Toward an
Epistemic Coalition, 19 CHICANo-LATINO L. REV. 213 (1998).

46. Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), Pub. L. No. 105100, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997). NACARA is part of the Fiscal Year 1998 appropriations bill for the
District of Columbia (H.R. 2607).
47. Little, supra note 20, at 732. The interdiction, detention and parole policies aptly call
attention to the disparities in our treatment of Cuban and Haitian refugees.
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articulated in LatCrit theory. It enables us to move from abstract discussions of the normative aspirations and commitments that ought to inform
the practice of intergroup comparisons to the more difficult task of articulating a methodology for assessing such comparisons from a LatCrit
perspective. The first step is to recognize that intergroup comparisons
impact the formation of collective solidarities and political alignments
by structuring the perception of similarities and differences within and
between the varied and various groups that might potentially coalesce
around any particular political project - in this case the politics of refugee policy. Comparing comparisons means assessing the way different
intergroup comparisons tend to structure different political alignments
and subjecting these alternative political alignments to anti-essentialist
critical analysis informed by LatCrit commitments to anti-subordination
politics.4 8
Applying this methodology, it is worth noting that unlike Professor
Luna, whose effort is to reveal suppressed commonalities in the legal
construction of Black and Chicano subordination, Attorney Little's narrative account is organized around a discourse of absolute difference that
emphasizes the uniqueness of the Haitian refugee experience by contrasting it to the experience of Cuban refugees. In doing so, her narrative marks the lines of similarity and difference along a racial schemata
that casts Cuban refugees as racially white and Haitian refugees as
racially Black. This racial dichotomization, though profoundly essentialized, may nevertheless further some anti-essentialist political realignments at least insofar as it destablizes discourses used to pit domestic
minorities against recent immigrants. Black Americans, in particular,
have often been cast as the group most directly and negatively affected
by the influx of immigrants.4 9 Reading the treatment of Haitian refugees
through a discourse that links their differential treatment to the fact that
a large majority of Haitians are Black can be an effective way of combating the articulation of anti-immigrant politics among Black Americans. By showing how Haitian refugees have been singled out for
particularly restrictive immigration exclusion, the discourse of absolute
48. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 32 (complaining that immigrants are assisted at the

expense of Black Americans); Toni Morrison, On the Backs of Blacks, in

ARGUING IMMIGRATION

98 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994) (arguing that hatred of Blacks is a central step in the
"Americanization" of immigrants so that "the move into mainstream America always means
buying into the notion of American Blacks as the real aliens"); Juan Perea, The Black/White

Binary Paradigm of Race, in

THE LATINO/A CONDITION:

A

CRITICAL READER

365 (Richard

Delgado & Jean Stefanic eds., 1998) (quoting Morrison and acknowledging that Latinas/os
participate in this paradigm of "Americanization" by engaging in racism against Blacks or darkerskinned members of the Latino/a community" but noting that "[c]urrent [anti-immigrant] events
...belie Morrison's notion of American Blacks as "the real aliens").
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difference makes a clear link between exclusionary immigration policies
and domestic racism. The domestic anti-racist agenda is thereby challenged to become more inclusive precisely because a politics of racial
justice cannot ignore the differential oppression and exclusion of Black
immigrants without invoking and/or activating a particularly problematic form of intra-Black hierarchy that privileges Black Americans over
Black immigrant refugees. Thus, reading the Haitian immigration experience through the discourse of absolute difference may help expand and
consolidate a pro-immigrant political coalition by foregrounding a perspective from which achieving justice for immigrants can be seen as a
part of a broader struggle for racial justice in this country.
Although Attorney Little's discourse of absolute difference may
help redefine the treatment of Haitian refugees as a matter of racial justice, the pro-immigrant political realignments fostered by this discourse
can become truncated in two important respects. First, Haitians are not
the only racialized immigrant group that has been treated unfairly and
restrictively by U.S. immigration policy, and Black Americans are not
the only domestically subordinated group that have cast themselves as
particularly victimized by immigrant entry."0 The discourse of absolute
difference can truncate the coalitional solidarity that might otherwise be
organized around these intergroup commonalities precisely because its
account of racial injustice is based on the claim that harsh treatment
received by other immigrant groups pales in comparison to the treatment
Haitian refugees have received because they are Black. Rather than fostering a comprehensive and inclusive political agenda in opposition to
racist immigration policies based on the substantive merits of each
group's particular claims of injustice, intergroup comparisons articulated
through a discourse of absolute difference tend to provoke intergroup
competition over which group has received the harshest treatment.
Equally important, articulating a discourse of absolute difference
forces Attorney Little to overlook intergroup commonalities and emphasize intergroup differences in ways that suppress other significant
dimensions of U.S. refugee policy. While refugees from Cuba, Haiti,
Guatemala and El Salvador have come to this country seeking refuge
from dictatorship and persecution in their countries of origin, in Attorney Little's account, the totalitarian repression experienced in Cuba is
reduced to the "relatively mild mistreatment of Cubans in their homeland (which results in a grant of asylum), while gross mistreatment of

50. See Kevin R. Johnson, Some Thoughts on the Future of Latino Legal Scholarship, 2
L. REV. 101 (1997) [hereinafter Johnson, Latino Legal Scholarship] (discussing

HARV. LATINo

Chicano perceptions of Mexican immigrants).

1999]

FOREWORD

Haitians does not."'' 5 This juxtaposition helps articulate a discourse of
racial difference, but only by minimizing the degree of repression in
communist Cuba and suppressing the fact that, Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees, who like Haitians experienced gross mistreatment and
death squad activities in their countries of origin, also have been routinely denied political asylum.52 These facts do not fit neatly into a discourse of absolute difference because the totalitarian repression in Cuba,
like the systematic denial of political asylum to Guatemalan and Salvadoran refugees, both suggest factors other than race are operative in the
differential treatment of Cuban and Haitian refugees. These other variables include the articulation of U.S. national security ideology, 3 the
doctrinal structure of U.S. refugee law, particularly its economic/political dichotomy, which justifies the exclusion of "economic refugees"
even as the indeterminacy of the dichotomy renders every racialized
immigrant group vulnerable to exclusion regardless of the objective
merits of their claim to political asylum, and the unsettled controversy
over the conditions and principles that justify international intervention
in the "internal affairs" of repressive regimes.54
To be sure, Attorney Little's narrative account notes these variables, but only in passing. Her objective is to center the reality of racial
discrimination in the way we understand the politics of refugee policy,
and in this respect, she is entirely successful. Her compelling narrative
leaves no doubt that eliminating racial discrimination from U.S. refugee
policy is a compelling objective; nevertheless, her narrative does trigger
doubts as to whether the kinds of intergroup coalitions needed to
advance this objective are likely to coalesce around a political agenda
defined by a discourse of absolute difference, particularly if this discourse is articulated through intergroup comparisons that minimize the
substantive claims of justice of one group in order to buttress claims of
discrimination made by another group. The challenge is to move
beyond these kinds of intergroup comparisons. The question is how.
51. Little, supra note 20, at 734.
52. See Ari Weitzhandler, Temporary ProtectedStatus: The CongressionalResponse to the
Plight of Salvadoran Aliens, 64 U. CoLo. L. REv. 249, 252 ("Two factors contributed
significantly to the denial rate: the characterization of Salvadoran nationals as economic
immigrants, and the Reagan and Bush Administrations' foreign policies toward El Salvador.");
Note, Political Legitimacy in the Law of Political Asylum, 99 HARV. L. REV. 450, 458-64 (1985)
(the political dimensions of economic conditions).
53. Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, The Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological
Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST.
MARY'S L. J. 833 (1997).
54. Cuban-American leaders in Miami have long called for the kind of intervention in Cuba
that was undertaken to dislodge the Haitian military dictatorship that overthrew President Aristide.
For statistics on the percentage of Miami Cubans who support military interventions of different
sorts in Cuba, see <http://www.fiu.edu/orgs/ipor/cubapoll/index.html>.
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The answer is to articulate a broader perspective from which the particular experiences and various claims of different groups can be seen as
part of a common struggle for justice.
A moment's reflection on the variables marginalized by Attorney
Little's narrative account may provide some direction. These variables
give reason to doubt whether a political agenda defined by the objective
of eliminating racial discrimination from U.S. refugee policy would be
enough to achieve justice for Haitian refugees - even as they suggest a
variety of perspectives from which all refugees inhabit a common context of struggle. All refugees, including Haitians, inhabit a world in
which U.S. policy responses to human rights violations, both at home
and abroad, are filtered through an aggressive and self-serving national
security ideology, 5 in which restrictions on mobility and exclusionary
policies can be directed with legal impunity at the world's poorest peoples, and in which the international community has not yet developed
the legal norms and enforcement mechanisms to empower and protect
peoples against the repression and abuses of internal elites. 6 Reading
the differential treatment of Cuban and Haitian refugees through these
variables, rather than the discourse of absolute difference, would activate
very different political agendas and foster very different intergroup
coalitions precisely because these variables link the critical analysis of
U.S. refugee policy to a critical analysis of the U.S. imperial state, the
production of poverty in the international political economy, and the
failures of the interstate system of sovereign nations to sustain a world
order based on respect for international human rights. These dimensions of domestic and international law and politics bear directly on the
project of achieving substantive justice for Haitian refugees; however,
their transformation implicates a fundamental reconfiguration of power
relations and requires a discourse of mutual recognition and intergroup
respect, not of absolute difference articulated through intergroup comparisons that minimize the substantive claims of one group to enhance
those of another.
SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE: BEYOND INTEREST CONVERGENCE

At the same time, the essay by Attorney Little effectively fore55. Gott, supra note 41.
56. For a substantive vision of the way the international legal order might mediate the relation
between the sovereignty of states and the self-determination of peoples, see Henry J. Richardson,
III, "Failed States," Self- Determination and Preventive Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia and
Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L. J. 1, 75 (1996) (revealing irrationality and

offering alternatives to international legal doctrines designed to uphold concept of sovereignty by
ignoring claims of liberation movements within nation-states until they "earn" such recognition

through successful military actions- thus constituting civil war as only recourse).
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grounds the difficulties of translating abstract assertions of intergroup
commonalities into a practical politics of coalitional justice. In Attorney
Little's narrative, the noticeable exclusion of Haitian refugees from the
amnesties enacted by NACARA is significant, not only because it is
linked to and informed by a long history of differential and discriminatory treatment towards Haitians, but because it represents an intergroup
political betrayal in the corridors of Congress. Though a bipartisan and
intergroup coalition, including leaders of the Black and Hispanic Congressional Caucuses, has been coalescing in response to growing community opposition to the continued and blatantly discriminatory
exclusion of Haitians, Haitians still lack the political representation and
committed advocacy other immigrant groups enjoy. The fact that
Republican members of Congress supporting NACARA were willing
and able to perform a so-called "jihad" for the benefit of Nicaraguan, but
not Haitian, refugees raises profound questions about the practice of
coalitional politics,57 particularly in light of another part of the story.
Confronted with assertions that including Haitians in NACARA would
kill the bill, Haitian advocates might, nevertheless, have decided to press
the point. They might, in effect, have chosen to perform their own
"jihad"on behalf of the excluded Haitians. According to Attorney Little,
they did not. 8 As a result, thousands of refugees and immigrants from
Nicaragua, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, the former Soviet Union and
Warsaw pact countries are enjoying the benefits of NACARA, leaving
Haitians to wonder whether their self-restraint and self-sacrifice in this
instance will be remembered and reciprocated in the next.
Told as a story of sell-outs and sacrifices, the story of NACARA
tracks a familiar problematic in the practice of coalitional politics.
Years ago, Professor Derek Bell gave us the theoretical framework for
understanding this problematic in the context of Black/White civil rights
coalitions. Professor Bell forwarded an "interest convergence" theory
of the way white people practice coalitional politics.59 In this practice,
intergroup unity and solidarity are grounded, not in any commitment to
objective justice nor in any substantive vision of inter-racial equality,
but rather in the contingencies of converging group interests. Inter-racial
57. According to Attorney Little, "Nicaraguan activists have said that Republican members of
Congress carried out a jihad in obtaining legal status for them. They didn't do that for Haitians
and others excluded and punished by the new law." Let's hope they do that now. Little, supra
note 20, at 741.
58. Attorney Little notes that when it became apparent that there was a powerful effort to
exclude Haitians in the legislation, "NACARA's architects maintained that if the Haitians were
included the bill would die, and supporters of the Haitians in Congress agreed to permit the
Central American refugee relief legislation to move forward without including them." Id. at 740.
59. Derek Bell, Brown v. Board of Education & the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93
HARv. L. REV. 518 (1980).
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civil rights coalitions were viable only so long as white people saw their
own particular self-defined group interests furthered by supporting
Black civil rights struggles. The much discussed collapse of the civil
rights coalition, and increasing reactionary retrenchment aimed at
affirmative action policies, minority business set-asides, entitlements
programs, read against the backdrop of economic problems, provide
ample evidence in support of Professor Bell's initial thesis. 6 °
Attorney Little's narrative reveals the way Haitian refugees were
cast as politically expendable in the coalitional politics that achieved the
enactment of NACARA. It thus raises the significant question whether
minority groups, their political representatives and legal advocates are
destined to replay the interest convergence politics through which the
white majority has strategically maintained its privileges. It challenges
LatCrit theory, in particular, to struggle with the problem of articulating
a more meaningful foundation for our coalitional theory and praxis.61
Can we move the practice of intergroup coalitional politics beyond the
pseudo solidarity and fleeting alliances of contingent convergence of
interests? Of course, this question, itself, presupposes a level of perceived commonality that may have yet to be imagined in the local politics of South Florida.
In this context, the question asked by Attorney Lyra Logan in her
essay in this symposium is whether Black and Cuban-American legislators, and the communities they purport to represent, can set aside their
differences to establish common cause.6 2 She believes they can, and this

belief is based on her experiences directing Florida's Minority Participation in Legal Education Program. The MPLE is a statewide, state-funded
affirmative action program designed to increase minority participation in
legal education through annual funding of scholarships for 200 minority
law school students and 134 undergraduate pre-law students. Attorney
Logan's express purpose in recounting the history of the MPLE Program
is to reflect critically on the conditions that enabled Black and Cuban60. See John A. Powell, An Agenda for the Post-Civil Rights Era, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 889
(1995) (linking disorganization of civil rights movement among other things to rise of colorblind
ideology); Michael J. Klasman, Brown, Racial Change and The Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L.
REV. 7 (1994) (recounting history); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and
Political Lawyering in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 821 (1997) (suggesting

strategies for meaningful revival of civil rights agenda).
61. Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 2; Berta Esperanza Hemindez-Truyol, Building Bridges:
Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads, in THE LATINO/A CONDITION, supra note 49, at 24, 30-31

[hereinafter Hemndez-Truyol, Building Bridges] (explaining the many ways Latinas/os can tap
the experience of intersectionality and multidimensionality to build bridges across differences

both within Latina/o communities and between Latina/o and other minority communities); Eric K.
Yamamoto, Conflict and Complicity: Justice Among Communities of Color, 2 HARV. LATINO L.
REV. 495 (1997).
62. Logan, supra note 20, at 743.
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American state legislators to transcend a politically partisan and racially
divisive competition over the creation and location of "a minority law
school" in Florida to develop the intergroup, bi-partisan coalition that
succeeded in enacting the MPLE Program.
Attorney Logan explains that the MPLE program was proposed by
Florida's State University System as an alternative to competing proposals to establish a new law school at Florida International University
(FIU), which is 50% Hispanic and 11% Black, or to reopen a law school
at the historically Black Florida A&M University (FAMU). FAMU's
all-Black law school was closed by Florida's all white legislature in
1965 in order to open another white law school at Florida State University. The decision was purportedly made to enable Florida to meet an
expected increase in the demand for lawyers, since FAMU's law school
was reportedly failing to graduate sufficient numbers of lawyers that
would later be admitted to the Florida Bar. The recent controversy over
whether a new law school should be located at FIU, a proposal favored
by Florida's Cuban legislators, or reopened at FAMU, the alternative
supported by Florida's Black legislators, was sparked by various reports
indicating that minorities are seriously under-represented throughout the
legal profession in Florida. Indeed, in 1990, the Florida Supreme Court
Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission concluded that a critical
shortage of minority law students, attorneys and judges was a major factor contributing to the denial of equal justice for minorities in the State.
According to Attorney Logan, the MPLE program aptly illustrates
the value of intergroup coalitions. The proposal to establish the scholarship program was introduced in 1994 by a Black representative in the
House and a Latino Senator, as a bi-partisan, biracial compromise bill.
This bi-partisan, bi-racial support has enabled the program to survive the
transfer of power between Democrats and Republicans in the various
elections since 1994. Rather than continuing a partisan and racially divisive competition for a law school that the State had no intention of funding, the Black and Hispanic legislators were able to put aside their
differences and find common cause in a program that would help both
groups achieve the objective of increased minority participation in legal
education and the legal profession.
The problem is that, as her account indicates, this successful coalitional initiative is a case study in interest-convergence politics. Indeed,
the success of the coalition was grounded in the contingencies of the
moment, most particularly on the fact that the State could not justify
giving either group the law school it wanted. If the State had decided to
give a school to one group, this bi-racial, bi-partisan coalition would
never have coalesced. Because the State did not, the two groups had to
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cooperate or walk away with nothing. This coalition is, however, fragile
and unstable. Each group still wants "its own" law school, and both FlU
and FAMU have indicated that a law school is among their top priorities
for 1998-2003. The stakes are as daunting as the coalition is fragile. As
Attorney Logan observes, "[i]f that battle reheats and intensifies,
chances for future alliances on any issue will become more and more
remote. Also, if one group gets a school, the other group may well find
its under-representation left inadequately addressed.

63

The fragility of

this coalition is directly attributable to the fact that it is based on a contingent convergence of interests, rather than a substantive vision of and
commitment to intergroup social and racial justice. Thus, while Attorney
Lyra Logan views the MPLE as evidence of progress in intergroup coalitional politics, a LatCrit sensitivity must demand more from both
groups.
At a minimum, a substantive vision of intergroup justice would
eschew any political move to cast the problem of equal justice as a simple matter of increasing the number of Blacks and Latinas/os enrolled in
Florida law schools or admitted to the Florida Bar, particularly when
number-counting can operate to pit Blacks and Latinas/os against each
other in a zero-sum competition. From the perspective of the Black and
Latina/o residents of Florida seeking equal justice and affordable legal
services, the crucial question is not who is going to control any proposed
minority law school, nor how many Blacks and Latinas/os are admitted
to the Bar, but how that control will be exercised and whether those
attorneys will be trained, committed and enabled to practice law for
social, racial, and ethnic justice.
The current structure of the legal profession in Florida, as in many
places, is hardwired for inequality and injustice.64 Despite the supposed
over-supply of lawyers in South Florida, low and middle income individuals and families, as well as many small businesses, are literally
priced out of the market for private legal services to such a degree that
their legal needs go unattended or they resort to pro se representation.65
State supported legal services for the poor are grossly underfunded.66
63. Id. at 747.
64. See Where the Injured Fly for Justice, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF FLORIDA'S
Part I (Dec. 11, 1990); see

SUPREME COURT RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMMISSION,

generally JEROLD

S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN

AMERICA (1976).

65. In 1998, the problems caused by the high number of pro-se litigants in family court
prompted the Florida Supreme Court to approve a family law self-help program. See Court
Approves Family Law Self-help Centers, FLA. BAR NEWS, Dec. 15, 1998, at 5. The problem,
however, remains. See, e.g., Jan Pudlow, Court Asks Family Law Section to Turn Attention to Pro
Se Problem, FLA. BAR NEWS, AUG. 15, 1999 , at 17.
66. See, e.g., Talbot D'Alemberte, Tributaries of Justice: The Search For Full Access, 73-
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Recent law school graduates inspired by a vision of social justice and a
desire to practice law in the public interest are hard-pressed finding any
public interest jobs, and certainly any that pay a living wage after
accounting for law school loan repayment obligations.67
Rather than empowering minority students to become effective
advocates on behalf of the poor and the marginalized or even to achieve
individual fulfillment through personally meaningful work, many minority students experience their legal education as a socialization process
that numbs their sense of justice, subjects them to relentless microaggression, triggers profound identity crises, ignites their appetites for status and money, distances them from the communities they initially
wanted to help and, if they are successful by mainstream standards, condemns them to slave away for years at any job that allows them to repay
their student loans, while they take solace in the fact they are making
more money than they have the free time to spend. 68 Integrating minorities into this pre-existing status quo without serious attention and proactive efforts to reform the way legal education, the legal profession and
the delivery of legal services are currently structured may provide Black
and Latina/o students with a well-deserved opportunity for individual
advancement through professional education, but it will not in and of
itself ensure that low and middle income Blacks and Latinas/os, not to
mention the poor of any race, will enjoy equal justice, nor that these new
attorneys will be ready and able to practice law for social justice.
Clearly, the MPLE program is a remarkable feat in an era of backlash and retrenchment. The question that Attorney Logan's essay effectively raises for LatCrit theory and praxis is this: how can we use the
contingencies of interest convergence as a stepping stone toward, rather
than a restriction upon, the achievement of social justice. Both the civil
rights and the MPLE experiences show that coalitions based on interestconvergence can be put to good use, but those two experiences also
counsel LatCrits to transcend the limitations and fragilities of these straAPR FLA. B.J. 12, 14 (1999) (noting that after Republican Party took control of Congress in 1995,
Congressional funding of legal services for the poor dropped, in real dollars, to its lowest level
ever - 12% below what it was when Reagan took office in 1981).
67. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Foreword: Rationing Lawyers: Ethical And Professional
Issues in The Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1713
(1999); cf Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education And Entry Into The Legal
Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, And Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829 (1995)
(advocating scholarships rather than loan repayment assistance based on analysis linking public
interest career choices to factors other than debt burden).
68. Margaret E. Montoya, Masks and Resistance, in THE LATINO/A CONDITION, supra note
49, at 276; Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Under-Representation of Minorities in the Legal
Profession: A Critical Race Theorist's Perspective, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1005 (1997); Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School
And Law Practice,64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1991).
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tegic alliances. With this critical account of the MPLE experience,
Attorney Logan usefully reminds LatCrit scholars that our challenge is
to imagine and implement coalitions based on a vision of and commitment to substantive justice.
In this context, Attorney Coto's essay is a particularly instructive
counter-example. 6 9 Like many students of color, Attorney Coto experienced her Latina identity as a compelling source of empathy for and
commitment to the marginalized communities with whose struggles and
suffering she could in many ways identify. Unlike most law students,
however, Attorney Coto was able, with the help of an Echoing Green
Fellowship and the sponsorship of the Florida Immigrant Advocacy
Center, to translate her empathy into an innovative legal services project,
which she founded upon graduating from the University of Miami
School of Law in 1997. This project is called LUCHA. Its mission is to
serve battered immigrant women by providing critical legal assistance
under "VAWA," the Violence Against Women Act, a federal law that
makes the prevention of violence against women "a major law enforcement priority" and includes provisions enabling battered immigrant
women to self-petition for permanent resident status without the cooperation or participation of their abusive spouse. VAWA also provides suspension of deportation relief; however, without access to effective legal
services, the vast majority of battered immigrant women lack the information and resources necessary to obtain this relief. Like other immigrants, these women face barriers of language, culture and social
economic marginalization, but they face additional barriers because they
are trapped in relationships with men who abuse them and manipulate
their fears of deportation in order to exert power and maintain control.
The LUCHA project is especially noteworthy because it reflects a
self-conscious and self-critical effort to implement an alternative model
of legal services that is less focused on traditional litigation and more
focused on reducing the dependency and isolation that make battered
immigrant women so desperately vulnerable. While the traditional legal
services model constructs the client as passive beneficiary of the benefits secured and rights vindicated through the agency of the lawyer advocate, LUCHA seeks to relocate and inspire agency in and among the
battered immigrant women themselves. Formed as a grassroots membership organization, its strategy is to enable and promote self-determination by involving battered immigrant women in a larger community
where mutual engagement and assistance become the vehicles of individual empowerment. LUCHA members are eligible for free legal services on immigration matters; however, to become a LUCHA member,
69. Coto, supra note 20.
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women must take a six-part educational program and commit a portion
of their own time to assisting other women. The educational component
raises women's consciousness and provides them with necessary information on relevant topics in immigration law, workers' rights, domestic
violence, public benefits, victim's rights, community resources and lessons on how to be heard by government. The mutual assistance creates
community and organizes social networks otherwise disrupted by the
dislocations of the immigrant experience and the isolation of domestic
battery.
Despite its many strengths, the LUCHA project faces two significant sets of obstacles. The first is that the structure and philosophy of
LUCHA run counter to elitist attitudes that currently structure the delivery of legal services to the poor. The second is that the project is primarily supported by a terminal fellowship. These two obstacles
illustrate the difficulties or conundrums facing even the most creative
and entrepreneurial minority law students committed to doing public
interest work. On the one hand, their identification with their client
communities can make them highly critical of the way traditional legal
services operate and eager to innovate new approaches; on the other
hand, established legal services are resource strapped and hardly interested in, nor often able, to hire recent graduates to develop and implement untested innovations. As a result, even the most innovative
projects and ideas are increasingly dependent on terminal fellowships
and grants, making these projects fragile, unstable and vulnerable to sudden termination, even after tremendous efforts have been invested in
their success. The unsurprising result, too often, is a disillusioned disengagement and retreat to well-trodden paths of career development. Thus,
Attorney Coto's story reflects the range and structure of possibilities and
obstacles confronting recent law graduates determined to translate antisubordination theory into meaningful practice. The reforms needed to
alter this picture are systemic and profound - and attest to the fact that
a struggle to increase minority participation in legal education, unconnected to a project of systemic reform in the delivery of legal services to
disadvantaged communities, may fall short of the mark.
This is not to suggest that increasing minority participation in legal
education and the profession is not a compelling social justice objective.7" It is to say that the struggle to achieve equal justice for Blacks,
70. Enrique R. Carrasco, Collective Recognition as a Communitarian Device: Or, Of Course
We Want to Be Role Models!, 9 LA RAZA L. J. 81 (1996) (arguing that the project of radical
reform requires connected critics acting as role models within institutional contexts of legal
education and the profession where power is created and distributed); Phoebe A. Haddon, Keynote
Address: Redefining Our Roles in The Battle For Inclusion of People of Color in Legal
Education, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 709 (1997).
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Latinas/os and other marginalized groups in Florida requires more comprehensive reforms, reaching deep into the heart of legal education and
forward into the structure of the legal profession.7 1 These reforms can
barely be imagined, let alone achieved, without the kinds of sustained,

collaborative, bi-racial and bi-partisan alliances that the MPLE coalitional initiative conjures, but has not yet fully delivered. By this, I mean
alliances that are grounded in a substantive vision of justice and of the
role of law and legal education in effectuating that vision, rather than a

contingent convergence of interests among two factions that choose to
position themselves in a racially marked, politically partisan, zero-sum
competition for control of a non-existent law school at the expense of
the collaborative intergroup political alliances needed to achieve more

comprehensive and systemic reforms in the structure of legal education
and the organization of the legal profession - to the detriment of the
minority interests they purport to represent and, more generally, to the
cause of social, racial justice through law in this State.72
B.

Inside Outside: Mapping the Internal/ExternalDynamics
of Oppression

The second cluster of essays maps the dynamics of internal and
external oppression within Latina/o communities, even as it illustrates a
rich multiplicity of perspectives from which the theory and practice of

anti-subordination politics can be mapped around the inside/outside metaphor.73 Professor Padilla first activates the inside/outside metaphor by
focusing our attention on the phenomenon of internalized racism.
Acknowledging that Latina/o subordination is not just a function of
external oppression, but also of internal acquiescence in the negative
stereotypes that undermine individual self-confidence and destroy collective solidarity, challenges LatCrit scholars to theorize the relationship
71. See Eric K. Yamamoto, LatCrit III: Introduction to Plenary Session Four, 53 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 683 (1999) (discussing SALT Action Campaign); see also Phoebe A. Haddon, Education
for a Public Calling in the 21st Century, 69 WASH. L. REV. 573 (1994); Joan Howarth, Teaching
in the Shadow of the Bar, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 927 (1997).
72. More recently, minority legislators have reportedly put aside their differences and agreed
to sponsor a joint proposal to establish two new public law schools in Florida, one at FAMU and
the other at FIU. See Mark D. Killian, FAMU/FIU Join Forcesfor Law Schools, Fla. Bar News,
July 1, 1999, at 1. Only time will tell whether this marks the beginning of a more substantive
alliance based on mutual commitment to intergroup justice or just another variation on, and
instance of, the interest-convergence politics of the past.
73. Laura M. Padilla, Social and Legal Repercussions of Latinos' Colonized Mentality, 53 U.
MIAMI L. REV.
769 (1999); Abreu, supra note 17; Berta Hernndez-Truyol, Latina
Multidimensionality and LatCrit Possibilities: Culture, Gender, and Sex, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV.
811 (1999) [hereinafter Hemindez-Truyol, Culture, Gender, and Sex]; Siegfried Wiessner, iEsa
India! LatCrit Theory and the Place of Indigenous Peoples Within Latinalo Communities, 53 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 831 (1999); Roberts, BlackCrit Theory, supra note 8.
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between internal and external oppression, to familiarize ourselves with
the psychologies of liberation"4 and to put into practice the affirmation
of self that Professor Abreu's essay so effectively displays.
The four essays by Professors Abreu, Herndndez-Truyol, Wiessner
and Roberts in very different, though complementary and synergistic,
ways introduce a second problematic that is also usefully analyzed
through the heuristic lens of the inside/outside dichotomy. LatCrit theory has from the beginning sought to articulate an inclusive and multidimensional critical legal discourse, aimed at centering the previously
marginalized experiences of Latinas/os, even as it continuously aims
toward an ever more inclusive vision and practice of anti-subordination
politics and intergroup justice. The initial birth and current trajectory of
LatCrit theory has in some instances been celebrated as a natural outgrowth of the intersectionality and hybridity that characterizes Latina/o
identities. Latinas/os are said to be uniquely positioned to bridge the
hierarchical divisions of race, ethnicity, class, immigration status, linguistic marginality, gender and sexual orientation because Latina/o identity constitutes the intersection of all of these terms.7 5
It is by now, for example, a LatCrit mantra that Latinas/os come in
all races and colors: we are of African, Asian, European and Indian
heritage. "We speak Spanish, English, Spanglish, regional dialects and
indigenous tongues." 7 6 Latinas/os are, in this respect, a universal that
contains all particulars, and whose liberation is therefore intricately
intertwined and directly implicated in the liberation of all particulars. 77
Against this backdrop, Professor Abreu's reminder that LatCrits must
avoid essentializing our intersectionality sounds a helpful note of caution, even as Professor Hernndez-Truyol's account of the multiple
forms of subordination experienced by Latina lesbians within their own
communities, Professor Wiessner's emphasis on the oppression of indigenous peoples within every Latina/o community across the globe, and
Professor Robert's discussion of the particularities of Black experiences
and political identity, all challenge LatCrit scholars to examine how
Latinas/os construct insiders and outsiders within the very midst of
Latina/o communities. Our aim must be to avoid the practices and
74. See, e.g.,
NANCY CARO
AMERICA

IGNACIO MARTIN-BARO,

HOLLANDER,

(1997);

LOVE IN

GERALDINE

WRITINGS FOR A LIBERATION PSYCHOLOGY

A TIME

MOANE

&

JO

OF HATE:

LIBERATION

CAMPLING,

PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF OPPRESSION AND LIBERATION

GENDER

(1999); A

PSYCHOLOGY
AND

(1996);

IN LATIN

COLONIALISM:

A

GUIDE TO DYNAMICS OF

(Doris Howard ed., 1986).
75. Valdes, Under Construction, supra note 1, at 1106 (noting that Latina/o communities are
characterized by high degree of mestizaje or racial intermixture and internal diversity).
76. Hemindez-Truyol, Building Bridges, supra note 61, at 30.
77. Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 2, at 557; see also infra at pp. 622-29.
FEMINIST THERAPY
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assumptions that would replicate these insider/outsider configurations in
the articulation of LatCrit theory, the consolidation of the LatCrit community and the organization of LatCrit conferences.
INTERNALIZED OPPRESSION AND THE PROBLEMATICS
OF SELF-AFFIRMATION

By invoking the notion of internalized oppression, Professor
Padilla's essay offers a valuable point of reference from which to
explore the role of individual psychological and spiritual agency in the
process of anti-subordination liberation praxis. Read in tandem with
Professor Abreu's account of her experiences as a Cuban immigrant,
these two essays center the psychological processes through which outsider groups both participate in and transcend their own marginalization,
as well as the way individual experiences of inclusion and exclusion are
mediated by culturally specific narratives of identity and community.
As narratives of Latina/o group identity, these two essays project very
different accounts of the way the constitution of Latina/o identities is
experienced by members of different Latina/o groups.
Professor Padilla's essay calls Latinas/os to begin our anti-subordination theory and praxis by acknowledging the reality of internalized
racism in Latina/o communities, a phenomenon in which, according to
Professor Padilla, "'Mexicans internalize the Anything But Mexican'
mind set." For Professor Padilla, exposing instances of internalized
oppression is an important first step in any liberation struggle because
internalized racism is the primary reason why Latinas/os collaborate in
their own denigration, sabotage the opportunities and undermine the
positive efforts of other Latinas/os. She cites numerous examples: the
fact that significant numbers of Latinas/os in California voted to deny
immigrants access to many benefits they had previously enjoyed (Prop.
187), to end affirmative action in government contracting and public
colleges and universities (Prop. 209), and to end bilingual education
(Prop. 227). Latinas/os who have internalized the negative stereotypes
promulgated by the white majority are alienated both from themselves
and from each other. Thus, they experience even their substantial
achievements through the insecurity of an imposter and project their
self-doubts and self-hatred onto other Latinas/os.
Overcoming subordination requires overcoming this internalized
racism, and to this end, Professor Padilla offers numerous suggestions as
to how Latinas/os can develop more positive self-identities and more
empowered and empowering relations with other Latinas/os, both within
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and beyond the legal academy. 8 These practices have the common elements of collective solidarity, mutual assistance and sustained engagement in each other's struggles and aspirations - over time and across
the many different social, political and professional settings where
Latinas/os can make common cause in promoting each other's achievements and development - including LatCrit conferences.
Professor Abreu's essay, by contrast, offers a narrative in which
Cuban identity has been experienced as a source of pride, privilege and
unique opportunities. She describes her own experience of being Cuban
as an experience of being "where it was at." 9 Cuban identity most certainly marks a whole constellation of differences between her and the
Anglo majority, but in Professor Abreu's narrative, these differences are
experienced of a piece with the talent of a Luciano Pavarotti or the intellect of an Albert Einstein. "Difference," she notes, "is negative only
when it is constructed as such."8 ° Being Cuban never felt like a negative
thing, nor did she ever feel inferior because she was Cuban. This is not
to say that she never felt excluded, stereotyped or pressured to conform
to the roles and positions the majority culture allots to immigrants in
general and Latinas in particular. It does mean that these instances of
exclusion produced no permanent damage in her sense of self because
she, like many of the first and later waves of Cuban refugees, experienced their presence in this country as a temporary phenomenon triggered by the disruptions of the Cuban revolution. For many Cubans, the
memory of a privileged pre-revolutionary status in Cuba and the dream
of return, not to mention the human capital and economic resources
some Cubans were able to take into exile, provide the social psychological resources through which many in the Cuban-American and "AmeriCuban" community combat their "minoritization.'
These two essays provide a unique opportunity to explore the wide
range of discourses through which Latina/o identity is mapped across the
multiplicity of differences and similarities that constitute us as individuals marked by, or invested in, a Latina/o identity. Their focus is internal,
self-critical and self-reflective. Though they perform the project of constituting a Latina/o identity in very different ways, each does so undeniably from the inside of a discourse, consciousness and community that are
as internal to the Latina/o construct, as they are external to each other.
The differences are striking. Where Professor Padilla reflects now on
the broader significance of the fact she never dated any of the Chicanos
78. Padilla, supra note 73, at 779-84.
79. Abreu, supra note 17, at 794.
80. Id. at 800.
81. Id. (attributing the term minoritized to Celina Romany).
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with whom she went to college, Professor Abreu remembers dating only

Cuban boys in high school; where Professor Padilla speaks of Chicanas/
os distancing themselves from the Spanish language, Professor Abreu
recounts the concerted and assuredly draconian efforts through which
her parents ensured she would grow up bilingual; and where Professor

Padilla speaks of Chicana/o feelings of inferiority at the margins of a
dominant white society, Professor Abreu recounts the decidedly critical
perspective her Cuban upbringing gave her on Anglo culture -

a per-

spective that shielded her from ever feeling excluded by a society into
which she never wanted to assimilate.
Read in counterpoint, these two essays give substantive content to
the general observation that the way individuals and groups respond to
experiences of oppression and exclusion is both central to the development of personal and social agency and informed by the different cul-

tural narratives we internalize.8" They also demonstrate how the project
of Latina/o liberation implicates existential questions of universal significance, in this instance provoking a critical analysis of the relationship
between the internal experience of one's own agency and will to flourish
and the external structural constraints that might otherwise determine
our fate by consigning us to the margins.8 3 Poised between the discourses of free will and determinism, between the constraints of struc-

ture and the possibilities of agency, is a subtextual conflict between
those who construct Latina/o identity through a discourse of victimization and those who eschew any connection to a victim identity.84 Read
in counterpoint, the essays activate this tension because they challenge
LatCrit scholars to reconcile Professor Padilla's "reconstructive para82. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race and Representation: The Power of Discourse,
Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality,49 VAND. L. REV. 869, 878 n. 18
(1996) [hereinafter Iglesias, Rape, Race and Representation] (challenging the characterization of
male power in feminist theory as an inescapable force in women's lives by arguing that the
content and exercise of agency is guided more by the different cultural narratives we internalize
than by "the reality" of the world we inhabit).
83. See Iglesias, Structures of Subordination, supra note 5 (arguing structures may not
determine our fate but they do raise the costs of finding ourselves and each other).
84. Professor Abreu asks whether, as a Cuban, she would want to embrace a pan-ethnic
Latina/o identity: "If the price of counting [as a Latina/o] is being cast in the role of victim, do I
want to count?" Abreu, supra note 17, at 801-02. Cuban-American culture not only eschews any
connection to a victim identity, but has also been exceedingly successful at affirming Cuban
identity in Miami and everywhere and elsewhere - so much so that Cuban self-affirmation is the
subject of internal jokes and external criticism. See, e.g., EARL SHORRIs, LATINos: A BIOGRAPHY
OF THE PEOPLE 62-76 (Avon Books, 1992). At the same time, Professor Abreu's narrative
provides an additional and often suppressed perspective on the politics of Cuban inclusion in the
"Hispanic category" when she recalls being told that, as a Cuban, she didn't really count. Abreu,
supra note 17. Her experiences at Cornell University are not unique. Indeed, Cuban-Americans
and Ameri-Cubans have long been excluded from the minority category for admissions purposes
at the University of Miami School of Law.
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dox" with Professor Abreu's celebration of self and assertions of indomitable agency.
The reconstructive paradox refers to the difficulties of enacting
one's liberation from within a society that barely notices "the most
insidious types of social evil because those evils tend to be so
ingrained." 85 If Latina/o marginality and inferiority are so pervasive in
our society, where or how, as Professor Westley asks, do Latinas/os find
the resources to resist acquiescing in the very power that constructs us? 6
Professor Abreu responds that Latinas/os should seek these resources of
self-affirmation and personal agency in the fact Latinas/os are always
both insiders and outsiders all at once. Drawing energy and affirmation
from those contexts in which we are insiders prepares us to combat the
power that, in other contexts, would cast us as outsiders. The problem,
as Professor Abreu acknowledges, is that, unlike herself, not all Latinas/
os know the experience of being inside a group that is privileged by
class, education, or social status. Not having access to an inside that is
materially privileged or socially valued means having to create a selfand other-affirming identity from the bottom or the outside.
To be sure, Professor Abreu recognizes that "[riefusing to acknowledge victimization does not transmute a victim into a non-victim."87 Her
point, as I see it, is that the impact of victimization is, in many though
not all instances, fluid and indeterminate. There is always some avenue
of agency. And even if there isn't really, the individual who always
believes there is a way forward (or out) is more likely to flourish than an
individual who internalizes the discourses and credits the practices that
cast her as inferior or inadequate. Personal agency, like any great
achievement or failure, is from this perspective a manifestation of the
will to be and believe.88 But even here, engaging Professor Padilla's
reconstructive paradox means confronting the question: where does the
outsider, one lacking access to the sorts of material, educational or social
privilege Professor Abreu admits to enjoying, or one, who - like the
Latina lesbian of whom Professor Hernindez-Truyol writes - finds
herself multiply rejected, despised and excluded from all the identity
groups or communities with which she might otherwise identify and
align herself, where does someone so positioned - at the bottom and on
the outside - find the will and resources to manifest an alternative
vision from the bottom or the outside?
85. Padilla, supra note 73, at 779.
86. Robert Westley, Lat Crit Theory and the Problematics of Internal/ExternalOppression:
A Comparison of Forms of Oppression and InterGroup/lIntraGroupSolidarity, 53 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 761 (1999).
87. Abreu, supra note 17, at 801.
88. See U.S. ANDERSEN, THREE MAGIC WORDS (Melvin Powers Wilshire Book Co. 1954).
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Read in this context, Professor Hernindez-Truyol's essay contributes a particularly valuable critical perspective on the significance of
internalized oppression as well as on the configuration of insider/outsider positions within Latina/o communities. Tracking earlier accounts
of the profoundly sexist constructs through which Latina/o culture structures heterosexuality and consolidates familial interdependence around
the images of female sexual purity and maternal self-sacrifice, Professor
Hernndez-Truyol notes how Latina/o culture routinely invokes the
strictures of Catholic religiosity to regiment a form of heterosexuality
that empowers men and smothers women. Under the weight and burden
of the virgin/whore dichotomy, heterosexuality is constituted as a practice of male dominance and female self-negation, while the expression
of female sexual agency or autonomy is cast as a dangerous step toward
a rapid and ineluctable free fall into a life of sin, perversion and vulnerability to male sexual dominance. 89 And yet, however oppressive these
cultural constructs may be for straight Latinas, Professor HernmdndezTruyol is right to insist that Latina/o culture is even more virulent in its
oppression of lesbians as lesbians.
Though all Latinas must negotiate the rigidity of the virgin/whore
dichotomy every time and everywhere it is invoked to confine Latina
assertions of autonomy and self-determination within the parameters of
permissibility dictated by heteropatriarchal normativity or to bully
Latinas into doing and being only those things a Latina can do or be
without being labeled "a whore," nevertheless, in this context, Latina
lesbians must, in addition, negotiate a cultural reality that sums itself up
like this: Mejor puta que pata. As Professor Hernindez-Truyol indicates, this cultural adage says it all: "The social and religious factors
and influences that render sex taboo for mujeres in the cultura Latina are
intensified, magnified and sensationalized when imagining lesbian sexuality." 90 As bad as the whore is, the lesbian is worse. The fact that
Latina lesbians have nonetheless found ways to develop and express a
self- and other-affirming identity reflects the power and resilience of

89. See Iglesias, Rape, Race and Representation, supra note 82, at 929-43 (discussing impact
of virgin-whore dichotomy on Latina/o sexuality and offering image of sacred prostitution as
resource and example of psycho-cultural resistance), and at 918-29 (discussing gender ideology
underlying maternal roles in Latina/o culture and arguing for a culturally nuanced psychoanalytical model of identity formation that recognizes the significance of maternal power and the
centrality of familial interdependence in Latina/o culture); see also Jenny Rivera, Domestic
Violence against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender
Differentials, in ADRIEN K. WING, CRITICAL RACE FEMINIsM 259, 260 (1997) [hereinafter WING,
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM]

(critically analyzing Latina/o cultural constructs of "El Macho" and the

sexy latina).
90. Hernndez-Truyol, Culture, Gender, and Sex, supra note 73, at 823.
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humanity asserting "I am and I count" against all odds, 91 but it does not
change the fact that the homophobia that marks her a lesbian also makes
her an alien outsider - marginal and irrelevant, perverted and unnatural
- everywhere and anywhere, but most painfully within her own Latina/
o family and community. 92
By centering the experiences of Latina lesbians, Professor Her-

nindez-Truyol projects a perspective from which the anti-subordination
imperative now pending on the LatCrit agenda far exceeds the anti-subordination potential of any strategies that would reduce this imperative
to a struggle against internalized oppression or would ground Latina/o

liberation on the identification and reclamation of some insider position
we have all purportedly experienced at sometime, somewhere or
another. This is not to say that these strategies, as articulated by Professors Padilla and Abreu, have no anti-subordination potential. It is just to
suggest that the anti-subordination potential of these seemingly different

strategies is limited by a common element that, but for Professor Herndndez-Truyol's intervention, might be easily overlooked. This common
element is that neither strategy really addresses the problem of outsiders
within the Latina/o community.

Professor Abreu's reflections on the insider/outsider dynamic conjure but do not really engage the problem because she intentionally conflates the difference between outsider status and difference itself. While
she may be quite right to insist that "difference" is negative only when it

is constructed as such, there is still a vast difference between being "different" in the way of a Luciano Pavarotti and being different in the way
of a Latina lesbian. The difference between these ways of "being differ91. See Mutua, supra note 8 (analyzing white racism as function of obsession with refusal of
Black people to accept their dehumanization).
92. See Iglesias, Structures of Subordination,supra note 5, at 488-97 (linking Latina lesbian
experience of multiple exclusions/inclusions in different political communities to argument that
anti-essentialist institutional arrangements must be designed in ways that effectively mediate and
simultaneously enable both individual autonomy and collective action). See also Francisco
Valdes, Notes on the Conflation of Sex, Gender and Sexual Orientation: A QueerCritand LatCrit
Perspective, in THE LATINO/A CoNoITIoN, supra note 49, at 543 (discussing the strong
heteronormativity of Latina/o cultures). For critical discussion of sexual orientation in Miami, the
site of LatCrit III, see Francisco Valdes, Below All Radars: An EthnographicPortraitof Latinasi
os Sexual Orientation and the Law in the Making of Miami's "New Enclave," 33 MICH. J. L.
REFORM; 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2000). See generally Francisco Valdes, Acts of
Power, Crimes of Knowledge: Some Observationson Desire, Law and Ideology in the Politics of
Expression at the End of the Twentieth Century, I IowA J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 213, 223-28
(1997) (discussing various strategies focused on increasing sexual minority visibility as central to
Queer politics and self-empowerment); Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture:
Ruminations on Identities and Interconnectivities, 5 So. CAL. L. REv. & WOMEN'S STUD. 25
(1995) (proferring "interconnectivity" as a strategic concept enabling intra- and inter-group
coalitions that accept difference and make respect for it integral to antisubordination theory and
praxis).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:575

ent" is precisely the fact that some differences, like sexual orientation,
race and gender are in fact constructed as negative. As a result, the proposal to ground Latina/o liberation on the self-valorization of one's difference rings a little hollow precisely because the project of selfvalorization smacks of other-world psycho-spiritual realization, rather
than the material and institutional transformation of the real-world configurations of power and privilege that are currently invested in maintaining these negative constructions of difference - precisely because
these constructions help reproduce and legitimate hierarchical relations,
both within and against Latina/o communities, in profound and material
terms.
Professor Padilla's discussion of internalized oppression skirts the
same problem in a different way. This is because the deconstruction of
internalized oppression addresses a pycho-cultural dynamic in which the
self is pitted against itself. In the case of Latina lesbians, overcoming
internalized oppression may help the Latina lesbian, like other victims of
relentless oppression, to resist the practices and discourses of subordination and exclusion and may thus enable her to revalue and respect both
herself and other lesbians, but it does not eliminate the reality of
homophobic oppression in la cultura Latina precisely because, and to
the extent, this oppression is embedded in the very different dynamic of
the self against its "other."
In this context, what Professor Herndindez-Truyol's intervention
suggests is that anti-subordination theory and praxis must make a clear
distinction between internalized and internal oppression within Latina/o
communities: the first dynamic targets sameness; the second targets difference. The first is activated by self-hatred and self-doubt, the second
by hatred or fear of the Other. Overcoming the first, requires that we
learn to value ourselves. Overcoming the second requires that we learn
to value others. Learning to value ourselves does not automatically
translate into the valuing of others, particularly "Others," in whose difference Latina/o culture has inscribed its most virulent prejudices and
whose acceptance and full inclusion within the Latina/o community
would threaten and profoundly destabilize the routine practices and
ingrained ideologies through which traditional relations of power and
dominance are culturally performed and legitimated. It therefore follows that self-valorization can be only part, though - as Professors
Abreu and Padilla powerfully demonstrate - an important part, of the
anti-subordination agenda that drives LatCrit theory and practice. The
other part requires that, in learning to value Others, who are at the bottom or on the outside of their particular contexts, we learn to value ourselves in a different way - in a way that does not reproduce the
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prejudices and hierarchies of the various supremacies we seek to
transform.
DECONSTRUCTING RACIAL HIERARCHIES AND

DE-CENTERING HISPANIC

IDENTITIES IN LATCRIT THEORY

Like Professor Hernndez-Truyol, Professor Wiessner calls on
Latina/o communities to practice anti-subordination principles internally.9 3 His essay opens by recounting a vision of a world order based
on human dignity, inclusion and respect for diversity. In this imagined
order, the anti-subordination agenda articulated by Latinalo communities
raises compelling claims of justice. Nevertheless, he finds fault in the
fact that LatCrit scholarship has seemingly turned a blind eye to the
plight of indigenous peoples. 94 This asserted failure to engage the struggles of indigenous peoples jeopardizes the legitimacy of Latina/o
demands for equal treatment and respect. In Professor Wiessner's
words, "If we do not respect the legitimate claims of others, we forfeit
our own."9 5 Indeed, the struggles of indigenous peoples are particularly
appropriate matters for LatCrit attention precisely because they implicate a whole array of current and historical discrimination and exploitation by Hispanic Latinas/os, both in Latin American countries, where
Hispanic Latinas/os constitute a dominant class, and elsewhere and
everywhere Latinas/os display the conscious and unconscious racism
that is endemic in Latinalo cultural sayings and practices toward indigenous peoples.9 6 Just as Latinas/os resist our subordination within Anglo
society, Professor Wiessner's objective is to challenge the subordination
of indigenous peoples within Latinalo society.
Professor Weissner makes his case by examining the legacy of Hispanic conquest in Latin America. This legacy is a history of physical
and cultural genocide. From the initial encounter with the Spanish Conquistadors through the more recent history of military dictatorships,
93. Wiessner, supra note 73.
94. Professor Wiessner bases this assertion on the fact that "a recent 'Annotated Bibliography
of Latino and Latina Critical Theory' manages to painstakingly describe seventeen distinct
'themes' of 'critical Latino/a scholarship,' and fails to mention the indigenous condition in any
one of them." Id. at 838. But see Luz Guerra, LatCrit y la Des-colonizacidn: Taking Coldn Out,
19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 351 (1998); Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 2, at 568-73 (reflecting on

themes inspired by plenary panel on indigenous peoples at LATCRrr II).
95. Wiessner, supra note 73, at 837.
96. Professor Wiessner recounts an incident in which a Chilean friend responded to an
automobile incident in Miami by hurling an anti-Indian epithet at the other driver. Other LatCrit
scholars have noted the anti-Indian prejudices expressed in Latina/o cultural practices. See, e.g.,
Elvia Arriola, Voices from the Barbed Wires of Evil: Women in the Maquiladoras,Latina Critical
Legal Theory and Gender at the U.S. -Mexico Border, 49 DE PAUL L. REV. 3 (forthcoming 2000)

(recounting anti-Indian references invoked to deter childhood conduct deemed inappropriate for a
muchachita).
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indigenous peoples in Latin America have been tortured, massacred,
robbed, enslaved and displaced from their communal lands by the brutality of scorched earth military campaigns, international development
projects, U.S. sponsored drug enforcement search and destroy missions,
and multinational companies seeking free access to their natural
resources. Theirs is a struggle for physical and cultural survival, for selfdetermination and for land. Their current legal status in countries like
Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Mexico reveals the legal legacy of the
Hispanic conquest as well as the increasing influence and impact of neoliberal hegemony in Latin America. In Brazil, for example, Professor
Wiessner notes that indigenous peoples are still subject to a special
regime of tutelage, which casts them as "relatively incapacitated" and
places them under the guardianship of the Brazilian state. Government
decrees initially promulgated to protect indigenous rights to their ancestral lands have been rolled back by more recent decrees designed to
afford private commercial interests the right to contest Indian land
demarcations in an adversarial process. By outlining the present day
legal struggles of indigenous peoples in the various countries of Latin
America, Professor Wiessner reveals the continued complicity of Latin
American elites in the expropriation of these subjugated, but resurgent
Indian nations, even as he notes with approval the legal advances being
made in some countries like Colombia and Chile.
This is not to say that Professor Wiessner's analysis is beyond criticism. Perhaps to underscore the compelling need for Hispanic Latinas/
os to recognize their own complicity in the subordination of indigenous
peoples, Professor Wiessner structures his argument around a comparison of the treatment indigenous peoples have received from Anglo and
Hispanic conquerors. In this comparison, Hispanics fair poorly.
According to Professor Wiessner, Anglo conquerors were more civilized
and less brutal than Hispanic conquerors. 97 To support this brash generalization, Professor Wiessner quotes the work of Professor Steven
McSloy.98 The problem is that nothing in Professor McSloy's text sup97. Wiessner, supra note 73, at 840. "By contrast [to Hispanic colonization], the British
colonization relied much less on brute force and the destruction of indigenous political structures
and society; its subjugation strategies included to a much larger degree the mechanisms of
negotiation and persuasion." Id.
98. Id. at 840 n.38 (citing Steven P. McSloy, "Because the Bible Tells Me So": Manifest
Destiny and American Indians,9 ST. THOMAs L. Rav. 37, 38 (1996)). More specifically, he quotes
McSloy's account of the way American Indian lands were taken:

How were American Indian lands taken? The answer is not, as it turns out, by
military force. The wars, massacres, Geronimo and Sitting Bull - all that was really
just cleanup. The real conquest was on paper, on maps and in laws. What those
maps showed and those laws said was that Indians had been "conquered" merely by
being "discovered."
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ports Professor Wiessner's comparative assessment. The fact that the
"the wars, massacres, Geronimo and Sitting Bull . . .[were] really just
clean up," hardly suggests that the colonization of the Northern parts of
the American continent was any more humane than the conquest of the
South. If anything, the comparison Professor Wiessner activates suggests instead that the "British colonizers " were more unitary and less
internally conflicted about their colonizer status. While Spanish colonizers struggled against internal opposition by Spanish religious elites,
who deployed "the natural law theories of St. Thomas Aquinas" to compel recognition of indigenous peoples as subjects with inalienable rights
under the law of nations, the "British" colonization was total - in the
law, as much as in the flesh.9 9
My point is not to defend the Spanish conquest of Latin America,
or to suggest that the treatment of indigenous peoples was, or continues
to be, anything but brutal. My point is rather to use Professor Wiessner's analysis as a reference point for further reflection on the commitments implicit in the LatCrit aspiration to promote an anti-subordination
politics that is broadly inclusive and relentlessly anti-essentialist, as well
as to reflect further on the politics and practice of intergroup comparisons. From this perspective, there is no question that Professor Wiessner's essay activates a problematic that often is organized around an
inside/outside dichotomy and is most immediately apparent in debates
over who has standing to criticize the practices of oppression and internal hierarchies within a subordinated community. This is because Professor Wiessner's pointed and comprehensive account of the way
indigenous peoples have been exploited, marginalized and oppressed
"within the Latino-Latina midst" is in no sense a self-critical intervention, as Professor Wiessner at no point claims a Latina/o identity. Thus,
his contribution provides a valued opportunity to reflect not only on the
substance of his criticisms, but also on the way LatCrit theory should
position itself in debates over standing to criticize the reproduction of
hierarchies within Latina/o communities. To this end, a LatCrit
response to these sorts of criticisms needs to take note that the practice
of coding criticism as external interventionism, like the discourses of
cultural relativism, privacy, sovereignty and the individualization of
guilt and innocense, are standard tropes, routinely invoked by elites the
world-over to deflect criticism from their abusive and exploitative pracId.
99. For an alternative perspective on the relative virulence of anti-Indian racism in Latin
American and U.S. cultures, see, for example, Martha Menchaca, Chicano Indianism, in THE
LATINO/A CONDITION, supra note 49, at 387 (recounting how racial caste system was dismantled
in Mexico by the 1812 Spanish Constitution of Cadiz, only to be reinstated by U.S. racial laws in
the territories ceded by Mexico after the Mexican War of 1846).
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tices, as well as from their unearned privileges.' 00 Thus, it is imperative
that LatCrit scholars resist the tendency to dismiss external criticisms
automatically, even as we reflect critically both on the difference
between internal and external criticism and on the way we draw the
internal/external line in responding to those particular criticisms we
might want most to suppress.
At the same time, the analytical and empirical imprecision with
which Professor Wiessner juxtaposes the colonization of North and
South America, as well as his mere passing reference to the substantial
efforts currently underway to incorporate indigenous peoples into LatCrit discourse should give self-constituted "outsiders" reason to pause
before launching their well-intentioned criticisms. At a minimum, such
criticisms need to avoid inflammatory over-generalizations that cast
their comparisons in broad, ambiguous and unsubstantiated terms. Such
comparisons do little to enlighten, though much to confuse the issues
and inflame the politics of reaction and division. Nevertheless, the
underlying truth of Professor Wiessner's broader argument warrants
serious LatCrit attention. Indeed, read through the heuristic of the
insider/outsider dichotomy already thematized in the preceding essays
by Professors Padilla, Abreu and Hernindez-Truyol, his essay calls
attention to, and prompts reflection on, the fact that none of these essays
address the way their analysis might be relevant to the particular experiences of indigenous peoples, nor for that matter of Black Latinas/os and
Asian Latinas/os - though these group experiences would certainly
enrich our understandings of the social-psychological processes of internalized oppression as well as expanding our analysis of the way "difference" is used to configure insider/outsider positions within and between
Latina/o communities.
To give just one brief example of the way attention to the particular
realities of indigenous peoples might substantially enrich the analysis,
even as it helps clarify the scope and meaning of LatCrit commitment to
anti-essentialist anti-subordination theory consider the following: When
Professor Padilla writes of internalized racism, she speaks specifically of
the practices through which Chicanas/os undermine themselves and each
other. The very concept of internalized oppression is activated around an
imagined inside/outside. Internalized racism is not external oppression
because it occurs within a delimited community, amongst its members,
pitting insider against insider. Asking how this analysis might be rele100. See, e.g., Adrien K. Wing, CriticalRace Feminism and the InternationalHuman Rights of
Women in Bosnia, Palestineand South Africa: Issuesfor LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REv.337 (1996-97) (noting that male elites often resist compliance with basic human rights
laws prohibiting discrimination against women by declaring their sexist customs and traditions
essential elements of their culture).
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vant to articulating a LatCrit perspective on the anti-subordination struggles of indigenous peoples means asking how the histories of
enslavement, exclusion and extermination, as well as the current
marginalization of indigenous peoples, both beyond and within the
United States, would figure in a theory of Chicana/o internalized
oppression? The discourse of Latina/o hybridity and mestizaje offers
one ready response.' ° ' In this response, the subordination of indigenous
peoples figures centrally in the dynamics of internalized oppression
because it is the indigenous aspect that makes Chicana/o identity a
source of self-hatred and self-doubt.
The important point, however, is to see how this response falls
short of the anti-essentialist commitments that ground the LatCrit project, even as it perhaps misses the mark of Professor Wiessner's criticism, for Professor Wiessner is not talking about the subordination of
indigenous identities, but of peoples. Grounding LatCrit concern for
their struggles in the discourse of Latina/o hybridity suggests that indigenous peoples are inside the Latina/o construct, and important to the
LatCrit project, not in and for themselves, but rather because their experiences and realities have been important to the construction of Latina/o
identities. To be sure, recognizing the indigenous and other racial mixtures that oftentimes are repressed in the constitution of Latina/o selfidentifications has been one of the important advances achieved through
the discourse of mestizaje; nevertheless, the anti-essentialist commitments underlying the LatCrit movement's aspiration to articulate a politics of intergroup justice will eventually require even further progress.
Indeed, fully recognizing and embracing the struggles for justice of
indigenous peoples challenges the LatCrit movement to develop the
critical discourses and implement the intergroup practices that will
enable the LatCrit community to pursue three important objectives,
simultaneously and in tandem: to continue articulating an anti-essentialist critique of the way the institutionalization and cultural performances
of white supremacy marginalize different Latina/o communities in different ways, to de-center Hispanic identity in our conceptualization of
Latina/o communities so that we can better understand the particular
experiences and perspectives of minority groups within our communities, and ultimately to recognize and embrace the universal claims of
right - to equality and dignity - that are everywhere constituted in the
demand for justice and desire for inclusion expressed by every group
oppressed by the articulation of white supremacy, both within and
beyond the United States. Ultimately, the struggles of indigenous peo-

in

101. See Wiessner, supra note 73, at 832 n.5 (quoting Margaret Montoya, Masks and Identity,
THE LATINO/A CONDITION, supra note 49, at 40).
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ples, like the struggles of Black and Asian peoples, are matters of LatCrit concern, not so much because Latinas/os are a hybrid people
composed of all these elements, but because recognizing and transforming the particularities of injustice is the only viable strategy for achiev102
ing substantive justice.
Read through the prism of these three objectives, the essays by
Professors Padilla and Abreu make significant contributions to the LatCrit project, understood initially as a movement to articulate the particularities of Latina/o perspectives and experiences within the regime of
white supremacy and to promote a pan-ethnic Latinalo political identity
that can mediate and transcend the politics of division that is too often
activated around the differences between Cuban-Americans, Puerto
Ricans and Mexican-Americans. 10 3 They want to make Latinas/os
"insiders" even as they make "the inside" a place worth inhabiting. But,
as Professors Hernindez-Truyol and Wiessner remind us, "the inside"
we create must aspire always and everywhere to provide a home for
those at the bottom of their particular contexts because the logical and
political implications of the LatCrit commitment to anti-essentialist
intergroup justice, both encompass and transcend the politics of Latina/o
pan-ethnicity and hybridity.
In this vein, Professor Roberts' contribution appropriately closes
this cluster of essays. 0 4 Her essay is based on remarks she delivered at
LATCRIT III in a colloquy programmed to open the focus group discussion entitled From Critical Race Theory to LatCrit to BlackCrit?
Exploring Critical Race Theory Beyond and Within the Black/White
Paradigm.'0 5 The purpose of this focus group was to expand the parameters of LatCrit discourse by triggering a critical analysis of the different
ways in which the Black/White paradigm of race truncates and essentializes the liberation struggles of Black peoples, for example, by deflecting
attention from the intra-group hierarchies and diversity that divide "the
Black community," as well as by obstructing the cross-racialand multiracial solidarities that might otherwise coalesce around issues of imperialism, colonialism, national origin discrimination, language rights,
immigration policy, gender and sexual orientation. The hope was that
102. See Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 2, at 555-61 (noting attention to particularities critical
to actualization of substantive justice); Enrique R. Carrasco, Opposition, Justice, Structuralism
and Particularity: Intersections Between LotCrit Theory and Law and Development Studies, 28
U. MIAMI IIrJER-AMER. L. REV. 313 (1997) [hereinafter Carrasco, LatCrit Theory and Law and
Development] (emphasizing the importance of particularity in LatCrit theory).
103. See Johnson, Latino Legal Scholarship, supra note 50; Ediberto Romin, Common
Ground: Perspectives on Latino-Latina Diversity, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 483 (1997).
104. Roberts, BlackCrit Theory, supra note 8.
105. For a description of the substantive themes of the focus group, see <http://
nersp.nerdc.ufl.edu/-malavet/latcrit/archives/Iciii.htm>.
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by creating a space and intentionally focusing attention on the sorts of
intra-Black particularities constituted in and through the different histories, perspectives, political ideologies and transnational identities of

Black Latinas/os and Caribbeans, we might begin the process of conceptualizing the critical methodologies, thematic priorities and substantive
areas of law and policy that might form the center of a post-essentialist
'BlackCrit" discourse, which is just to say, a critical discourse that
engages the particularities of Black subordination from an anti-essentialist perspective.
LatCrit stakes in such a project are high, for while LatCrit theory

was itself born of the critical need to move beyond the essentialism of
the Black/white paradigm toward a more inclusive theoretical framework that focuses, broadly and comprehensively, on the way the institutionalization and cultural performance of white supremacy affect all
peoples of color, though in different ways, still the political impact of

uncritically abandoning the Black/white paradigm would be indefensibly
regressive.1"6 To be sure, Asian and Latina/o communities have been
marginalized by the Black/White paradigm and our increasing and
mutual recognition of the commonalities that construct Asian and
Latina/o subordination are among the most powerful new insights enabled by the anti-essentialist movement in Critical Race Theory. 10 7 Nevertheless, the inter-group solidarities this knowledge enables us to
imagine and pursue cannot be promoted at the expense of our theoretical

and political commitments to combating the particular forms of racism
experienced by Black people, both in this country and abroad. If LatCrit
theory were to abandon uncritically the Black/White paradigm, it would

marginalize a substantial portion of the Latina/o community and betray
our aspirations to substantive intergroup justice. Thus, the objective
must be to move our understanding of white supremacy progressively
beyond the Black/White binary of race, even as we acknowledge the
106. See Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 2, at 562-74 (urging LatCrit scholars to remain
cognizant and vigilant lest in rejecting the Black/White paradigm, we uncritically equate Black
and white positions within a paradigm that emerged from the very real oppression of whites over
Blacks, as well as by non-Black minorities who have sought their own liberation in the delusions
of a white identity); Chris lijima, The Era of We-construction: Reclaiming the Politics of Asian
Pacific American Identity and Reflections on the Critique of the Black/White Paradigm, 29
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 47, 50 (1997) (warning that moves beyond the Black/White paradigm
may be coopted by racist status quo); Taunya Lovell Banks, Both Edges of the Margin: Blacks
and Asians in Mississippi Masala, Barriers to Coalition Building, 5 AsIAN L.J. 7 (1998)
(articulating critique of "the middle position" as constituted by pervasiveness of Black/White
paradigm in both dominant and minority consciousness and practices and advocating coalitionbuilding among minority groups as alternative); see also Mutua, supra note 8.
107. See, e.g., Iglesias, Out of the Shadow, supra note 30, at 351-72 (exploring points of
commonality between emerging Asian Pacific American Critical Legal Scholarship and LatCrit
theory).
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particular and virulent forms of anti-Black racism that are institutionalized and expressed in virtually every society across the globe, including
Latina/o communities. Doing so requires that we center the particularities of Black subordination long enough to recognize the way anti-Black
racism operates in Latina/o communities and the way the struggles of
Black peoples, who are not Latina/o, are also implicated in the LatCrit
project.
From this perspective, Professor Roberts essay makes two points
worth further reflection. Her first point is to challenge a common misunderstanding of the meaning of "essentialism" in the anti-essentialist critique. White feminist legal discourse, for example, has construed this
critique as an attack on any analysis that focuses exclusively on the
experiences of one group of women without also addressing the experiences of other groups of women or, indeed, of all women in general.
This misunderstanding may be genuine or opportunistic, but in either
case, it makes it easier to deflect the impact of any analysis that focuses
on the particular forms of oppression experienced by any particular
group of women of color. Thus, when Professor Roberts writes or talks
about the particular experiences of pregnant Black women in a racist
criminal justice system, her analysis is at times discounted on the
grounds that it does not discuss the experiences of other pregnant
women in analogous situations. But, as Professor Roberts argues, the
anti-essentialist critique, which launched Critical Race Feminism as a
reaction against the exclusive attention feminist legal discourse was then
giving the problems of white women, did not attack the practice of studying the problems of a particular group of (white) women, but rather the
practice of assuming that this particular group represented all women.,0 8
As Professor Roberts puts it, "[w]riting about Black people is not essentialist in and of itself. It only becomes essentialist when the experiences
discussed are taken to portray a uniform Black experience or a universal
experience that applies to every other group."' 0 9
This important insight has profound implications for the way the
LatCrit movement should understand and pursue the practice of producing anti-essentialist, anti-subordination critical legal scholarship and
was, in fact, a driving force behind the initial decision to organize the
"BlackCrit" focus group discussion at LatCrit III. The purpose of this
focus group was to operationalize, within the LatCrit community and
conference setting, a vision of intergroup solidarity and substantive justice that is categorically different from the vision that currently links the
anti-essentialist critique to a particular, and ultimately unsatisfactory,
108. See

WING, CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 89.
109. Roberts, BlackCrit Theory, supra note 8, at 857.
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representation of both the meaning and the practical and political implications of a commitment to "multiculturalism." This alternative vision is
referenced in, but not fully explained by, the call for "rotating centers"
because the aspirations embedded in the practice of rotating centers are
too easily confused with and overshadowed by an ingrained tendency to
hear the call for critical attention to the particularities of subordination
experienced by different groups as a call that can only be answered
through the Balkanization of the universals that might otherwise bind us
in solidarity. 1"'
Against this backdrop, the decision to feature a focus group discussion exploring the necessity and possibilities of launching a new intervention in outsider scholarship provisionally styled "BlackCrit Theory,"
was to perform a public event that, thereafter, would provide a meaningful point of reference for articulating a different vision of the way the
anti-essentialist critique can (and should) mediate the relationship
between universal and particular. The easiest way to explain this is to
contrast the structure of the BlackCrit focus group at LatCrit III with the
paradigm model through which the commitment to multiculturalism has
been performed in other contexts.Il' Rather than organizing LatCrit III
as a conference dedicated to Hispanic Latina/o issues and relegating discussion of the particularities of Black subordination to one of a number
of concurrent sessions, in which different subgroups separate to discuss
"their own" particular issues, the BlackCrit focus group was designed to
center the problem of Black subordination in LatCrit theory and to invite
all participants to focus on these particularproblems, with the implicit
understanding that these particular problems are of universal concern
for all LatCrit scholars committed to an anti-subordination agenda based
on substantive intergroup justice, and with the further understanding that
future LatCrit conferences would, in similar fashion, seek to center the
110. See, e.g., Cho, Essential Politics, supra note 15 (expressing concern that the "antiessentialist critique" may undermine collective solidarity and political engagement); see also A.
Sivananda, All that Melts into Air Is Solid: The Hokum of New Times, RACE & CLASS, Jan.-Mar.
1990 (expressing concern that the post-modem politics of proliferating subject positions forsakes
commitment to universality and solidarity); cf Iglesias, Structures of Subordination, supra note 5,
at 486-502 (challenging notion that proliferation of political identities undermines pursuit of
"common good" and arguing, instead, that the genuine common good can only be discovered and

achieved through the reconfiguration of anti-democratic institutional power structures that
suppress the self-representation and expression of multidimensional and intersectional identities).
111. For example, in the labor context, the commitment to racial and/or gender equality has
sometimes been expressed through the formation of separate racially marked or gender based
caucuses within the broader collectivity, where members of the subgroup meet separately to
discuss their particular problems and needs. For a critical analysis of the pros and cons associated
with different institutional structures or arrangements that might be used to operationalize a
commitment to anti-essentialist intergroup justice, see Iglesias, Structures of Subordination, supra
note 5, at 478-86.
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particularities of subordination confronting other marginalized and intersectional minority identities.
This latter point is crucial. By linking critical analysis of the particularities of subordination experienced by different groups to the practice
of "rotating centers," the BlackCrit focus group at LatCrit III clearly
illustrates why the production of anti-subordination theory and praxis
must be conceptualized and performed as a collective project, reflected
in and strengthened by our mutual commitment, across our many differences, to remain engaged in each other's issues over time. As Professor
Roberts rightly notes, no one need, nor ever can, focus on everything at
once, but the struggle against white supremacy requires that we - each
individually and all collectively - increasingly learn to see and combat
the multiple structures and relations through which the practices and ideologies of white supremacy have constructed the particular forms of subordination confronted, in different ways, by all peoples of color, both
within and beyond the United States. Thus, the common project to
transform the realities of white supremacy can only be realized through
a collective and collaborative effort, in which we teach each other about
the similarities and differences in the way white supremacy operates in
our various communities. This by necessity requires a practice of "rotating centers," even as this practice, in turn, requires a mutual commitment to remain engaged over time. Only members of a community
committed to fostering an inclusive and collaborative anti-subordination
project for the long haul can afford to decenter their own compelling
problems to focus, instead, on the problems confronting people other
than themselves.
It follows, therefore, that the practice of rotating centers can operate
effectively only in the context of a genuine community, whose members' commitment to remain engaged for the long haul can foster the
kind of continuity needed to ensure that "the center" does, in fact, rotate
from year to year and from venue to venue. It is this kind of community
that the decision to feature a BlackCrit focus group at LatCrit III was
designed to perform and promote. However, despite these seemingly
unobjectionable intentions, the BlackCrit conference event generated
significant controversy from two distinct perspectives, each of which
sheds substantial light on the many challenges awaiting our collective
attention. From one end, the critique was that, in centering Black subordination, LatCrit III was on the verge of taking "the Lat" out of LatCrit
Theory." 2 From the other end, the critique was that, by centering Black
subordination, LatCrit III was on the verge of assuming an umbrella
position that was more appropriately left to the more universal and
112. See, e.g., Mutua, supra note 8 (reporting discussions at LatCrit III).
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inclusive venue of Critical Race Theory.1" 3 Both of these critiques,
however, miss the point of featuring the BlackCrit focus group at LatCrit
III - though they do so in different ways.
The first critique misses the point because it essentializes Latina/o
identity in a way that threatens to reproduce, within LatCrit theory, the
racial and ethnic hierarchies that pervade Latina/o communities and culture and that are fundamentally at odds with any anti-essentialist commitment to anti-subordination politics. Latinas/os, to repeat yet again,
come in every variety of race and ethnicity. LatCrit theory cannot
marginalize the particular experiences of Black subordination, without
presupposing, among other things, that Black Latinas/os are somehow
less fully Latina/o, than Hispanic Latinas/os, and that therefore their
problems are somehow less central to the LatCrit project.
The second critique misses the point because it tends to reinscribe
the project of generating anti-subordination theory and praxis within a
model of multiculturalism that continues to cast Black subordination as
primarily "a Black thing," Hispanic subordination as "a Hispanic thing,"
Asian subordination as "an Asian thing," and so on and so forth. This
structure has been tried, and the consciousness it simultaneously reflects
and constructs has failed to enable the kinds of intergroup engagement
and solidarity necessary for the task at hand: the deconstruction of white
supremacy and reconstruction of a sociolegal reality grounded on a commitment to substantive intergroup justice. Indeed, it is all but obvious
that this kind of structure and consciousness can promote little intergroup understanding and collaborative progress precisely because the
"discussions" it generates are hardwired to flounder in arguments about
whose particular subordination ought to be addressed first: in the initial
instance, when the particularities separate into groups that inevitably
will include multiple and intersectional identities, like the Black Latina/
o or the Japanese Peruvian; and in the second instance, when these separate particularities regroup to articulate a universal agenda in a common
setting.
This is where Professor Robert's second major point makes her
essay a welcomed and timely intervention. Professor Robert's second
point illustrates the otherwise suppressed realities that make Black identity an intersectional space, where group affiliation can be seen as a matter of political choice. She describes three different contexts in which
her self-identification was fluid and in flux: in choosing to identify as
African American, rather than as West-Indian; in choosing to identify as
113. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 7, at 1256 (representing Critical Race Theory Workshop as
"a place where, among other things, the experiences of all groups of color are articulated and
where narrow conceptions of group interest are critiqued").
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Black, rather than as bi-racial or multi-racial; and in choosing to identify
as the daughter of a Jamaican immigrant during a debate with Peter
Brimelow. I 4 To Professor Robert's credit, each of these acts of selfidentification reflects and performs, in different ways and from different
perspectives, a commitment to anti-subordination solidarity. This is
because the West-Indian identity has often been embraced by Caribbean
Blacks as a mark of distinction that separates them from and seeks to
raise them above the subordinated status of Black Americans in the
United States;' 15 the bi-racial or multi-racial identity category has sometimes operated to privilege whiteness and other non-Black identities in
the configuration of Black identity among people marked by non-Black
racial mixtures; and finally, because claiming an immigrant identity can,
in some contexts, position Black Americans in solidarity with the victims of the virulent nativism that seeks to consolidate a supposedly
"multicultural" American identity by purchasing inclusion for Black
Americans at the expense of precisely those immigrants most vulnerable
to exclusion: the racialized and impoverished peoples of the Third
World.
Professor Robert's discussion of the different political identity
choices she has made in different contexts challenges the notion of a
unitary Black identity and thereby strengthens the case for the practice
of "rotating centers," not only at LatCrit conferences, but at every gathering committed to the production of anti-subordination theory and practice through identity-based critique - whether those gatherings are
organized under the auspices of the Critical Race Theory workshop or in
other venues such as those emerging from the recent development of
Asian Pacific American Critical Legal Scholarship."I 6 Viewed from this
perspective, the practice of rotating centers is, indeed, a move to claim a
universal perspective for LatCrit theory, but only as an expression of the
profoundly revolutionary possibilities embedded in the anti-essentialist
critique. These new possibilities of thought and action will fully emerge
only when enough us learn to see that every particular identity group
constitutes a universal because every particular group includes members
whose multiple and intersectional identities link each group to every
other group. Just as Latina/o identity includes Blackness, certainly the
converse is equally true that Black identity includes Latinidad; just as
114. See

PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION

(1995) (articulating a nativist agenda).

115. See, e.g., MARVIN DUNN, BLACK MIAMI IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 99 (1997) (noting
that Black Bahamians, proud of their British roots, "thought themselves to be less servile than
American-born Blacks in Miami").
116. See Symposium, The Long Shadow of Korematsu, supra note 27; see also Iglesias, Out of
the Shadow, supra note 30 (offering one vision of the intellectual and political agenda that might
be collaboratively pursued at the intersection of APACrit and LatCrit theory).
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Latina/o identity includes Asian, Indigenous and European identities, so
too it is true that each of these identities include all the others.
This realization has profound implications for the future development of identity politics and positions the anti-essentialist critique
beyond rather than, as often is charged, at the center of the political
fragmentation and Balkanization that threatens to sunder every universal
into a proliferation of increasingly atomized and ineffectual particularities. This is because the anti-essentialist critique makes it possible to see
that all the particular groups into which we might possibly separate are
inhabited by multiple and intersectional identities. Any particular group
that purports to practice anti-essentialist politics internally will, by
necessity, have to treat the distinct problems of group members marked
by intersectional identities as equally valid and central to the anti-subordination agenda defined by the group. This is simply to say, for example, that just as LatCrit theory must engage the problems of Black
subordination because Latina/o identity includes Blackness, so too an
anti-essentialist BlackCrit theory would have to confront the problems
of Latina/o subordination because Black identity includes Latinidad.
And yet, by doing so, each group would find that its pursuit of a genuinely anti-essentialist politics promises, always and everywhere, to
reconstitute the group as a universal that contains all particulars. This
would, however, be a very good thing. Indeed, the "only" thing still
blinding us to the reality that every particularity constitutes the universal, albeit from a different perspective and in a different configuration, is
the essentialist assumptions embedded in the imperatives of organizing
hierarchical power relations through practices of inclusion and exclusion
and the ingrained tendency, both within and between our various communities, to construct our collective identities and solidarities around an
1 17
inside/outside dichotomy.

117. See, e.g., Guadalupe T. Luna, Zoo Island: LatCritTheory, Don Pepe and Seflora Peralta,
19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 339, 341 (1998) (locating Chicana/o subordination in the ideological
and rhetorical struggles between universal and particular through which the white perspective is
cast as universal in contrast to the particularity of the Chicana/o perspective); Iglesias, Structures
of Subordination,supra note 5, at nn. 21 & 22 and accompanying text (implying need for gestaltshift that would enable recognition of the way women of color constitute a universal perspective).
See also generally Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race
and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory and Politics of "Sexual Orientation," 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293
(1997) (urging similar points in the context of Queer legal theory). See also Valdes, "OutCrit"
Theories, supra note 7.
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DEMOCRACY,

COMMUNICATIVE POWER AND INTER/NATIONAL
LABOR RIGHTS

Part II takes up three clusters of essays that appear at first glance to
have little in common: the first cluster focuses on the transition to and
consolidation of democracy in regions as diverse as the Caribbean and
Eastern Europe; the second cluster centers the struggle over language
rights and communicative power, while the third cluster takes up a broad
range of issues exploring the way Latinalo identities and lived realities

should figure in the transformation of domestic and international labor
rights regimes. Despite their differences, these essays reveal a common

tension. In each instance, the struggle for self-determination confronts a
seemingly

irreconcilable

and

pervasively

articulated

antagonism

between freedom and order, stability and plurality, uniformity and
chaos. This antagonism has been most clearly articulated in democratic

theory as the so-called "crisis of governability.""' 8 But this underlying
antagonism is revealed everywhere the claim to individual or group selfdetermination threatens inherited patterns and identities. It is evident, for
example, in the political struggle over language rights and the paranoid
nativism of the English-Only movement, in which the domestic prolifer-

ation of languages and cultures is cast as threat to the unity and integrity
of the American national identity.' 19 It is evident also in the anti-political structure of the labor rights regime established in this country. 120 By
taking up these various issues, the essays in these three clusters illustrate

how the universal struggle for self-determination is reflected in and
118. The theory is that mass political mobilization triggers such undeliverable demands that it
causes the democratic political system to internally implode. Thus, the discourse of democratic
ungovernability has proven a valuable resource in legitimating political repression by casting mass
mobilization as a threat to the democratic political form. Of course, the question this raises is
whether a system that represses its people because it cannot meet their demands is really worth
preserving. For an overview and critique of the way the problem of "democratic governability"
has been addressed by both the left and the right, see Claus Offe, The Separation of Form and
Content in Liberal Democracy, in STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1980); for an extensive
analysis of the reasons why "the liberal democratic state" cannot effectively respond to the
demands of a politically mobilized polity, see Clause Offe & Volker Ronge, Theses on the Theory
of the State, in CLASSES, POWER, AND CONFLICT: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY DEBATES
(Anthony Giddens & David Held eds., U.Cal.Press 1982) (linking the political limitations of the
democratic state to the material bases of state power in liberal capitalism).
119. See Rachel F. Moran, What ifLatinos Really Mattered in the Public Policy Debate?, 85
CAL. L. REV. 1315, 1328-9; 10 LA RAZA 229, 242-43 (1998) (noting limitations of traditional
race-neutral model of inclusion and advocating alternative model of immigration which
recognizes that bilingualism and biculturalism are assets rather than threats to national integrity).
120. See Iglesias, Structures of Subordination, supra note 5 (critiquing impact of labor law
doctrine of "exclusive representation" on self-determination of women of color in American
workplaces).
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advanced by the anti-essentialist commitment to anti-subordination politics at the heart of the LatCrit movement.
A.

Democracy in Anti-SubordinationPerspective:
Global Intersections

The meaning of democracy and its role in the struggle for liberation
present formidable conceptual and political challenges for LatCrit legal
scholars and activists. As sociologist Max Castro aptly suggests, these
challenges are born of the many profound and apparent disjunctures
between democratic theory, or rather, the strategic manipulations of
democratic rhetoric, on the one hand, and the reality of "democracy" as
we live it, on the other. It is this disjuncture between rhetoric and reality
that makes the struggle over the meaning of democracy a crucial political space for LatCrit theory to occupy, even as it makes the actualization of democracy, an aspiration and objective that, approached from an
anti-subordination perspective, positions us against the injustices and
beyond the hypocrisies of the "really existing democracies" we currently
inhabit. 12 1 By critically examining the disjuncture between democratic
rhetoric and the trans/national power structures that coopt and subvert
the self-determination struggles of so many peoples in so many different
contexts, all five essays in this cluster make significant contributions to
articulating an anti-essentialist perspective on the meaning and practice
of a real and substantive democracy both within and beyond the United
States. 122
THREE STORIES OF "THE CARIBBEAN"

The opening essay by Professor Griffith provides an excellent point
of departure for a LatCrit analysis of democracy. His objective is to
show how "the drug problem" impacts the democratic project in small
countries throughout the Caribbean. By locating his intervention in "the
Caribbean," Professor Griffith situates our analysis of democracy in an
imaginary region whose multiple dimensions exceed the boundaries of
121. See Max J. Castro, Democracy in Anti-Subordination Perspective: Local/Global
Intersections: An Introduction, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 863 (1999) (using the phrase "really
existing democracy" to measure the difference between democratic theory and the democracy in
which we actually live).
122. Ivelaw Griffith, Drugs and Democracy in the Caribbean, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 869
(1999); Irwin P. Stotzky, Suppressing the Beast, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 883 (1999); Mario
Martinez, Property as an Instrument of Power in Nicaragua, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 907 (1999);
Julie Mertus, Mapping Civil Society Transplants: A Preliminary Comparison of Eastern Europe
and Latin America, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 921 (1999); Ediberto Romin, Reconstructing SelfDetermination: The Role of Critical Theory in Positivist International Law Paradigm, 53 U.
MiAmi L. REv. 943 (1999) [hereinafter Romin, Reconstructing Self-Determination].
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any particular term. 123 Like "the drug problem" or "democracy," "the

Caribbean" is a signifier with no stable, uncontested referent. It is, at
first glance, a sea, not a territory - its boundaries marked by water, not
by land. It is at second glance a clustered string of geographically isolated islands governed by weak and often corrupt little states, politically
fragmented, but strikingly similar in their economic vulnerability to and
dependence on the foreign aid and so-called preferential trade arrangements of their former colonizers and current day masters. 124 On a triple

take, the Caribbean might be found beating to the rhythms of mambo,
reggae, salsa, merengue and the cha-cha-cha -

somewhere in, and yet

beyond, a complicated overlay of transplanted cultures that emerge
from, and have flourished despite, the last 500 years of colonial penetration, intervention and relentless expropriation - a history we 25would
Pull
have to tell in Spanish, English, French, Dutch and Portuguese.
back a bit, redraw the map a moment, and the Caribbean rises yet again
- this time from a sea of blood, a theater of war zoned for the lowintensity conflicts that submerged it in waves of broken, burnt and
butchered bodies, bleeding to the pulse of state sponsored terror and
super-power contestations.
Embedded in this controversy over where "the Caribbean" begins
and ends is the dialectic of universal and particular - as well as of the
many diverse and conflicting political projects emerging from and
targeted at this region.126 Whether any universal term can unify these
123. See, e.g., ANTONIO BENfTEZ-RoJo, THE REPEATING ISLAND: THE CARIBBEAN AND THE
POSTMODERN PERSPECTIVE 35-36 (Duke U. Press, 2d ed. 1996) (noting the indeterminacy of "the
Caribbean" and observing further that organizing "the Caribbean" construct around the plantation
economy would redraw its boundaries to include the Brazilian northeast as well as the southern
United States); see also H. MICHAEL ERISMAN, PURSUING POSTDEPENDENCY POLITICS: SOUTHSOUTH RELATIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN at 27, n. 1 (1992) (suggesting that "the Caribbean" be
conceptualized in terms of three concentric circles: its inner circle comprised only of the English-

speaking Caribbean islands, including the Bahamas; the second circle delimited by the Caribbean
archipelago, meaning all the islands plus the mainland extensions of Guyana, Suriname, and
French Guiana (Cayenne) in South America, along with Belize in Central America; and its outer
circle constituted by the Caribbean Basin, which would include all the countries in the first two
categories as well as the littoral states of South America (e.g. Colombia and Venezuela), all of
Central America, and Mexico). These are, of course, only a few of many ways to imagine the
meaning and parameters of "the Caribbean."
124. See MODERN CARIBBEAN POLITICS 4-6 (Anthony Payne & Paul Sutton eds., 1993).
125. See generally BENfTEZ-RoJo, supra note 123, at 35 (of course, Benftez-Rojo's
construction of "the Caribbean" as "a way of being in the world" incorporates, but is not
exhausted by, the musical rhythms that express it).
126. The Caribbean Basin construct was initially forwarded by the United States as part of its
project to combat the "leftist threat to the prevailing pro-western ideological order and U.S.

influence in the Caribbean Basin." See ERISMAN, supra note 123, at 132 n.12 (discussing the
purpose and scope of the Reagan Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) which defined
the Caribbean Basin to encompass Central America, Panama, all the independent islands plus
Guyana and Belize). But the struggle to delimit a broader map of the Caribbean has also been
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politically fragmented, culturally distinct, and multi-lingual particularities is an open question, but whether we seek "the Caribbean" in the
regional similarities that transcend the diversities of language and history or, alternatively, in the struggle to imagine a future beyond the
political fragmentation and economic uniformity that keeps these small
countries dependent and weak, we will certainly not find it in any substantive meaning of the term democracy. On the contrary, as the first
three essays in this cluster demonstrate, the Caribbean offers a particularly compelling starting point for an anti-subordination analysis of
"democracy," precisely because democracy has been, for so long and for
so many different reasons, as elusive in this region, as the dream of selfdetermination and the hope of peace. By focusing LatCrit attention on
"the Caribbean," Professor Griffith challenges us to configure a broad
and multidimensional vision of the democratic project - one that genuinely engages the anti-subordination struggles of peoples beyond the
United States, even as it requires LatCrit scholars to think more critically
about the U.S. role, both in promoting and obstructing the democratic
project in this hemisphere.
Professor Griffith's story of the Caribbean is of democratic possibilities held hostage to an international drug war. Though U.S. popular
rhetoric casts the problem primarily in terms of drug traffickers and
pushers, "the drug problem," as Professor Griffith argues, is a fully integrated multi-billion dollar transnational industry that - from production
to consumption to the recycling of drug profits - cuts across all regions
of the hemisphere, penetrates all sectors of society and implicates all
levels of government. 27
' Assessing the impact of "the drug problem" on
democracy requires a clear understanding of the divergent problems
triggered by the different stages of this industry. It also presupposes
some working definition of what democracy is. Drawing on the classic
work of Joseph Schumpeter, Professor Griffiths defines democracy as a
political form in which the contestation over state power operates
through free and regular elections, where a high degree of participation
is admitted and where there exist effective institutions to guarantee
respect for civil and political rights and enhance social justice. Thus,
when we speak of democracy "we are talking about contestation for
central to the CARICOM project to promote the kind of regional integration that will enable the
small countries of the Caribbean to coordinate the diversification of their otherwise competing
economies and to leverage their political objectives by articulating a unified position. See
ERISMAN, supra, at 111-12 (discussing the Pan-Caribbean perspective underlying Mexican and
Venezuelan pledges to provide oil at preferential prices to various Central American and
Caribbean states, as well as the vision underlying CARICOM itself).
127. United Nations estimates that the international trade in illegal drugs is worth $400 billion
approximately 8% of world trade - more than the trading in iron, steel or motor vehicles. See
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL 2 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 503 (1991).
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power, participation, and institutions."'' 28
Given this definition of democracy, Professor Griffith develops a
multidimensional analysis of the way the international drug industry and
the war it has spawned operate in different ways to undermine the democratic project in the Caribbean. It is a story of corruption engendered by
the circulation of billions in illegal profits that skews the logic of political contestation and makes state power unaccountable to the democratic
electoral process, as well as a story of private business and financial
elites, seduced into money laundering schemes that disrupt ordinary
market forces, undermine the viability of legitimate economic activities
and facilitate the consolidation of power and wealth in the hands of drug
lords and their cronies. It is also a story of law enforcement run amok in
its increasingly futile efforts to stamp out the drug trade through repressive and anti-democratic assaults on precisely those fundamental civil
and political rights without which no democracy can flourish.
Professor Stotzky's essay tells a second story of the Caribbean.
Measured against the aspirational imperatives of what he calls "deliberative democracy,"' 29 the transition to democracy in Haiti is a story of the
democratic project held hostage to internal corporative political structures and external financial elites. These internal corporative structures
suppress the emergence of a genuinely deliberative democracy by
excluding "the people" from effective participation in the political process - in different ways, depending on whether the corporative structures are organized from the top down or the bottom up. When imposed
from the top down, the state controls, coopts and to a large degree incorporates the organization of interest groups into state sanctioned monopolies, whose agendas are then confined to the politics of the possible as
determined by the state; when organized from the bottom up, private
power blocks so dominate the political process that the state is captured
and subordinated to the articulation of their special interests. In either
case, these corporatist variations leave little room for the expression of
the popular will of the people.
In Haiti, as elsewhere throughout Latin America and the Caribbean,
factions of the military, the Catholic Church, the business class, trade
unions and even the press have all, at different times, cooperated in the
institutionalization of corporatism by trading support for authoritarian
regimes in exchange for special privileges. Because these privileges are
threatened, as much by the rise of a genuine and popular sovereignty as
by the extremism of a military dictatorship run amok, the legacy of cor128. Griffith, supra note 122, at 873.
129. Stotzky, supra note 122, at 890 (explaining the fundamental elements of a deliberative

democracy).
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poratism is a network of organized power blocks hostile to any project
of social, political or economic change that might force them to relinquish their special privileges or hold them accountable to the people
whose families they have murdered or whose patrimony they have
expropriated and squandered. In such a context, the consolidation of a
democracy requires dismantling these corporative power blocks pre-

cisely because a genuinely participatory democracy presupposes and
would undoubtedly trigger vast changes in the socio-economic and polit-

ical structures these corporatist groups are most invested in maintaining.
Indeed, one need only consider Professor Stotzky's description of
the objectives of "the Aristide Plan" to see how constructing the condi130

tions for participatory democracy might threaten vested interests.
Demilitarization, an independent judiciary, empowered labor unions,
grass roots organizations, cooperatives and community groups, progressive taxation and human rights prosecutions are all political objectives
certain to put any democratic project on a collision course with precisely those sectors that have most benefitted from the repression and
demobilization of the impoverished majority. Add to these internal
obstacles, the externally imposed austerity measures dictated by the

structural adjustment policies through which international financial
organizations like the World Bank and the IMF have projected their neoliberal agenda onto the international political economy, 13 1 and the obstacles confronting the democratic project in Haiti are nothing less than
daunting.

132

130. Id. at 893-903 (describing and critiquing the Aristide Plan).
131. As Professor Stotzky notes, the economic aspects of the Aristide Plan reflect the influence
of the World Bank, the IMF and the Agency for International Development in their boilerplate
responses to the economic crisis in Haiti. Id. at 899. Trade "liberalization," privatization, reduced
social spending and similar policies are a familiar fare served up for Third World consumption by
these international agents of transnational capitalism. Unfortunately, these policies have, since
the 1980s, only further impoverished and politically destabilized the countries that adopt them. It
doesn't take a rocket scientist to see this - thus leading anyone with half an open mind to wonder
at the relentless insistence with which these failed policies are repeatedly prescribed. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces and the Role of CriticalRace Theory in the
Strugglefor Community Control of Investments: An Institutional Class Analysis, 45 VILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces] (assessing structural
adjustment policies through a critical analysis of the institutional class structures of the
international political economy).
132. See James H. Street, The Reality of Power and the Poverty of Economic Doctrine, in
LATIN

AMERICA'S

ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT:

INSTITUTIONALIST

AND

STRUCTURALIST

PERSPECTIVES 16-32 (James L. Dietz & James H. Street eds., 1987). Street's analysis is
particularly interesting because it shows the symbiotic relationship linking authoritarian political
regimes and international financial organizations. The call for structural adjustment by
institutions like the IMF may well serve the political needs of authoritarian elites. When the
people mobilize against the impact of austerity policies, their mobilization is cast as civil disorder
(instigated by subversive communist influences) and used to justify the kinds of repression to
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However, the Haitian story only brings into starker relief the extent
to which the democratic project in poor countries throughout Latin
America and the Caribbean is caught between the internal rock of corporative political monopolies and the external hard place constituted by
international financial organizations. Based on past history and the
short-term interest analysis these two sectors tend routinely to exhibit, it
is reasonable to predict that the former will continue opposing the progressive tax policies, antitrust regimes and educational programs
through which Professor Stotzky would reform the neoliberal agenda to
help the poor majority live a dignified life, the latter will continue to
oppose any state intervention in the economy that impinges on foreign
exports and direct investments or restricts the expatriation of profits, and
neither will be much interested in actually implementing Professor
Stotzky's vision of deliberative democracy.
Thus, this second story of
33
heartening.
not
is
the Caribbean
Mr. Martinez's essay on the rise and fall of the socialist project in
Nicaragua provides yet a third perspective on the problem of democracy
in the Caribbean. Though Nicaragua is geographically located in Central
America, its position in "the Caribbean" is a function of the geopolitical
rhetoric through which the Reagan Administration chose to respond to
the "communist-in-our-own-backyard" problem. 34 The will to view the
Nicaraguan revolution in terms of Cold War politics, rather than as a
response to the legacy of terror and expropriation imposed on this small
country by a U.S. sponsored dictatorship, is testament to the self-serving
myopia that enabled former President Reagan to tell the Wall Street
Journal in 1980 that "It]he Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is
going on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominos, there
'3
wouldn't be any hot spots in the world."' 1
Contrary to Reagan's suggestion, the Nicaraguan revolution ousted
the Somoza dictatorship in 1979 through "the organized, militant particiwhich these elites are already inclined. Only from this perspective can an authoritarian
dictatorship be made to appear a solution rather than a problem for the nation.
133. For a more hopeful perspective on the potential role for Bretton Woods institutions to

contribute to the evolution of a more just international political economy, see Carrasco, LatCrit
Theory and Law and Development, supra note 102; Enrique R. Carrasco & M. Ayhan Kose,
Income Distributionand the Bretton Woods Institutions: Promoting an Enabling Environmentfor
Social Development, 6 TRANSN'L LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1996).
134. See, e.g., HOLLY SKLAR, WASHINGTON'S WAR ON NICARAGUA 57-8 (1988) (noting that

"[iln a March 1979 radio broadcast, Reagan seconded Idaho Rep. Steve Symms' concern that 'the
Caribbean is rapidly becoming a Communist lake in what should be an American pond."' Reagan
added: "The troubles in Nicaragua bear a Cuban label also. While there are people in that
troubled land who probably have justified grievances against the Somoza regime, there is no
question but that most of the rebels are Cuban-trained, Cuban-armed, and dedicated to creating
another Communist country in the hemisphere.").
135. Id.

1999]

FOREWORD

pation of Nicaraguan citizens in a 'people's war' against a brutal and
ruthless tyranny." 136 Mr. Martinez's objective is to explain why the Nicaraguan people initially supported this revolution and how the Sandinistas ultimately lost the people's support. 137 He tells this story through a
critical analysis of the Somocista property regime that preceded the
revolution, as well as the promises made and later betrayed by the
Sandinista government's failure to legally institutionalize its agrarian
reforms in a viable property rights regime. ' 38 This failure to establish a
new legal order facilitated the rapid re-concentration of land ownership,
through privatization, Sandinista self-dealing, and the rush of former
landowners to reclaim their expropriated properties after the Sandinistas
lost the 1990 election to Violeta Chamorro.
These three stories of "the Caribbean" provide different perspectives on the profound challenges confronting the articulation of democratic theory in LatCrit scholarship. They tell of the democratic project
held hostage to drug traffickers, domestic corporative elites, international financial organizations and the self-interests of defeated revolutionaries. What they do not mention is the role played by U.S.
government agents in facilitating the growth of international drug trafficking through their collaborations with, protection of and assistance to,
known drug traffickers involved in this government's "anti-communist"
crusades;' 39 they do not tell of the millions of U.S. tax payer dollars
spent supporting the Duvalier and Somoza dictatorships, as much as the
corporatist elites in post-dictatorship Haiti and Nicaragua;' 4 ° they do
136. GARY RUCHWARGER, PEOPLE IN POWER: FORGING A GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY IN
NICARAGUA (1987) (noting that the revolution would have been impossible without widespread
support and recounting extent of popular participation in the struggle against Somoza).
137. See JEFFREY M. PAIGE, COFFEE AND POWER: REVOLUTION AND THE RISE OF DEMOCRACY

IN CENTRAL AMERICA (1997) (explaining role of agro-export elite in consolidating national unity
alliance that enabled overthrow of Somoza, even as it laid seeds for eventual failure of Sandinista
reform project).
138. For a variety of perspectives on the Sandinista's land reforms and Nicaraguan property
law, see generally Symposium: The Nicaraguan PropertyRegime After Sandinista Land Reform,
22 CAP. U. L. REV. 833-963 (1993). Compare Jaime Wheelock RomAn, Changes in Agrarian
Property in Nicaragua,22 CAP. U. L. REV. 853 (1993), with 0. Herodocia Lacayo, The Current
State of Nicaraguan Property Law, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 839 (1993).
139. See, e.g., Peter Dale Scott & Jonathan Marshall, COCAINE POLITICS: DRUGS, ARMIES AND
THE CIA IN CENTRAL AMERICA (1991); ALFRED W. McCoY, THE POLITICS OF HEROIN:
COMPLICITY IN THE GLOBAL DRUG TRADE (1991).

CIA

140. See WILLIAM BLUM, KILLING HOPE: U.S. MILITARY AND CIA INTERVENTIONS SINCE
WORLD WAR 11 (1995). As Blum recounts, the Duvalier family ruled Haiti from 1957-1986, when
Jean Claude was forced to take flight for the French Riviera on U.S. Air Force jet. Id. at 370. In
Nicaragua, Anastasio Somoza was installed as director of the Nicaraguan National Guard by
departing U.S. military forces in 1933. The United States had invaded the country to quash the
revolutionary uprising, supported by Augusto Cesar Sandino of the Liberal Party and purportedly
financed by the Mexican government. In the years between 1933 and 1979, when Anastasio
Somoza II was finally forced into exile by the Sandinista revolution, the Somoza family had
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not tell of the CIA complicity in, and financial support for, the terror
unleashed by the Haitian military and the Nicaraguan contras in their
efforts to "restore order" and demobilize the masses for a more "governable democracy." And yet, these missing elements are crucial to any
anti-essentialist, anti-subordination analysis of the challenges facing the
democratic project in the Caribbean precisely because, and to the
increasing extent that, the democratic project everywhere is ultimately
hostage to the policies of the only remaining superpower. The United
States cannot continue "to promote democracy" with one hand, even as
it undermines it with the other.
Thus, from an anti-subordination perspective, it makes sense for
LatCrit scholars to begin our foray into democratic theory by focusing
on the nature and impact of U.S. policies and politics. Beginning this
way locates the problems of democracy at the center, rather than the
peripheries, where LatCrit sensibilities should counsel us to tread rather
carefully, lest we are too quickly seduced or reduced to thinking in terms
of the readily available blame-the-victim discourses of Third World corruption, authoritarian traditions, and bureaucratic impotence.'
These
factors are certainly obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in the
Caribbean and elsewhere, but they are embedded in an ongoing, centuries-long process of interventions, transactions and exchanges between
Third World states and peoples and a multitude of "foreign intervenors," whose resources, objectives and ideologies are profoundly implicated in the scourge of corruption, dictatorship and underdevelopment
that has visited these regions. Thus the problems of democracy in the
Caribbean or elsewhere cannot be fairly assessed, nor effectively
resolved without detailed and particularized attention to the anti-democratic impact of U.S. foreign and domestic policies. Indeed, revealing
and combating these policies may be the best way for LatCrit scholars to
get to "the bottom" of the problems of democracy, both beyond and
within the United States.'4 2
RECONTEXTUALIZING

THE DEMOCRATIC PROJECT:

BEYOND

NEOLIBERAL ASSUMPTIONS AND IMPERIALIST LEGAL STRUCTURES

The last two essays in this cluster by Professors Mertus and Romdn
amassed a fortune in land and businesses then worth $900 million, even as they left behind a
country where two-thirds of the people earned less than $300 a year. Id. at 290.
141. See Ileana M. Porras, A LatCrit Sensibility Approaches the International: Reflections on
Environmental Rights and Third Generation Solidarity Rights, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
413, 419-20 (1996-97) (urging a LatCrit perspective sensitive to both sameness/difference that can
mediate the USLat/OtroLat identities).
142. Iglesias, Out of the Shadow, supra note 30, at 379-83 (examining linkage between U.S.

anti-terrorism interventions abroad and the devolution of domestic civil rights).
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shift our focus and expand our analysis of the problem democracy. 43
Professor Mertus's essay launches a new trajectory of analysis by offering a preliminary comparison of the transition process in the countries of
Eastern Europe and Latin America. In articulating these comparisons,
she notes four particularly significant differences worth further reflection: (1) the different attitudes and relationships foreign intervenors
have adopted towards the governing elites of the pre-transition regimes
in these two regions; (2) the logically incoherent rhetorical structures
generated by the biased and uninformed manner in which foreign
observers tend to assess the meaning of, and allocate blame for, the
internal conflicts and atrocities committed by competing groups in Eastern Europe and Latin America; (3) the different way foreign intervenors
in these two regions have prioritized market and electoral reforms in the
transition from dictatorship; and (4) the degree of internal conflict over
the so-called "stateness problem" within these different regions. By
identifying these four points of comparison, Professor Mertus provides a
valuable analytical framework for a critical comparative analysis of the
substantive content of "the democratic project" now circling the globe,
as well as for assessing the degree to which this neoliberal project
coheres with the right of self-determination, understood from an antiessentialist, anti-subordination perspective.
In this vein, Professor Mertus notes that western intervenors have
generally been more willing to work with the remnants of pre-transition
regimes in Latin America than those in Central and Eastern Europe. This
she finds unsurprising, given that the U.S. government actually established and substantially maintained the military dictatorships in some
countries, like Haiti, Guatemala and Nicaragua, and remained a steadfast
ally of, and apologist for, the military dictatorships in others, like Argentina and Chile - even as these regimes waged dirty wars of inconceivable brutality against their own people.'" These regimes, though
homicidal and corrupt, were friends and clients of the U.S. national
security state. The need to legitimate U.S. complicity in their criminal
practices and repressive policies gave birth to the totalitarian/authoritarian state dichotomy. In Reaganite doublespeak, the kind of human
rights violations and political and economic repression perpetrated by
the military dictatorships in Latin America were of a lesser evil than the
143. Mertus, supra note 122; Roman, Reconstructing Self-Determination, supra note 122.

144. See, e.g.,

SKLAR,

supra note 134, at 61 (quoting several of Ronald Reagan's radio

broadcasts in support of the Argentine military dictators and Chile's Pinochet); see generally

BLUM, supra note 140 (recounting U.S. role in installing and/or assisting the military dictatorships
in Guatemala, Haiti, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia,

Nicaragua, Panama and El Salvador as well as its various efforts to topple the democracy in Costa
Rica).
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kind committed by Eastern block regimes because the latter were "totalitarian states," while the former were only "authoritarian." Totalitarian
states were always, everywhere and in every way, repressive and evil.
Authoritarian dictatorships, by contrast, were not nearly so bad, and
sometimes even necessary to ensure the governability of impoverished
and uneducated masses too readily duped by international communists.' 4 5 By organizing her comparison of the transition process in Latin
America and Eastern Europe around a critical analysis of the relationships and attitudes foreign intervenors adopt toward pre-transition
regime elites, Professor Mertus thus reveals how the neoliberal democratic project is still embedded in the doublespeak legacy of cold war
politics.
Professor Mertus also contrasts the attitudes reflected in the way
western intervenors have treated the process of political reform in Latin
America and Eastern Europe. She notes, for example, that the 1988 Chilean plebiscite that ousted the Pinochet dictatorship was observed by
thousands of western election observers, while fewer than thirty western
observers were sent to oversee the 1992 Presidential elections in which
Slobodan Milosevic defeated challenger Milan Panic. 4 6 This differential treatment raises profound questions about the "really existing
agenda" driving the neoliberal project to promote "democratic" transitions across the globe. Certainly, Professor Mertus is right to suggest
that western intervention projects of the 1990s in Eastern Europe have
tended to prioritize the institutionalization of transnational capitalist economic relations over the consolidation of democratic accountability and
the self-determination of peoples. However, the apparent emphasis on
political reform in Latin America may not reflect different priorities, so
much as the fact that Latin America has already been dancing to the
tune of neoliberal market reform projects since the sovereign debt crisis
of the early 1980s and its aftermath shifted the balance of power
between Latin American debtor states and international financial organizations.14 7 Indeed, if anything, the ready willingness with which the
U.S. government embraced and supported the Pinochet dictatorship,
which even today is lauded as a poster-child for the neoliberal model of
economic development in the Third World, 4 8 suggests the degree to
145. See SKLAR, supra note 134, at 60-61 (attributing the totalitarian/authoritarian dichotomy
to Jeanne Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations under Reagan and deconstructing
its incoherence and hypocrisy).
146. Mertus, supra note 122, at 939-40.
147. See, e.g., Philip J. Power, Note, Sovereign Debt: the Rise of the Secondary Market and its
Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701 (1996) (providing excellent
overview of Latin American debt crisis and legal mechanisms through which balance of power

between debtor countries and international financial organizations has since been reconfigured).
148. Cf

Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, Chile and Singapore: The Individual and The
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which U.S. foreign policy in the region has subordinated democratic

reform to the imperatives of transnational capitalism.
By focusing LatCrit attention on the relative priority accorded democratic political and neo-liberal economic reforms in these different
regions, Professor Mertus's comparative analysis maps out a rich field
of inquiry for examining and assessing, from an anti-subordinationperspective, the increasing convergence between current projects to promote "democratic transitions" through market reform in Eastern Europe

and the structural adjustment policies and agendas that have ravaged
much of Latin America. 14 9 At the same time, by situating her comparative analysis in the perennial debate over the relationship between capitalism and democracy, Professor Mertus challenges LatCrit scholars to
reflect more deeply on the way LatCrit anti-essentialist, anti-subordination objectives are impacted by the economic and political outcomes of
this debate.
In the dominant neoliberal narrative, capitalism and democracy are
cast as complementary and mutually reinforcing processes: capitalism

promotes democracy, and democracy promotes capitalism in a happy
embrace of economic abundance and political freedom. In some variations of the narrative, this is because competitive markets prevent the
concentration of economic power, thereby preserving the people's freedom by dispersing and decentralizing private power; 50 in others, ironically, it is because capitalism enables the consolidation of private power
blocks large enough to counter-balance the power of the ever-embryonic

totalitarian state. 51 This narrative of the happy relationship between
Collective, A Comparison, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 739 (1998) (noting and criticizing
assumptions embedded in representations of Chile as the "model for necessary authoritarianism");
Enrique R. Carrasco, Autocratic Transitions to Liberalism: A Comparison of Chilean And
Russian Structural Adjustment, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99 (1995) (Chile cast as
model for Russian transition).
149. Compare, e.g., Kent Klaudt, Hungary After the Revolution: Privatization, Economic
Ideology and the False Promise of the Free Market, 13 LAW & INEQ. 303 (1995) (documenting
the impact of neoliberal economic ideology on the production of poverty, unemployment, massive
inequality and crime on a scale previously unknown in the centrally planned statist economies of
the former Soviet Union), with STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE SPREADING CRISIS IN LATIN
AMERICA, (1995) <http://www.igc.apc.org/dgap/crisis.html> (visited August 27, 1999) (providing
overview of impact of neoliberal structural adjustment policies on the political instability and
economic underdevelopment in Latin America).
150. See, e.g., Walter Adams & James W. Brock, The Sherman Act and the Economic Power
Problem, THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN, Spring 1990. Conversely, neoliberals argue that democracy
promotes capitalism because private companies must be free of state interventions and
bureaucratization in order to innovate. See Bob Jessop, Capitalism and Democracy: The Best
Possible Political Shell? in POWER AND THE STATE (Gary Littlejohn et al. eds., 1978); F.A.
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1946).
151. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 9 (1962):
Viewed as a means to the end of political freedom, economic arrangements are
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capitalism and democracy exists in direct competition with accounts of
their mutual incompatibility. In these alternative accounts, each domain
threatens always and everywhere to overrun and subsume the other:
Capitalism threatens democratic freedom, and democratic politics
threaten capitalist freedom. The threat to democratic freedom arises
from the growth of economically powerful private firms, whose significance to the national economy renders the state, and the political possibilities it can pursue, hostage to the policy preferences of these
corporate giants. 152 Conversely, since democracy creates the space
through which demands for redistributive interventions are expressed
and imposed upon private economic elites, the institutionalization of
democratic accountability to the people always threatens to contract the
53
realm of capitalist freedom.
Given the degree to which racial, ethnic and other forms of subordination are organized around both the political marginalization and the
economic dispossession of peoples of color, Professor Mertus's essay
suggests the profound challenges and wide range of questions awaiting
LatCrit attention in the field of democratic theory. Though a LatCrit
perspective might certainly shed valuable light on the rhetorical instability created by these abstract theoretical debates about the "real" relationship between capitalism and democracy, our legal training makes us
particularly well situated to pursue a project more immediately relevant
to the objectives of promoting anti-essentialist, anti-subordination social
transformation through law. This project would focus critical analysis on
the way the relationship between the state and the market is articulated
in the interpretation of legal doctrine - particularly in litigated cases
and legislative debates where the struggle for racial justice has confronted and sought to render the monopolization of both economic and
political power democratically accountable.' 5 4 The outcome of such
important because of their effect on the concentration or dispersion of power. The
kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely,
competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates
economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the
other.

Indeed, in some versions of this second account, even concentrated markets promote freedom
because only large economically powerful private corporations can counterbalance the power of a
centralized, bureaucratic, interventionist state. See Jessop, supra note 150.
152. See Adams & Brock, supra note 150, at 44 (discussing the capacity of giant firms (and
labor unions) to threaten economic catastrophe if their demands are not met); see also Robert
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1057 (1979) (excessive
concentration of economic power will breed anti-democratic political pressures).
153. See Offe & Ronge, supra note 118; Offe, supra note 118.
154. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, "Confronting Race" by Mapping the Construction of
Institutional Power: LatCrit Reflections on Law and the Anti-Political Economy, 33 MICH. J. L.
REF.; 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter Iglesias, The Anti-PoliticalEconomy]
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cases and legislative debates raise fundamental questions about the relationship between racial inequality and the institutional structures and
processes of the neoliberal political economy.
At stake, ultimately, is the question whether racial, ethnic and other
forms of subordination can be eliminated within the institutional
arrangements of a neoliberal political economy, structured around the
strategic separation of economics and politics.' 5 5 The answer LatCrit
scholars give to this question may determine whether the imperatives of
racial equality are to be satisfied by a project that achieves for minority
communities the reproduction and transposition of the same class hierarchies pervasive in white society or whether the struggle for racial equality will eschew institutional arrangements that perpetuate the economic
dispossession and political marginalization of the world's vast majorities
and engage, instead, in the search for alternative arrangements that can
actualize a more real and substantive democracy throughout both the
political and economic institutions of the inter/national political
economy.
Finally, by focusing her comparative analysis of the transition
processes in Latin America and Eastern Europe on "the problem of
stateness," Professor Mertus raises one of the most vexing problems
confronting any project aimed at articulating a substantive vision of selfdetermination - that is, in Professor Roman's formulation, the problem
of defining "the self' whose right of self-determination is to be protected
and enabled through the construction of democratic regimes. 5 6 While
Latin American states have enjoyed substantial international support in
resisting the legal recognition of self-determination movements operating in this hemisphere,"5 ' Professor Mertus notes that "the state" in Eastern Europe has been systematically weakened by recent developments
both at the international and subnational levels. At the international
level, the driving engine of the neoliberal project has been the perceived
imperative of weakening the totalitarian state. Indeed, the weak state,
(tracing interpretative manipulation of the state/market dichotomy through cases adjudicating
constitutionality of minority business set-asides and political boycotts seeking racial justice in the
market); see also Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces, supra note 131 (illustrating how
economic/political dichotomy is invoked to obstruct democratization of economic institutions).
155. See Iglesias, The Anti-Political Economy, supra note 154 (for deconstructive analyses
revealing the strategically manipulated indeterminancy of the purported separation of economics
and politics).
156. See Roman, Reconstructing Self-Determination, supra note 122, at 947.
157. L.C. Green, Low Intensity Conflict and the Law, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 493, 503-04
(1997) (noting that none of the guerrilla movements in Latin America have ever been recognized
by the Organization of American States on the theory that they are not national liberation
movements, but only "revolutionary groups seeking to replace the local government rather than to
overthrow domination, alien occupation or a racist regime").
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with limited authority to intervene in the economy and power fragmented across a system of checks and balances is at the heart of the
liberal democratic vision of freedom. 158 However, in weakening the
state to free the market, foreign intervenors have perhaps unwittingly
contributed to the reactivation of ethnonationalist divisions at subnational levels throughout the region. These ethnonationalist group identities each claim the right of self-determination, undermining the power of
the state and thereby triggering the so-called "stateness problem," precisely because the right of self-determination is legally effectuated
through the international community's recognition that a particular
group has the right to pursue self-government through the organization
of their own state.
The final essay by Professor Romdn takes up the international right
of self-determination as if by design. While the preceding essays reveal,
in different ways, the disjuncture between democratic rhetoric and the
anti-democratic realities produced by the history and ongoing fallout of
cold war politics, Professor Romdn's essay links this disjuncture to the
structure of international law and, more specifically, to the strategic
manipulations through which the doctrine of the right of self-determination of peoples has been interpreted in international law. According to
Professor Romdn, despite the supposed underpinning of the right to selfdetermination in the universal norms of human freedom and the equal
right of all peoples to control their own destinies, the right of self-determination has been hostage to three stages in the organization of the current world order. These three stages are marked by the era of
geopolitical militarism; the era of racial tutelage, in which the self-determination for non-self-governing and trust territories was to proceed,
under the Trusteeship System, "at a pace dictated by the colonial administrators"; and the era of global disinterest marked by the tolerance of
first world powers towards the alien domination of some third world
peoples by other third world peoples.
In each era, the right to self-determination has been hostage to the
political calculations of the most powerful states in the international
community as well as to the indeterminacy surrounding the scope and
limits of the right of self-determination. In its most restrictive formulation, the right is not recognized outside the decolonization context; in its
most expansive formulation, the right of secession might be asserted by
any distinct minority group. Thus, in Professor Romdn's view, articulating a substantive content for the right of self-determination of peoples
requires the formulation of objective criteria by which to determine
whether a group constitutes "a self'or "a people."
158. See Offe & Ronge, supra note 118; Offe, supra note 118.
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Professor Romdn's search for the objective criteria that make a
group a people, like Professor Mertus's comparison of the stateness
problem in Latin America and Eastern Europe, raise manifold questions
for LatCrit theory. The Eastern European experience under the ethnonationalist governance structures established by the Dayton Peace Accords
counsels grave caution in conflating the right of self-determination with
the project of having "a state of one's own."1'59 As with any complex and
multidimensional problem, the substantive and methodological commitments already articulated in prior LatCrit scholarship provide a useful
point of departure. At a minimum, this record counsels that the problem
of defining the meaning of, and designing the institutional structures to
give substantive content to, the right of self-determination should be
approached from an anti-essentialist, anti-subordination perspective.
From this perspective, the problem of self-determination is the same visa-vis any collectivity that purports to represent the interests of individuals, who are always and everywhere constituted as multidimensional
beings marked by distinctions of class, gender, race, ethnicity, language,
sexual orientation, and national origin. That problem, as Professor Mertus notes, is the problem of developing institutional arrangements that
can sustain the commitment to social justice, both between and within
states, by recognizing the importance of group membership and identities, on the one hand, and the value of personal autonomy and individual
rights, on the other. 16 0
From this perspective, the anti-subordination agenda implicated in
the struggle for self-determination reaches far beyond the parameters
delimited by the problems of constituting a state. Indeed, I have argued
before, and still believe, that the demise of the interstate system of sovereign nations is a potentially progressive development for the struggle
" ' Not only has the structure of the
against subordination. 16
interstate system figured prominently in enabling both the processes of uneven development and the practice of war, 6 2 but as the essays by Professor Mertus
and Romdn illustrate, the very project of delimiting the parameters of a
state must inevitably essentialize the identities and suppress the multi159. See Shelley Inglis, Re/Constructing Right(s): The Dayton Peace Agreement,
InternationalCivil Society Development, and Gender in PostwarBosnia-Herzegovina, 30 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 79-80 (1998) (describing the ethnonationalistic structure of the
constitutional regime established by the Dayton Peace Accords, which divide all components of
the central government into thirds, ensuring both equal representation of Croats, Serbs, and
Bosniaks and the paralysis of a central government mired in ethnic politics).
160. Mertus, supra note 122, at 942.
161. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Foreword: International Law, Human Rights and Lat
Crit Theory, 28 INTER-AM. L. REV. 206-07 (1996-97) [hereinafter Iglesias, Foreword].
162. See id. (citing references).
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plicity of interests that simultaneously converge and diverge in the configuration of any group.
Rather than investing further in a bankrupt system of nation-states,
LatCrit theory might chart a new agenda to imagine and articulate the
kinds of institutional arrangements and rights regimes that can promote
the right of self-determination, both at the international and sub-national

levels where the neoliberal project is, even now, reconfiguring and consolidating new regimes of freedom and compulsion. At an international
level, this agenda might take up the pending project of promoting the
full recognition of individuals as subjects of international law, for exam-

ple, through the incorporation of international human rights into the
institutional structures, substantive norms, and decisional procedures
currently regulated by international economic law.' 6 3 At a subnational
level, this agenda might begin by rejecting the neoliberal paradigm that

confines democracy to the political realm, and pursue the institutionalization of democratic governance structures throughout the inter/national
economy as well. 164 Both trajectories provide a meaningful way out of
"the stateness problem," even as they expand the parameters and meaning of democracy in ways that more readily cohere with the anti-essen-

tialist, anti-subordination commitments that are the heart of the LatCrit
movement.
B. Language, Technology and Communicative Power: From
Language Rights to the Struggle for Control of the Means
of Communication

Language rights have been a central issue in LatCrit theory since its
inception.1 65 LatCrit III was, however, the first time that LatCrit conference organizers sought intentionally and self-consciously to link the
163. See, e.g., Iglesias, InternationalEconomic Law, supra note 15; G. Richard Shell, Trade
Legalism and InternationalRelations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44
DUKE L.J. 829 (1995) (advocating trade stakeholder's model as vehicle to incorporate social
welfare and human rights into WTO); Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an
Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A Proposalfor Addition to the World Trade
Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 1 (1996).
164. See, e.g., Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces, supra note 131 (critical analysis of
legal reforms needed to promote community participation in decisionmaking processes through
which investment capital is allocated in the inter/national political economy).
165. See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, Direct Democracy and Distrust: The Relationship Between
Language, Law, Rhetoric and the Language Vigilantism Experience, 2. HARV. LATINO L. REv.
145 (1997); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garc(a Cousins Lost Their Accents:
Understandingthe Language of Title VII DecisionsApproving English-Only Rules as the Product
of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347; 10 LA
RAZA 261 (1998) (critical analysis of Title VII's anti-discrimination framework given its failure to
prohibit the imposition of arbitrary and intrusive restrictions on the use of languages other than
English in the workplace).
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struggle against English-Only to a broader struggle for communicative
power. This imagined project was forwarded to expand LatCrit theory's
substantive agenda by encouraging a collaborative effort to develop a
critical analysis of the way differential access to the means of communication is legally constructed across different sociolegal contexts and the
way the resulting structures of communicative power/lessness should be
addressed in LatCrit theory.' 66 In this expanded critical project, the
struggle over language rights reflects only one instance in a more general struggle against relations of domination organized by and effectuated through the legal production of differential access to the means of
communication. This is because the compelling personal and collective
interests at stake in the struggle against the suppression of non-English
languages are equally implicated in the such matters as the regulation of
political speech 167 and the ownership and control of new technologies of

communication.

168

Indeed, in each of these contexts, the matter at stake is the power to
communicate - to express oneself - meaningfully and effectively.

Increasingly, the power to communicate is determined by access to, control of, or authority over the means of communication.

69

Indeed, the

"means of communication" have become as central to the structure of
power/lessness in our postmodern, hyperlinked, globalized, mass media
society as the "means of production" were central to the class struggles
of modernizing industrialism. Individuals and communities shut out of
the information age and out-spent in a political system that casts the
expenditure of money as protected political speech - such that effective

speech comes to depend increasingly on the ability to spend money are just as certainly robbed of the instruments of self-determination and
166. To this end, LatCrit III featured a plenary panel entitled Anti-Subordinationand the Legal
Struggle over Control of the "Means of Communication:" Technology, Language and
Communicative Power. A description of its substantive objectives can be found at <http://
nersp.nerdc.ufl.edu/-malavet/latcrit/archives/lciii.htm>.
167. See, e.g., Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1977) (striking down restrictions on
corporate political expenditures on theory that such expenditures constitute speech protected by V
Amendment); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (expenditures of money constitute protected
speech).
168. See, e.g., Madeleine Mercedes Plasencia, The Politicsof Race on the Electronic Highway:
An Analysis of the Video Dialtone Redlining Cases, and the Nynex Consent Decree in Roxbury, 15
ToURo L. REV. 513 (1999) [hereinafter Plasencia, Video Dialtone Redlining] (describing how
discriminatory redlining practices of telecommunications companies threaten to shut minority
neighborhoods out of communications revolution).
169. See Keith Aoki, Introduction: Language is a Virus, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 961 (1999)
(Long Live Keith Aoki!); see also MARK D. ALLEYNE, INTERNATIONAL POWER AND
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION 2-5 (1995)

(explaining difference between communication,

understood as systems and infrastructures for dissemination of information, (e.g. telephones,
satellites, news agencies, and languages) and information, understood as 'raw matter' or data,
whose content is circulated through the means of communication).
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the power of self-expression, as workers separated from and denied control over the means of production. By thematizing the linkages between
language, meaning-making power and the struggle for self-determination, the essays in this cluster go a long way toward delimiting a broad
0
field ripe for anti-subordination theory and practice. 17
LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL THEORY

The opening essay by Professors Bill Bratton and Drucilla Cornell
is based on a collaborative project in which they join the anti-nativist
struggle against initiatives to suppress the use of languages other than
English. 17 ' Their objective is to make an economic and moral case for
treating language based discrimination as an equal rights violation. Interestingly, they develop their arguments using two very different forms of
discourse. Professor Bratton uses law and economic analysis to challenge key assumptions about the way English-Only laws and employment regulations affect the incentive structures through which individual
language acquisition and group assimilation are mediated in this country. Professor Cornell articulates a moral theory of rights that casts
respect for language rights as fundamental to "the basic moral right of
personality," thereby moving the articulation of equality rights beyond
the truncated formalism of an anti-discrimination framework to ground
it, instead, on the concept of self-determination.
More specifically, Professor Bratton's objective is to use economic
analysis to destabilize the nativist political project by challenging the
assumption that English-only laws and workplace regulations will promote assimilation to the English-speaking norm that, for the nativist,
defines "the essence" of American identity. He acknowledges that English-only laws and policies are, at least superficially, supported by a
plausible economic argument that language regulation maximizes social
utilities by increasing communicative efficiency and reducing barriers to
social interaction otherwise associated with the Tower of Babel
170. William Bratton, The Law and Economics of English Only, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973
(1999); Drucilla Cornell, The Imaginary of English Only, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 977 (1999); Wells,
supra note 16; Madeleine Plasencia, "Suppressing the Mother Tongue": Anti-Subordination and
the Legal Struggle Over Control of the Means of Communication, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 989
(1999) [hereinafter Plasencia, Suppressing the Mother Tongue]; Yvonne Tamayo, Literal
Silencing/Silenciando la Lengua, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 995 (1999); Sharon K. Hom, Lexicon
Dreams and Chinese Rock and Roll: Thoughts on Culture, Language, and Translation as
Strategies of Resistance and Reconstruction, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1003 (1999); Hayakawa Torok,
supra note 9.
171. See Drucilla Cornell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of
Nativism: Economics, Freedom and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 595

(1999).
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cacophony of multiple languages.' 72 To be sure, Professor Bratton also
challenges the initial assumption that "sameness" lowers costs.' 7 3 However, his major contribution is in showing why English-only laws are
unlikely to achieve their purported "efficiency" objectives. He does this
through a detailed analysis of the incentive structures Spanish speakers
confront in acquiring English language proficiency.
In a nut shell, Professor Bratton's economic analysis suggests that
if nativists are really serious about promoting Latina/o assimilation into
American society, they should focus on eliminating discrimination
against Latinas/os, rather than suppressing Spanish. This is because the
suppression of Spanish is neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve its
purported objective of fostering Latina/o assimilation. Spanish suppression is unnecessary because Latinas/os have strong economic incentives
to learn English.' 74 Those incentives only increase when non-discriminatory practices enable English language acquisition to produce upward
social mobility. Conversely, Spanish suppression is insufficient to promote assimilation precisely in those instances in which the reality
Latinas/os confront in American society is discriminatory and exclusionary. From this perspective, enclave settlement, employment and commercial practices are simply a rational response to the discrimination
experienced when Latinas/os venture outside the Spanish-speaking
enclave. 75
'
Professor Bratton's law and economics analysis of English-only is
particularly interesting and valuable because it creates the point of
departure for a more general and far-reaching attack on the oft-repeated
assertions made by law and economics practitioners that civil rights and
anti-discrimination laws constitute unwarranted "special interest" interventions in the otherwise efficient private ordering of American society.' 76 It doesn't take a rocket scientist to see the ready uses of this
discourse for the nativist project. Bilingual education programs and
other public policies aimed at mitigating the exclusionary impact of lan172. Bratton, supra note 170.
173. According to Bratton, "at some point, [this assumption] has to be qualified by the counterassumption that diversity leads to creative interaction." Id. at 974.
174. Professor Tamayo further buttresses this argument by noting the unmet high demand for
English classes among immigrant populations. Tamayo, supra note 170, at 998-99 (5,000
immigrants turned away from ESL classes in Washington D.C.; 40,000 wait-listed in Los
Angeles).
175. See, e.g., Alex Stepick et al., Brothers in the Wood, in NEWCOMERS IN THE WORKPLACE
145, 148 (Louise Lamphere et al. eds., 1994) (recounting how Cuban construction workers
excluded from Anglo dominated unions in Miami responded by creating their own non-union
firms and ultimately taking over the industry: "When the unions finally recognized that excluding
Cubans was a mistake, it was too late.").
176. Bratton, supra note 170, at 974.
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guage difference on non-English speakers are either manifestations of
the concrete steps needed to give meaning and effect to the vision of
inclusion underlying the promise of equal protection and non-discrimination - or they are manifestations of the capture of public policy by
special interests. Framed this way, it is clear that the initial debate is
over the meaning of bilingual programs, on the one hand, and Englishonly, on the other.
In this debate, law and economics discourse gives the nativist substantial meaning-making power because the language of costs and efficiency is so readily wrapped in the mantle of purported objectivity and
value-neutrality: English-only laws are not discriminatory because they
are efficient, or so goes the argument. Against this backdrop, Professor
Bratton's contribution maps the economic arguments that can effectively
turn the tables to reveal English-only laws as special interest legislative
interventions. Since- in the absence of discrimination - private ordering already ensures that non-English speakers will have strong incentives to acquire English language proficiency, there is no regulatory
need to create such incentives through English-only laws. There being
no regulatory need, English-only laws constitute the use of state power
to reaffirm the exclusionary political project embedded in the presumption that Anglo culture defines what it means to be "an American," and,
more specifically, to promote higher levels of English language acquisition and usage than the market would produce - in the absence of
discrimination.
By laying out these arguments, Professor Bratton arms the antinativist struggle with a valuable meaning-making resource: the language
of law and economics, but his analysis also demonstrates the indeterminacy and normative vacuity of law and economics analysis. Ultimately,
cost-benefit analysis cannot tell us how public policy should respond to
the skewed incentive structures currently obstructing Latinalo assimilation. This is, at least initially, because discrimination is not "absent"
from the incentive structures mediating language acquisition. Given the
presence of discrimination, the public policy issue cost-benefit analysis
cannot answer is precisely the question whether state interventions
should attempt to counteract these skewed incentive structures by promoting language assimilation through anti-discrimination enforcement
and bilingual initiatives or through the imposition of policies like English-only. Indeed, cost-benefit analysis not only cannot tell us how to
promote language assimilation in a discriminatory social context, it also
cannot justify why assimilation to an English language norm should be
the objective, given that efficiency is only one of many compelling values at stake in the formulation of public policy.

19991

FOREWORD

Professor Bratton is not unaware of the normative problems inherent in any discourse that measures language rights through a cost-benefit
analysis. Thus, a fair assessment of his efforts requires that we read it as
it was intended to be read - as part of a larger collaborative project in
which Professor Cornell's role is to articulate the normative framework
which gives moral content to the task of articulating public policies that
otherwise are rendered profoundly indeterminate by Professor Bratton's
creative subversion of the nativist economic arguments. Professor Cornell proceeds in this way to ground the case against English-only in the
basic moral right of personality of non-English speaking and bilingual
Americans.
As I read Professor Cornell, this basic moral right of personality is
not just a right to be treated as an end-in-oneself rather than a disposable
means in some project to maximize social utilities, nor does it simply
refer to the right to be treated as a free and equal subject whose rights of
self-determination and self-expression are non-negotiable imperatives. It
is all this and more, for in Professor Cornell's formulation, the moral
right of personality is a right to be recognized - in one's very difference -

as an equal and legitimate perspective. This formulation, cor-

rectly understood, constitutes a profound and compelling call for a
fundamental gestalt shift in our current interpretations of the meaning of
equal protection because it clearly marks the difference between "equal
treatment" and "treatment as an equal." Treatment as an equal does not
always mean equal treatment, precisely because the expectations
imposed and benefits conferred by equal treatment may have a substantially different impact on one's human dignity and self-determination
depending on the circumstances of one's difference. Conversely, it
would be a mistake, in my view, to confuse the call for an equality norm
based on the treatment of others as equals with earlier calls for an equality of results rather than of treatment.17 7 The objective in treating others
as equals is not to make everybody equal by eliminating differences, but
rather to recognize that everybody is already equal in their very differences and to design our social and legal institutions in ways that respect
78
that reality.
177. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CMu. L. REV. 235
(1971) (discussing difference between equal treatment and equal results in context of fair
employment laws).
178. For further reflections on this important theme, see, for example, SOREN KIERKEGAARD,
WORKS OF LOVE 72 (Howard & Edna Hong trans., Harper Torchbook 1964). Kierkegaard puts

the thought like this:
One's neighbor is one's equal. One's neighbor is not the beloved, for whom you
have passionate preference, nor your friend, for whom you have passionate
preference ... Your neighbor is every man, for on the basis of distinctions he is not
your neighbor, nor on the basis of likeness to you as being differentfrom other men.
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The implications of Professor Cornell's way of understanding the
meaning of equality are profound and far-reaching. It entirely changes
the public policy issue, for the issue is not whether public policy effectuates equal treatment among the similarly situated, but whether it treats
those who are differentially situated as equally worthy of the respect and

deference to which equals are entitled. Applying this framework to the
analysis of English-only laws, it is immediately evident that the impact
of English-only on the self-determination and self-expression of nonEnglish speakers and bilingual or multilingual Americans cannot be reconciled with the imperative to treat all others as equals - each having
the right of self-determination as defined and effectuated from their particular and altogether different perspectives. Thus, in this context, it is
clear that the legitimacy of English-only laws depends on the projection

of an equality norm that presupposes sameness as the predicate for equal
treatment. Professor Cornell's great contribution is to show the
profound inadequacy of this approach and to offer a more meaningful
normative framework through which to resolve the indeterminacies
otherwise generated by the instrumental analysis of public policy.

Though Professor Wells' reading of Professor Cornell's analysis is
different from my own, 17 9 her essay does offer a clear and compelling
account of the reasons why Professor Cornell's call for an equality norm
based on the treatment of others as equals would constitute a major
evolution in the moral fabric of human society. In this vein, Professor
Wells' argument begins by noting the advantages a Kantian perspective
offers over the utilitarian perspective underlying law and economics discourse: "while the economist thinks of human beings as aggregations of
preferences backed by dollars, the Kantian conceives of them as nonHe is your neighbor on the basis of equality with you before God; but this equality
absolutely every man has, and he has it absolutely.
Id. (emphasis added). Like many male philosophers, Kierkegaard's otherwise expansive vision
was truncated by the gender myopia of his times. That, however, would be another article.
179. Professor Wells' critique notes the limitations of grounding the equality norm in a
Kantian framework. Wells, supra note 16, at 987. A close reading of Professor Cornell's
argument reveals, however, that her analysis draws as much on Franz Fanon's insistence on the
right to be recognized "as a legitimate point of view" as it does on Kant. See Cornell, supra note
170 (reflecting on meaning of Fanon's observations that evil of racism is in being "denied
existence as a legitimate point of view."). The claim embedded in the demand the I be recognized
as a "legitimate point of view" is precisely the claim that my difference be respected and my
different perspective be recognized as an equally valid point of reference in defining the common
good. See, e.g., Iglesias, Structures of Subordination, supra note 5, at 468, 473-78 (challenging
"the complete and total absence of women of color as a legitimate agent or remedial reference
point and the structure of power that is thereby established and maintained," and developing
account of "the inter-subjectivity of equals" as "a moral imperative and institutional blue print").
Thus Professors Wells and Cornell are not as far apart as an initial reading of Professor Wells'
critique might suggest.

19991

FOREWORD

negotiable subjects of respect and value."' 8° Indeed, as Professor Bratton's essay illustrates, in a world ordered by law and economics, a person's interest in speaking a particular language will, like any other
interest, be measured against the efficiency costs of protecting that interest so that, if the cost is too high, the individual's right will be sacrificed
for the "greater good" of the whole. By contrast, in a Kantian moral
universe, a fundamental right of personhood cannot be sacrificed at any
cost.

The non-negotiable status given to rights of personhood makes
Kantian moral discourse a more appropriate language than law and economics for articulating the meaning of equal protection. Nevertheless,
in Professor Wells' view, the Kantian framework is ultimately inadequate because it grounds respect for others on the notion that human
beings share an essential sameness - that the imperative of doing onto
others as you would have done onto you is based on the recognition of a
common humanity and a reverence for the things that make all human
beings the same - rather than a recognition of the value of the differences between us. In Professor Wells' words, "[w]hat we can't get from
Kant is the notion that what is sacred in you is fundamentally different
from what is sacred in me; that someone who differs is -for
reason - especially worthy of respect."''

that very

This is a brilliant insight, clearly and simply articulated in a way
that makes evident the profound challenge awaiting LatCrit theory and
practice. By linking respect for difference to the experience of one's
own particularity, contingency and finitude, Professor Wells articulates a
profoundly revolutionary perspective on the reasons why respect for difference is, always and in every respect, a moral, existential and epistemological imperative. The suppression of difference and enforced
assimilation are not only attacks on the dignity of another, but acts of
self-destruction that confine us even further in the limitations of our own
contingency, for it is precisely through the other that our finite ways of
being and knowing are expanded and enriched.' 82 The implications are
profound. Otherness and difference are a gift, an avenue of insight
beyond our own particularities, a window on the world we might behold
if ever we could see beyond our own contingency and live beyond our
finitude - a glimpse of God. An equality norm based on the imperative
of treating others as equals operationalizes this understanding in ways
180. Wells, supra note 16, at 987.
181. Id. (emphasis added).
182. See, e.g., Iglesias, Structures of Subordination, supra note 5, at 478 ("Through the
suppression of the other, we are all denied the opportunity to transcend the limitations of our
contingent perspectives. We are denied, in short, the opportunity for authentic self-determination
grounded on the objectivity of a collective truth.").

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:575

that the norm of equal treatment neither does nor can, for it is only by
treating others as equals that we activate an equality norm that enables
us to focus, as Professor Wells suggests, on "the gift of otherness, the
opportunities of multi-lingualism and the possibility that through differ83
ence we can find wholeness."'
Professor Wells makes another point worth further reflection. The
power of self-expression is crucial to self-determination. Both presuppose access to language, not just any language, but a language in which
the world, as one sees it, and one's own self-understandings can be
meaningfully formulated and expressed. The language of law and economics has not been popular among critical legal scholars. Part of the
reason is, as Professor Wells indicates, its failure to incorporate precisely those values, interests and cultural processes that resist translation
into a cost-benefit analysis. The not-so implicit suggestion is that LatCrit
84
theory should avoid speaking the language of law and economics.1
Some might dismiss this suggestion out of hand: not only are the costs
and benefits of any proposal substantively relevant to its proper assessment, but law and economics is the language of choice among policymaking elites and, increasingly, evident in the interpretative practices of
many judges. 85
Speaking the language of power is, from this perspective, imperative precisely because, and so long as, power is power. Indeed, there is
no question that Professor Bratton's efforts to recast the debate over
English-only laws in terms that destablize the economic justifications
routinely invoked to support the nativist agenda constitute a major contribution to the anti-nativist struggle precisely because law and economics analysis is the language of power. More importantly, however, the
indeterminacy revealed by Professor Bratton's creative subversion of the
law and economics analysis underlying English-only suggests that law
and economics discourse may have become such a ready conduit for
regressive and elitist political agendas precisely because critical legal
scholars have rarely contested its articulation on its own terms. 8 6 Learning and using the language of power may thus be the best way to combat
the legal production of subordination. Though not all LatCrit scholars
need use law and economics analysis, certainly this suggests there is
183. Wells, supra note 16, at 988 (emphasis added).
184. Id. (suggesting that we avoid getting caught up in "the cost of multilingualism").
185. See, e.g., Carrasco, LatCrit Theory and Law and Development, supra note 102, at 331
(challenging LatCrit scholars to become fluent in the language of law and economics analysis, in
part because that is the language to which policymakers respond).
186. See also Frank J. Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA: A Critique of Piecemeal
Accession, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 539 (1995) (demonstrating that law and economics analysis can be

made to further anti-subordination objectives).
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room for, and value in, counting it among the repertoire of critical methodologies through which we expand the scope of our anti-subordination
1 87
agenda and enhance the depth of our analysis.
Nevertheless, Professor Wells' cautionary words give me reason to
pause- not because I doubt the possibility or apparent usefulness of
strategically deploying a language whose basic assumptions one does
not embrace. Instead, my concern stems from the way increased fluency
in the language of law and economics tends to reaffirm and consolidate
its dominant position within the legal academy and profession. In Language & Symbolic Power, Pierre Bourdieu writes incisively of the way
linguistic hierarchies are created and the way these hierarchies operate in
the organization of social power. 188 Two points are particularly pertinent here. First, he argues that linguistic hierarchies are produced
through "the dialectical relation between the school system and the
labour market - or more precisely between the unification of the educational (and linguistic) market, . . . and the unification of the labour
market."' 8 9 He further argues that "recognition of the legitimacy of the
official language... [is] impalpably inculcated, through a long and slow
process of acquisition, by the sanctions of the linguistic market, and
which are therefore adjusted, without any cynical calculation or consciously experienced constraint, to the chances of material and symbolic
profit which the laws of price formation characteristic of a given market
objectively offer to the holders of a given linguistic capital."' 190
There is no question that a cost/benefit analysis would suggest, at
least at first glance, that acquiring fluency in the language of law and
economics makes for a better career investment than acquiring fluency
in the methodologies, references and critical frameworks of outsider
jurisprudence. Those who master the dominant language reap the
rewards of assimilation. In this case, those rewards are directly linked to
the labor market. Law and economics aficionados get hired by elite law
schools, appointed to the federal bench, recruited for high-level policymaking positions and published in prestigious law journals at higher
rates than exponents of any of the major strains of critical legal discourse.' 9' By contrast, legal scholars working to articulate critical per187. See, e.g., Iglesias, Foreword, supra note 161, at 177, 182, 187, 191 (noting the critical
methodologies embraced or advocated by LatCrit scholars).
188. PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE & SYMBOLIC POWER (Raymond & Adamson trans., 1991).
189. Id. at 49.
190. Id. at 51.
191. Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law, 72 CORN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986) (contrasting critical
legal studies and law and economics in terms of their representation within faculties at elite
schools and on federal bench); Ian Ayres, Never Confuse Efficiency with a Liver Complaint, 1997
Wis. L. REV. 503, 504-05 (noting that economic analysis has been dominant social science in
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spectives and promote legal transformation in and through the
discourses of Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, Critical Race
Feminism, Queer Theory, LatCrit Theory and even of Law and Society
are channeled into the "interesting visitor" circuit, cast as "too political"
for judicial appointment and "too abstract and theoretical" for the nittygritty of policy-making. For young scholars, the choice of an academic
discourse can make the difference between being cast as "an insider" or
"an outsider," and that difference can cost you tenure.
The stakes are high. Understanding their full scope requires understanding not only that legal education is training for hierarchy, 192 but
also the extent to which those hierarchies can, consciously and unconsciously, infuse everything we do and aspire to achieve. It can infuse our
assessments as to who should be our audience - whether we write to
impress the powerful and well-positioned or to engage, enlighten and
empower each other and thus to consolidate our otherwise dispersed and
diverse community. It can also infuse our assessments as to where and
how to publish our works - whether we seek to acquire prestige
through fancy placements in top-ten law journals or, rather, seek instead
to confer prestige by submitting our best works to the "secondary" journals run by minority law students eager to work with, and learn from, us.
Certainly, these matters would not concern me so much if I
believed that the language of law and economics was infinitely indeterminate such that it really could, with sufficient effort, be made to formulate, communicate and construct the world as I, and other others, see it
and, perhaps more importantly, as we aspire to imagine and transform it.
It cannot - for the reasons Professors Bratton, Cornell and Wells have
each alluded to in different ways. At the same time, critical legal discourses, that might, won't ever develop their full potential unless we
collectively invest our human capital and professional careers in their
further development and dissemination. The stakes are high indeed. The
pay offs are higher, for rather than speaking the language of power - to
tinker at the margins and to shift ever so slightly the points of pervasive
disequilibrium - the articulation and effectuation of an anti-essentialist,
anti-subordination vision and politics requires that we empower other
languages by speaking them as much, as well and as often as we can.
There is definitely a place for law and economics analysis in LatCrit
theory, but, in my view, it is, and should remain, at the margins of our

analyzing legal issues and that economists and J.D.s with Ph.Ds in economics are more likely to
be hired to teach in law schools than J.D.s with Ph.Ds in other social sciences).
192. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY

(1983).
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efforts to understand and reconfigure the structures and ideologies of
subordination.
Professor Plasencia's comment introduces yet another dimension of
the anti-subordination agenda awaiting future LatCrit analysis at the
intersection of language rights, meaning-making power and the struggle
for self-determination. Focusing on the awesome technological breakthroughs that continue to revolutionize the structure and content of
global communications, Professor Plasencia notes the frustrations nonEnglish speakers often encounter in attempting to use the new means of
communication that increasingly will mark the difference between
"information haves" and "have nots" in the new world information
order:
In composing e-mail in Spanish, for example, one cannot readily find
the symbols necessary to communicate fully in Spanish. Of the various templates made available for computerized language production,
Spanish accents and other symbols often do not match the font of the
original text in which the document was composed. The e-mail I
have drafted in Spanish often arrives to its addressee with circles
where I had placed accents. Therefore, I look like some sort of chaotic writer. "'
While the personal embarrassment experienced when one's communicative efforts are distorted into gibberish may seem, to some, a
minor frustration, the issues it raises are profound. The Internet and the
World Wide Web have been heralded as engines of a new world information order and as the most recent advances that increasingly are making the dream of universal communications a reality. They may be all
this, but they also constitute a major challenge for the critical task of
giving substantive meaning and anti-subordination content to the international and historical commitment to cultural pluralism and universal
service.I94 From fiber optics to cyberspace networks, new communications technologies are speeding the flows of information. Being plugged
into these flows means having the power of virtually instantaneous communications: the power to send and receive messages, to and from multiple audiences, instantaneously, to transfer documents, to reallocate
capital, to purchase goods, to download and print out the world of information, it previously took hours or days or weeks to compile. Not being

193. Plasencia, Suppressing the Mother Tongue, supra note 170, at 994.
194. See, e.g., Arturo Gandara, Equity in an Era of Markets: The Case of Universal Service,

33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107 (1998) (critiquing rupture of telecommunications social compact
based on universal service by Federal Communications Commission's Universal Service Order);
Margaret Chon, Radical Plural Democracy and the Internet, 33 CAL.W. L. REv. 143 (1997)
(mediating cultural pluralism and liberal normativity in cyberspace).
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"plugged-in" can mean knowing too little too late. For some this is a
personal choice. Others have no choice.
These developments suggest the pressing need for LatCrit theory to
examine the ongoing communications revolution and its impact on the
reproduction of Latina/o subordination, both domestically and internationally. This is because taking self-determination seriously means taking seriously the information inequalities that link the issue of
meaningful access - to the historical development and future evolution
of the legal regimes that regulate international and domestic communications technologies, information infrastructures, services and networks.
The compelling social and racial justice issues implicated by the recent
privatization and increasing monopolization of the broadcast spectrum
by large multinational corporations,' 95 by the redlining practices of forprofit telecommunications companies, 196 by the struggle for minority
access to media ownership, 97 as well as the struggles of Third World
states for access to the geo-stationary orbit for satellite communications
- all these suggest the broad field of critical analysis awaiting LatCrit
attention in ensuring that Latinas/os and other peoples of color are not
shut out of the information age.
In pursuing this line of inquiry, LatCrit scholars would, as always,
do well to draw on the writings and analyses of other Third World peoples and peoples of color, for example, by excavating the economic and
political claims underlying earlier proposals to create a New World
Information and Communication Order (NWICO) and the various
reforms NWICO articulated for the information and communications
regimes governed by the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the
Universal Postal Union (UPU) 198 as well as by subjecting to critical anti195. See

HERBERT

I.

SCHILLER, INFORMATION INEQUALITY: THE DEEPENING SOCIAL CRISIS IN

AMERICA (1996).

196. See Plasencia, Video Dialtone Redlining, supra note 168.
197. SCHILLER, supra note 195, at 84 (noting that FCC permitted large corporate investors to
acquire 75% of the equity and 49.9% of voting stock of minority businesses receiving set-asides in
sell-off of publicly owned broadcast spectrum to private interests). Cf Adarand Constructors v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) on
grounds that enhancing broadcasting diversity through minority ownership set-asides is not
compelling government interest); see generally Marcelino Ford-Livene, The Digital Dilemma:
Ten Challenges Facing Minority-Owned New Media Ventures, 51 FED. COMM. L. J. 577 (1999).
198. See, e.g., ALLEYNE, supra note 169, at 118-53 (explaining how each of these regimes

advantaged first world interests at expense of third world interests and the reform proposals
propounded by third world representatives); see also Ingrid Volkmer, Universalism and
Particularism: The Problem of Cultural Sovereignty and Global Information Flows, in BORDERS
IN CYBERSPACE (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997) (re-mapping the center/periphery of

the global informatics world around the "spillover environments" marked by in/access to major
satellite systems and telecommunications infrastructure and noting that "Africa has "12% of the

world's people, but just 2% of the world's main telephone lines").
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subordination analysis the more recent trend to shift decision-making
authority formerly delegated to these international organizations to
venues like the World Trade Organization (WTO).199 From another perspective, this inquiry might entail mapping and deconstructing homologies in the way the discourse of "politicization" has been used to
delegitimate Third World peoples as a legitimate perspective on the way
international communications should be structured for the common good
and the way the ideology of "free market competition" has been used to
legitimate legal reforms and public policies that channel the achievement of universal service through the market imperatives of profit maximization, rather than the promotion of democratic governance and equal
access norms. These brief observations demonstrate some of the wide
range of issues and methods of analysis that will become increasingly
relevant to the LatCrit project and our efforts to understand the relationship between the struggle for self-determination, for meaning-making
power and for access to, and control over, the new means of
communication.
TOWARD AN ETHIC AND POLITICS OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION:
COUNTERACTING EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES, ELITIST PRETENSIONS
AND INTELLECTUAL APPROPRIATIONS

The last three essays in this cluster by Professors Tamayo, Hom
and Hayakawa Torok focus LatCrit attention on the complex and varied
problems confronted by any project aimed at communicating across cultural differences and translating the untranslatable. Professor Tamayo's
essay takes up these issues through a critical analysis of the arguments
proffered by English-only advocates in Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official
English."°° In that case, English-only advocates argued that laws mandating use of English as a common language were appropriate and necessary means of combating the social disunity, political instability and
public distrust and suspicion purportedly triggered when the Englishspeaking majority hears public business conducted in a language they do
not understand. In addition to recounting the reasoning that ultimately
persuaded the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to strike the Arizona Lan199. See, e.g., Taunya L. McKarty, Liberalized Telecommunications Trade in the WTO:
Implicationsfor Universal Service Policy, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (1998); see also Keith Aoki,
(Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1338-52 (1996) (intellectual property rights under TRIPS/GATT regime).
200. 69 F.3d 920 ( 9 th Cir. 1995) (declaring unconstitutional English-only provision in State
constitution), vacated as moot and remanded to districtcourtfor dismissal, Arizonans for Official
English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055 (1997); see also Plasencia, Suppressing the Mother Tongue,
supra note 170 (providing further critical analysis of arguments advanced in support of Arizona
Language Initiative invalidated in this case).
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guage Initiative as an invalid regulation violating the rights of Arizona
public employees to speak and of non-English speaking Arizonans to
hear public information spoken in Spanish, Professor Tamayo makes a
point of linking her analysis to a narrative account of her own difficulties in attempting to translate meanings across Spanish and English. It is
precisely these difficulties, and the "untranslatability" of certain meanings, that make the suppression of languages other than English a direct
assault on the personal identity and self-expression of those persons,
whose means of effective communication are thereby contracted solely
in order to maintain English as the privileged and dominant means of
communication in this country. Rather than fostering genuine integration based on mutual respect for, and accommodation of, these different
means of self-expression, English-only laws seek to coerce a false sense
of unity through the enforced silence of non-English speakers in, and
their ensuing exclusion from, the public realm of American social life.
Professor Hom's essay also takes up the problem of "untranslatability." However, she substantially expands our analysis by providing concrete examples of the kinds of words and meanings that do not
easily translate across language differences and the political implications
of these barriers for cross-cultural understanding and exchange. Drawing
on her experiences co-editing the first and only English-ChineseLexicon
on Women and Law,2" Professor Hom describes the process of identifying and collecting a list of English terms that have been central to the
development of feminist legal theory and political activism, but that Chinese women report to be particularly confusing, unclear or incoherent
when presented in Chinese translation. Terms such as Affirmative
Action, Empowerment, Gender and Sex defy ready translation into Chinese because these terms refer to particular social, political and historical contexts and/or because they are embedded in particular theoretical
frameworks. Translating these terms is not impossible, but it does
require an in-depth explanation of the broader context that gives each
term its particular meanings within feminist legal discourse and politics.
Through her concrete examples and detailed explanations of the
interpretative processes through which she and her collaborators sought
to identify appropriate Chinese terms that could effectively be made to
signify the new and foreign meanings embedded in English feminist terminology, Professor Hom provides an extremely valuable and fascinating avenue of insight into the way language is both the constructed
repository and the unfinished instrument of the social and political transformations we have achieved in the past and might seek to imagine in
201. See
LAW

SHARON

K.

HOM AND XIN CHUNYING, ENGLISH-CHINESE LEXICON OF WOMEN AND

(Yinghan Funnu Yu Falu Cehuishiyi) (1995).
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the future. This is because the terms, whose meanings she struggled to
convey through this English-Chinese Lexicon, are linguistic artifacts of
particular historical struggles and conceptual breakthroughs. These
struggles and breakthroughs generated a need for new ways of signifying new meanings which did not previously, and would not now, exist
but for the intellectual and political efforts through which women's
struggles for equality and dignity gave birth to the newly shared consciousness referenced in and by the new feminist terminology which
developed to express it. Our present ability to convey these meanings
quickly and easily by uttering a simple word like "gender" or "empowerment" is a tremendous political resource, whose historical contingency
and inestimable value are often invisible - except in precisely those
instances where the effort to produce a common political consciousness
"goes international" or cross-cultural. Only then can we see the real
and
material costs of not having the words to reference the ideas we seek to
202
express or the consciousness we seek to construct.
Professor Hom's essay would have been a major contribution to the
future evolution of LatCrit theory if it had simply stopped here. It goes
even further. Like her brilliant performance at LATCRIT III, Professor
Horn's essay is an imaginative and multiply nuanced interrogation of the
normative and political implications embedded in the practice of cultural
and intellectual appropriation.20 3 In particular, her essay links an engaging narrative of a playful mother-son exchange, in which her son
asserted that her use of his life stories might be a copyright infringement, to her own thoughts about the way she should interpret and
respond to the massive underground xeroxing and distribution inside
China of her copyrighted Lexicon. Linking these two instances of
"copyright infringement" enables her, on a more serious note, to reflect
critically on the possessive individualism that underlies western copyright and intellectual property regimes. To this end the linkage is entirely
successful. The conjured image of a son proposing to charge his mother
"by the story" provides a compelling backdrop against which to critically question the appropriateness of seeking to enforce copyright
restrictions against a continent of Chinese women. In'both instances, the
assertion of copyrights ruptures bonds of solidarity and interconnection
202. The implications for LatCrit theory are profound - not only because so much of LatCrit
theory's anti-essentialist agenda is focused on exploring and activating Latina/o transnational
identities and international solidarity, but also because, and precisely to the extent that, LatCrit
theory seeks to articulate a politics of anti-essentialist, anti-subordination intergroup justice and
interconnectivity that defies expression in readily processed sound-bites. See, e.g., infra notes
213-15 and accompanying text.
203. Professor Hom's presentation was, without question, one of the many highlights of the
LATCRrr UI program. As my own son would say, her multimedia presentation rocked.
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because it operates, in effect, to commodify the interpersonal experiences and shared political objectives that produced, and are otherwise
embedded in, the copyrighted "product." Only someone completely
ensconced in the (lack of) values of possessive individualism would seek
to commodify these artifacts of a shared reality and a common cause.
Not surprisingly, Professor Hom continues to use her son's life stories even as she expresses hope that her copyrights in the Lexicon will
continue to be violated by women in China. However, her reflections
beckon further inquiry because they raise the question whether there are
any instances in which LatCrit scholars should resist the appropriation of
our intellectual work and the erasure of our individual authorship. For
example, many scholars of color, in private discussions and public fora,
have criticized the network of self-referential cross-citations through
which majority scholars exclude minority authors, even as they appropriate and seek to preserve their dominant positions, in producing "the
normal science" of mainstream legal scholarship, by ignoring any critical analysis they cannot rebut."0 4 Beyond these instances of exclusion,
scholars of color have also noted instances in which their intellectual
work has been cannibalized in subsequent works by majority scholars,
whose analysis uncannily tracks the same sources and articulates the
same, or related, observations and conclusions with no citation, or a
mere see generally, to the original work from which they have lifted the
major theoretical insights or chain of analysis they present as their own.
From any objective standard of scholarship, the failure to reference
and engage major critical works directly pertinent to the issues under
discussion is at best poor scholarship and often reflects the intellectual
dishonesty of either an ideologue or, more often, an imposter. However,
when confronted with evidence that their work has been appropriated
without appropriate citation or acknowledgment, many scholars of color
flounder in the very sorts of internal conflict Professor Hom's essay conjures. To assert one's authorship and demand individual recognition for
ideas whose purpose is to transform the world seems self-promoting and
counter to the political aspirations underpinning the production and dissemination of critical scholarship. Put differently, too often minority
scholars find themselves caught between the sense of being individually
wronged by the unacknowledged appropriation of our intellectual labor
204. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561 (1984). For an account describing the practice of "normal
science" and the politics through which its practitioners seek to suppress paradigm shifts, see
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2 nd ed.1970). See also Juan

F.

Perea, The Black/White Paradigmof Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought,
85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L.J. 127 (1998) (applying Kuhn's analysis to legal

doctrine and theory).
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and a deeper sense that our individual authorship is simply not the issue
that matters.
It is precisely because LatCrit theory seeks to transform the production of legal scholarship from an experience of individual isolation into a
practice of collective engagement and empowerment that LatCrit scholars should theorize the difference between the kinds of intellectual
appropriations we should permit or encourage and the kinds we should
challenge and resist. We should also explore different strategies for
identifying instances of, and collectively implementing appropriate
responses to, the erasure of minority authorship. Certainly, one ready
response is to self-consciously practice a politics of mutual recognition
by reading and citing the works of other LatCrit scholars as often, and in
as many venues, as possible. It is politically significant when we choose,
for example, to cite the works of dead European philosophers rather than
living LatCrit colleagues. This is because who we cite (or fail to cite)
reflects and defines the participants we acknowledge and engage as our
intellectual and political community.
Beyond this practice of mutual recognition, LatCrit scholars might
explore other strategies through which collective action might effectively be marshaled to combat the erasure of minority authors. For
example, LatCrit scholars might consider the possibility of "outing"
works by majority legal scholars that inappropriately ignore or appropriate theoretical insights and analysis previously forwarded by minority
scholars. Collectively compiling and publishing a list of such works,
with appropriate commentary, might go a long way toward revealing the
extent of erasure and appropriation individual minority scholars too
often suffer in silence. On the other hand, this particular strategy might
be more work than it's worth. Perhaps a different strategy is in order.
Rather than seeking recognition from the legal academy's "normal
scientists" and gatekeepers of the status quo, LatCrit scholars might
work, collectively, proactively and self-consciously, to foreswear the
elitist pretensions too often evident in the politics of citation and commit
ourselves, instead, to a politics of mutual recognition through which the
persistent dissemination and consistent cross-referencing of LatCrit
scholarship may, thereby, actually trigger the paradigm shifts already
embedded in the critical insights of LatCrit theory and discourse.
The final essay by John Hayakawa Torok closes this cluster with
reflections on language acquisition and loss drawn from his experiences
as a participant observer at the LATCRIT III conference. Like the other
essays in this cluster, his comments focus on the role of language in the
construction and expression of personal and political identities. Reflecting on the many distinct and diverse perspectives articulated during the
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conference, he raises fundamental questions about the possibility of
inter-group translation and cross-cultural recognition. Through personal
narrative, he highlights the processes of individual language acquisition
and challenges the wisdom of enforcing language uniformity. Read in
tandem with the other essays in this cluster, his reflections reassert the
centrality of language in the de/construction of communities, the affirmation of identity, the organization of power and the demarcation of
insider/outsider relations.
C.

Inter/NationalLabor Rights: Class Structures, Identity Politics
and Latinalo Workers in the Global Economy

The essays by Professors Romero, Corrada and Cameron constitute
the third and final cluster in Part 11.205 Like the essays in the first two
clusters, these essays explore the relationship between regimes of il/
legality, identity politics and the struggle for individual and collective
self-determination. While the first two clusters examine these relationships through a critical analysis of the disjunctures between democratic
theory and the realities of anti-democratic practices and institutions, on
the one hand, and the ongoing struggle over language rights and communicative power, on the other, these last three essays focus LatCrit attention on the struggle for worker rights. In doing so, they explicitly center
the issue of class in the articulation of LatCrit legal theory.
Attention to class issues has been acknowledged as a pending, but
as yet underdeveloped, trajectory in the further evolution of LatCrit theory and the consolidation of LatCrit social justice agendas.2 °6 Classbased analysis is a particularly pressing matter for LatCrit attention precisely because so much ink has been spilt and so much intergroup solidarity has been squandered in abstract theoretical debates about the
relative priority of class and "identity," particularly racial, ethnic and
gender identity, in the subordination of peoples of color, as well as by
205. Elvia R. Arriola, Introduction: The Value of Our Work, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1037
(1999) (introducing the essays); Mary Romero, Immigration, the Servant Problem, and the Legacy
of the Domestic Labor Debate: "Where Can You Find Good Help These Days!," 53 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1045 (1999); Roberto L. Corrada, FamiliarConnections: A PersonalRe/Viewing of Latinol
a Identity, Gender, and Class Issues in the Context of the Labor Dispute Between Sprint and La
Conexion Familiar,53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1065 (1999); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The
Labyrinth of Solidarity: Why the Future of the American Labor Movement Depends on Latino
Workers, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1089 (1999).
206. See Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 2, at 574-82 (mapping historical and regional
differences in configuration of class relations and production of poverty among different Latina/o
communities and calling for particularized analysis as distinct from generalized and abstract
debates); Iglesias, Out of the Shadow, supra note 30, at 368-72, 370 (calling for LatCrit theory to
move beyond abstract race/class debates by centering political economy and production of class

hierarchies in analysis of white supremacy).
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the counter-positioning of race and class in more concrete debates over
the future of public policies like affirmative action, minority business
set-asides, public assistance eligibility rules, trade liberalization and
immigration policies.
On the one hand, calls to ground the articulation of social justice
reforms in a class-based analysis have too often ignored the very real
impact of racism and sexism as strategic instruments in the material dispossession and anti-competitive exclusion of women and minorities.
From this perspective, class-based legal reforms and empowerment
strategies cannot eliminate the impact of racism or sexism precisely
because they do not really engage the reality of racism and sexism.20 7
Conversely, however, calls to emphasize the centrality of racial subordination, rather than class or gender-based subordination, have too often
ignored the material realities of intra-racialstratifications and hierarchies that are organized around relations of gender and class privilege
within minority communities, while calls to focus on gender-based sub-

ordination have often ignored the problems of class and racial hierarchies among women."'

Against this backdrop, the three essays by Professors Romero, Corrada and Cameron illustrate the analytical power gained by articulating
an anti-essentialist, anti-subordination analysis of the complexities of
class subordination within and between Latina/o communities. This is
because all three essays locate the economic dispossession of Latina/o
workers at the intersection of national and international legal regimes
and the ongoing transformation and restructuring of an increasingly
internationalized global economy. They reveal, in different ways and
from different perspectives, the failure of domestic and international
labor law regimes to establish a fair and just framework for preventing
the exploitation of Latina/o labor and the expropriation of the real value
it creates. They also challenge us to further examine and more clearly
articulate the relationship between the class biases reflected in these
207. See, e.g., Iglesias, Structures of Subordination, supra note
universal class-based identity and solidarity ignores fact that racial
within working class make race and gender-based solidarity and
imperative); see also Iglesias, The Anti-Political Economy, supra

5, 488-92 (projection of
and gender stratifications
collective action equally
note 154 (deconstructing

suggestion that racial structure of "market" for government contracts can be transformed through
color-blind reforms to assist small businesses in the inter-capitalistcompetition between small
and large firms).
208. See, e.g., Iglesias, Structures of Subordination,supra note 5, 488-97, 493 (exploring how
class-based, gender-based and race-based essentialism of different liberation movements has
caused each to ignore the perspectives and claims of justice advocated by the others, analyzing
negative consequences for intersectional identities of women of color and suggesting reforms
needed to construct anti-essentialist institutional arrangements that enable self-determination
through more democratic self-representational governance structures and decisional procedures).
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legal regimes, their politics of (non)enforcement and the reproduction of
racial and gender subordination both within and beyond the United
States.
THE DYNAMICS OF DISPOSSESSION:

LABOR WRONGS, THE FANTASIES

OF MARKET IDEOLOGY AND THE REALITIES OF

ECONOMIC POWER/LESSNESS

Professor Romero's essay opens the cluster with a narrative of her
personal experiences at the home of a colleague who employed a Latina
domestic servant. Professor Romero contextualizes this story of class
privilege and gendered exploitation by linking it to a critical analysis of
the unfair labor standards regulating domestic labor in the United States,
as well as to a sophisticated critique of the theoretical assumptions that
undermined, and ultimately betrayed, the anti-subordination potential
otherwise embedded in early feminist efforts to recast the unpaid domestic labor performed by women in the home as a form of class exploitation. Professor Romero's analysis provides a particularly valuable point
of departure for articulating an anti-essentialist class analysis in LatCrit
theory because it shows how the material dispossession of Latina
domestic servants is effected through a complex interaction of race,
class, gender and immigrant status-based subordination - even as it
reveals the methodological limitations of neoliberal micro-economic
analysis.
In a nutshell, Professor Romero criticizes the fact that feminist
efforts to cast women as an economic class and to theorize the economic
value of women's unpaid labor structured the so-called "domestic labor
debate" in ways that completely ignored the experiences of the women
of color, who oftentimes must bear the burden of domestic work both
within their own homes and in the homes of other (upper-class) women
who hire them as domestic servants. Though early feminist theory
sought to establish the value of women's unpaid domestic labor and to
thereby reveal the full extent of unjust enrichment conferred on men
through the cultural circulation and performance of patriarchal norms
casting housework as "women's work," these early feminist efforts
ignored the realities of "the market" for domestic service. In this reality,
immigrant women of color often work long hours, at less than minimum
wage, with no employment benefits, and under personally intrusive and
otherwise exploitative working conditions. Instead of confronting this
reality, feminists turned to the fantasy world of micro-economic analysis. They sought to establish the monetary value of the many services
women render in their own homes by calculating the costs of securing
these same services through the voluntary arms length transactions of a

1999]

FOREWORD

market exchange. This analysis revealed that the vast majority of household units would be completely priced out of the market for domestic
services because few could afford the accumulated costs of acquiring the
services of a cook, a house cleaner, a teacher, a nurse, a chauffer, a
babysitter (and one might now add - of a surrogate mother) in the
market. In this way, the economic viability of every patriarchal family
was clearly linked to the exploitation and uncompensated expropriation
of women's labor.
This domestic labor debate eventually erupted into public consciousness, as the "Nannygate" controversy, when President Clinton's
woman nominee for Attorney General was discovered to have illegally
employed undocumented workers as domestic servants in her home.
The Nannygate affair, as recounted by Professor Romero, brings into
sharp relief the contradictions in the way (some) white feminists have
engaged the problem of domestic labor. On the one hand, the earlier
feminist efforts to establish the "market value" of domestic labor cast
women's services as ultimately priceless. On the other hand, the dominant feminist response - to the public controversy over Nannygate was to minimize the criminal aspects of employing undocumented
domestic workers by insisting that current immigration restrictions were
out of step with "women's needs" for stable and affordable domestic
help - meaning low wage workers owed no expensive benefits
obligations.
But, as Professor Romero's analysis suggests, if the reproductive
labor involved in maintaining a home is "priceless" when performed by
white women in their own homes, certainly it should also be priceless
(or at least remunerative) when performed by women of color in the
homes of other women. The fact that it is not shows that wages for
domestic service are determined not by "the market value," let alone the
use value, of the services rendered, but rather by the asymmetrical
power relations that are constructed through the compulsion of economic necessity, the vulnerability of being "illegal" or undocumented,
and the cultural and racial prejudices that devalue the labor value produced by immigrant women of color. The fact that dominant feminist
discourse has yet to acknowledge and address its internal contradictions
reveals the essentialist assumptions through which feminist theory
delimits the category of "women's interests" to privilege the particular
interests of upper-class white women, while neglecting the "women's
interests" of lower class immigrant women of color. By revealing this
contradiction, Professor Romero's analysis enables us to see the full
extent of unjust enrichment conferred on upper-class household units
through the cultural circulation and performance of elitist classist and
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racist norms that legitimate the uncompensated material expropriation of
the labor value of immigrant women of color.
CLASS CRIMES AND THE POLITICS OF NON-ENFORCEMENT:

LAW'S

COMPLICITY IN THE UNJUST (AND ILLEGAL) EXPROPRIATION OF
LATINAIO LABOR VALUE

Against the backdrop of Professor Romero's critical analysis of the
asymmetrical power relations that "distort" the supposedly voluntary
exchange transactions upon which micro-economic analysis builds its
house of cards, the essays by Professors Corrada and Cameron further
develop and expand the theoretical parameters and thematic concerns of
an anti-essentialist class analysis in LatCrit theory. They also offer additional insights into the role of law in facilitating the material expropriation of Latina/o labor value as well as the poverty, marginality and
economic dispossession this expropriation visits upon Latina/o families
and communities.
Professor Corrada offers these insights by focusing LatCrit attention on the labor dispute between a Mexican labor union and Sprint Corporation after Sprint purchased La Connexion Familiar (LCF). This
dispute is particularly noteworthy because it became the subject of the
first complaint ever filed by a Mexican labor union against the United
States under the NAFTA Labor Side Accord. LCF was a small Hispanic
telephone company based in San Rafael, California. Its business
involved marketing long distance telephone services to recent immigrants who speak mainly Spanish and who frequently make long distance calls to friends and family in Mexico. After the purchase, Sprint
discovered that a large majority of LCF's employees were undocumented workers and sued to recind the purchase. Though Sprint eventually went through which the deal, they paid substantially less money for
the company and canceled the employment contracts in which they had
agreed to retain the former Hispanic owners of LCF.
According to Professor Corrada, there was no further information
about the fate of the undocumented workers whose employment at the
company triggered Sprint's efforts to recind the purchase. In particular,
there was no information as to whether these workers were kept on or
replaced by "legal" Spanish-speaking employees, though as Professor
Corrada notes, this information would have been relevant to determining
whether Sprint's efforts to recind were pretextual. Alas, the fact that
Sprint's scruples about buying a company staffed by undocumented
workers might have been pretextual and strategic was not directly relevant "within the four corners" of the labor dispute at issue in the
NAFTA complaint. Nevertheless, what is evident is that Sprint initially
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decided to purchase LCF based on projections that increasing immigration by Spanish speaking persons into the United States would make
LCF's niche market a growing profit center. Thus, Sprint's apparent
scruples about employing undocumented workers did not affect its readiness to make a calculated business decision based on the expected profits to be earned from the consumption practices of illegal immigrants.
This point is key. Read in tandem with Professor Romero's analysis
of the under-enforcement that makes the (unfair) employment of
undocumented workers a low-risk white collar crime, it shows that the
politics of immigration enforcement is not so much about stopping illegal immigration, but rather about who will be allowed to profit from the
increased migration flows that are all but inevitable given the push-pull
factors of an increasingly interconnected and global economy.2" 9 The
fact that U.S. companies can with impunity profit from, and proactively
plan their business projections around, the labor influxes and consumption patterns of illegal immigrants is a field of sociolegal analysis crying
out for further exploration by LatCrit scholars interested in theorizing
the political economy of Latina/o subordination.
But Professor Corrada's story goes on. After Sprint purchased LCF,
the company started to perform below projected profit levels. At about
the same time, the Communications Workers of America began an
organizing campaign at the company in response to worker complaints
of unfair treatment and failure to pay promised sales commissions. An
administrative law judge issued a cease and desist order, finding that
Sprint managers had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by interfering
with union organizing activity through threats of plant closure and
employee interrogations. Just before the union election was to be held,
Sprint closed LCF and terminated the employees. Part of LCF's customer base was transferred to Dallas, Texas, where Sprint hired additional Spanish speaking employees to deal with the influx of new
business. There is no information as to whether these additional workers
were documented or unionized. After an administrative law judge and a
federal district court judge both ruled that Sprint's course of conduct in
closing LCF did not violate federal labor laws, a Mexican labor union
filed a submission under the NAFTA labor side accord alleging that
United States was not enforcing its own labor laws as required by its
commitments under the accord.
It was at this point that Professor Corrada was asked to testify as an
209. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 29, at 310-11 (noting that investment patterns promoted by
NAFTA actually encourage Mexican immigration to the United States and arguing therefore that
"the United States is morally obligated to do more than simply build a 'fortress America' in

reaction" to push-pull factors it has itself created).
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expert witness for Sprint at a U.S. NAO hearing on the Mexican submission. He agreed and ultimately testified that U.S. labor laws had been
properly enforced. Much of his essay is a searching, honest, selfrevealing and self-critical effort to explore the broader implications of
his decision to testify on Sprint's behalf. His essay is structured as a
dialogue between himself and an inquiring Latina law student, perplexed
by the seeming contradictions between his classroom discourse, his
Latino identity and his decision to testify in support of a major U.S.
company charged with the flagrant violation of Latina/o workers rights.
It is, in fact, a moving demonstration of the way the intersectionalities of
Latinalo identity can trigger the sorts of existential crises that expand
political identity and enable new ways of seeing and being.
The more immediate point stems, however, from the fact that Professor Corrada's legal conclusion, that the United States government had
properly enforced its labor laws in the Sprint case, was, on its face, a
legally correct and entirely defensible expert assessment. After all, the
NLRB had vigorously prosecuted the case up to and including its efforts
to secure a district court injunction. The district court and the ALJ, for
their part, were enforcing labor laws that have systematically and
increasingly expanded the realm of employer business prerogatives and
of unreviewable discretion in making "core entrepreneurial decisions"
such as whether to close or relocate a plant - regardless of the foreseeable and profoundly negative impact of such decisions on union organizing and collective bargaining.2"' The fundamental un/fairness of U.S.
labor laws is, however, simply not an issue relevant to the resolution of a
labor dispute under the NAFTA labor side accord. The only issue there
is whether the U.S. government enforced them properly, and that, therefore, was the only issue Professor Corrada was called to address.
Read, however and once again, in tandem with Professor Romero's
analysis of the lack of enforcement that makes the employment of
undocumented workers a low-risk white collar crime, these two essays
reveal the many and profound inadequacies of domestic and international labor law regimes. Not only are domestic labor law violations
routinely unenforced - even when enforced, these laws fail to establish
a fair and just framework for preventing the exploitation of labor and the
expropriation of the real value it produces. This is precisely because the
hyper-technicalities, of which Professor Corrada writes, are simply the
210. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. 390 U.S.
263 (1965) (plant closings are matters peculiarly within management prerogative requiring proof
of discriminatory intent rather than balancing test); see generally Francis Lee Ansley, Standing
Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty and America's Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J.
1757 (1993) (analyzing doctrinal devolution expanding scope of employer unilateral control over
"core entrepreneurial business decisions"- such as whether to sell, close or relocate a business).
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masks that hide the asymmetrical power relations these anti-labor laws
and interpretative rulings are designed to institutionalize, preserve and
enforce. The resulting consequences are well documented in Professor
Cameron's essay linking the decline in union organization to the increasing impoverishment of labor and the simultaneous increase in business
profitability.
Focusing specifically on Los Angeles County, Professor Cameron
notes that in communities experiencing 20% or higher poverty rates,
"over 15,000 manufacturing firms were generating annual revenues of
over $54 billion, due largely to the low-wage labor of 357,000 Latino
employees. 21 Moreover, three enormous construction projects, totaling
12-14.5 billion dollars in investment, are currently in the works for the
region. Professor Cameron asks whether anything could be done to help
Latina/o workers share more equitably in this enormous wealth. Certainly, he is right to suggest that a larger share of the value their labor
produces would go a long way toward ending, or at least substantially
mitigating, the destitution that keeps so many Latinas/os at the margins
of the social and political life of this country. This is just as surely certain as the fact that if poor immigrant Latina domestic servants were
paid the fair "market value" of their labor in upper-income households,
they would make enough money to lift themselves and their families out
of "the culture of poverty" and criminality they purportedly are so wont
to inhabit. Certainly, Professor Cameron is also right to suggest that
securing a fair and equitable share of the value Latina/o workers produce
depends ultimately on Latina/o self-determination through collective
action and solidarity. No employer, union boss, labor board, AU, or
district court is going to solve the problem. Only the concerted action
and mutual assistance of Latina/o workers will do the job.2t 2
In this vein, Professor Cameron's essay reviews a number of recent
examples of successful union activity by Latina/o workers. His thesis is
that the future of Latina/o workers and the American labor movement
are intricately interconnected. Just as the increasing "Latinization" of
the U.S. workforce makes Latina/o organizing power an important
resource for revitalizing the American labor movement, the significant
wage gaps between union and nonunion jobs, particularly when analyzed by race and ethnicity, make it clear that Latinas/os have a lot to
gain from unionization. Professor Cameron also offers a valuable analysis of the kinds of collective action and strategies most likely to work,
211. Cameron, supra note 205, at 1099.
212. See, e.g., Mary Garcia Castro, What is Bought and Solid in Domestic Service? The Case
ofBogotd: A Critical Review, in MUCHACHAS No MORE 105-26 (Elsa M. Chaney & Mary Garcia
Castro eds., 1989) (recounting the struggle to gain legal recognition for SINTRASEDOM, a

domestic workers union in Colombia).
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like corpo-

rate campaigns and community based boycotts - and, not surprisingly,
strategies that do not depend or rely on the vindication of worker rights
through legal process.

III.

MAPPING THE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS AND
FUTURE TRAJECTORIES OF LATCRIT THEORY
AND COMMUNITY

The six essays in Part III appropriately close the LATCRIT III symposium by raising important questions about the purpose, history and
future trajectories of the LatCrit project. 21 3 These essays reflect the rich

and varied intellectual heritage of the many different scholars and activists who have committed their energies to finding, or planting, their
roots in the LatCrit community. The unprecedented and rapid expansion
of LatCrit discourse over the last three years reflect the synergies
embedded in these diverse perspectives and constitute the substantial
pay-offs of our concerted, self-conscious and collective efforts to release
these synergies through respectful and inclusive intergroup discourse
based on our shared commitment to an anti-essentialist vision of substantive justice. At the same time, the rapid expansion and many diversities of position and perspective coalescing in the LatCrit movement
raise substantial questions about the future trajectories and sustained viability of this imagined, and still very young, community of scholars and
activists.
To my mind, that future depends, both theoretically and politically,
on the degree to which the LatCrit community is able to forge a common
consciousness and generate a shared discourse for articulating and manifesting, in concrete ways, a new vision of the relationship between the
universal and the particular. It depends, ultimately and in other words,
on the degree to which each of us is able to see the many different ways
in which the relationship between the LatCrit community and the many
particularities of which it is composed and into which it might at any
point fracture - is not a relationship between "the universal and the
particular," but rather is, at every moment and in every instance, a rela213. Margaret E. Montoya, LatCrit Theory: Mapping Its Intellectual and Political
Foundationsand Future Self-Critical Directions, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119 (1999) [hereinafter
Montoya, LatCrit Foundations]; Kevin Johnson & George Martfnez, Crossover Dreams: The
Roots of LatCrit Theory in Chicanalo Studies Activism and Scholarship, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1143 (1999); Mutua, supra note 8; Tayyab Mahmud, Colonialism and Modern Constructions of
Race: A Preliminary Inquiry, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1219 (1999); Phillips, supra note 7; Victoria
Ortiz & Jennifer Elrod, Reflections of LatCrit III: Finding "Family," 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1257
(1999).
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tionship of the universal to itself.2" 4 What this means, in effect, is that
the challenge we confront, directly and immediately over the next few
years, is a challenge that most of us cannot even really imagine. This is,
in no small part, because there are simply no words, no readily accessible sound-bites, no immediately obvious and easily recognized formulations that convey the conceptual implications, political parameters,
ethical substance and practical consequences, as yet to be manifested in
and as - an anti-essentialist vision of human interconnection.2 15 Not
only are we challenged to imagine the ineffable and make manifest the
unimaginable, but to do so concretely and effectively, - not at some
unspecified time in some distant and abstract future, but rather - in the
here and now of this moment, as it reflects itself in our collective efforts
to further the objectives and foster the growth of a particular and historically contingent group of scholars and activists, who have chosen to
coalesce around this imagined community and its aspirations for a new
way of seeing and being in the world.
It is with these thoughts in mind that I take up the last six essays of
the LATCRIT III symposium. The first section focuses on the theoretical
dimensions and directions of the LatCrit project as reflected in these
particular essays. The second section takes up the practical challenges
involved in ensuring the continued institutional and programmatic
evolution of the LatCrit project.
A.

Of Intellectual Debts, Theoretical Directions and the Challenge
of Anti-Essentialism

From its title, the opening essay by Professors Johnson and Martfnez would seem to suggest that the LatCrit movement originates, and is
rooted, in the history of Chicana/o activism and scholarship.2" 6 A fair
and fully informed historical account of the initial beginnings and subsequent evolution of the series of conferences, publications and related
events that now constitute the historical record of the LatCrit project
would not support such a claim. 2 7 However, a close reading of their
essay quickly reveals a very different and altogether appropriate
message. Indeed, the opening paragraphs of their essay make it quite
clear that Professors Johnson and Martfnez are not claiming that the LatCrit movement is, in fact, historically rooted in Chicana/o studies. Not
only do they acknowledge the central importance LatCrit theory has,
214. See, e.g., supra notes 104 & 109 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
216. See Johnson & Martfnez, supra note 213.
217. See, e.g., Valdes, "OutCrit" Theories, supra note 7 (recounting relationship between CRT

workshop and emergence of the LatCrit movement); see also Philips, supra note 7 (same).
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since its inception, accorded the project of promoting a discourse and
politics of pan-ethnic solidarity among Latinas/os, but the recorded history, thus far developed, unequivocally illustrates the degree to which
LatCrit theory has also,from its inception, aspired to articulate an inclusive anti-essentialist politics of intergroup justice and solidarity that goes
2t 8
far beyond the politics of Latina/o pan-ethnicity.
Rather, Professors Johnson and Martfnez's claim, as I understand it,
is that LatCrit theory should be rooted in Chicana/o studies or, more
precisely, that LatCrit scholars should view the long history of Chicana/
o activism and scholarship as a rich resource worth further study and
serious engagement. It is to this end that they append the bibliography of
Chicana/o history compiled by Professor Dennis Valdes, and it is in this
respect that their claims are entirely appropriate and consistent with the
historical development and the theoretical and political aspirations of the
LatCrit project.
LatCrit scholars should indeed study and learn from the significant
body of scholarship and history of activism reflected in and recorded by
a long tradition of Chicana/o studies. The particular perspectives and
experiences of Chicanas/os are as central to the LatCrit project as the
perspectives and experiences of any other multidimensional and intersectional collective political identity group committed to the struggle
against white supremacy and the articulation of a substantive vision and
political practice of social justice and solidarity. Only an unfortunate
regression to the failed politics and limited consciousness of an ethnic or
racial essentialism would view Professor Johnson's and Martfnez's call
for attention to the particularities of Chicana/o histories and experience
as a threat to the LatCrit project. As Professor Roberts noted in her own
contribution to this symposium, an anti-essentialist commitment to antisubordination politics does not mean a commitment to an abstract universalism stripped forever of any particular content.2 9 It is, instead, a
commitment to see and respect the universal claims of justice and dignity reflected in and asserted by every particularity, as well as by the
multidimensional and intersectional identities that oftentimes are sup218. These theoretical and political aspirations have been substantially enriched by the active
and continuous participation of a highly diverse and extraordinarily talented assortment of
APACrit scholars, RaceCrits, QueerCrits and other OutCrit scholars. See, e.g., Aoki, supra note
169, at 969 (noting extent of APACrit participation in LatCrit conferences and community); Culp,
supra note 45 (reflecting on relevance of LatCrit project to African Americans); Barbara J. Cox,
Coalescing Communities, Discourses and Practices: Synergies in the Anti-Subordination Project,
2 HARV. LATINo L. REV. 473 (1997) (reflecting on relevance of LatCrit project to white lesbians);
Stephanie M. Wildman, Reflections on Whiteness & Latinalo Critical Theory, 2 HARV. LATINO L.
REV. 307 (1997) (reflecting on significance of LatCrit project from a white critical feminist
perspective).

219. See, supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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pressed within each particularity.2"'
What this means, more concretely, is that Professors Johnson and
Martfnez are right on point when they assert the need for a distinctive
emphasis on the particularities on Chicana/o perspectives and experiences, both within and beyond the institutional and programmatic
parameters of the LatCrit project. They are also right to suggest that
Chicanalo Studies and LatCrit theory may ultimately converge if, and as,
Chicana/o Studies become more inclusive and LatCrit theory continues
to encourage a theoretical and political attention to the particularities of
subordination experienced by the many different Outgroups that have
coalesced in the LatCrit movement. 22 ' LATCRIT III sought to operationalize precisely this theoretical and political commitment to addressing
the particularities of subordination by self-consciously and intentionally
organizing the BlackCrit focus group discussion as a programmatic
event through which a tradition of "rotating centers" might be definitively launched and effectively institutionalized in the organization of
LatCrit conferences.222 Within this context, a Chicana/o Studies focus
group discussion would not be difficult to imagine or to organize for a
future LatCrit conference.
Conversely, of course, Chicana/o activists might likewise effectuate
and expand upon Professors Johnson's and Martfnez's call for attention
to and respect for Chicana/o particularities, for example, by centering
the experiences and perspectives and listening to the stories of Chicanas/
os, who have experienced Chicana/o activism from positions located
outside the parameters of identity and relations of solidarity defined and
delimited by Chicana/o intellectual and political elites. 223 Beyond that,
Chicana/o Studies activists and scholars might, as Professors Johnson
and Martfnez suggest, invite the comments and perspectives of nonChicanalo Latinas/os, who share their commitment to an anti-subordination social justice agenda. Making these and other similar moves might
indeed produce the ultimate convergence of Chicana/o Studies and the
220. See Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 2, at 556-57 (urging LatCrit scholars to "avoid the
essentialist tendency to seek universal truths in generalities and abstractions, rather than seeking
universal liberation in and through the material, though limited, transformation of the particular
and contingent"); see also, e.g., Iglesias, Structures of Subordination, supra note 5 (criticizing
different ways in which intersectional particularity of women of color is oftentimes suppressed in
the constitution of class, race and gender based collectivities).
221. Johnson & Martfnez, supra note 213, at 1157 (noting that "[u]ltimately, Chicana/o Studies
and LatCrit theory may move in opposite directions- with Chicana/o Studies becoming more
inclusive and LatCrit theory allowing for focused inquiry when appropriate").
222. See supra notes 105-17 and accompanying text (discussing original purpose and intent
behind the BlackCrit focus group discussion and controversies it generated at LATCRIT IlI).
223. See, e.g., Montoya, LatCrit Foundations, supra note 213, at Part III (reporting interviews
with two Chicana scholars about their experiences as women within the National Association for
Chicana/Chicano Studies).
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anti-essentialist, anti-subordination agenda that, thus far, has defined
LatCrit theory as the collective and collaborative project of a diverse
group of critical scholars and activists.
In this vein, the essays by Professors Mutua and Mahmud offer
very different, but equally appropriate, reference points for the future
development of LatCrit theory. Professor Mutua draws on her experiences at LATCRIT III, and particularly her reflections on the BlackCrit
focus group featured at the conference, in order to develop a deeply
moving analysis and theoretically sophisticated framework for comparing the racialization of Latinas/os and Blacks. Professor Mahmud's
essay, by contrast, draws upon, and introduces for the first time ever in a
LatCrit symposium, the rich discourse of post-colonial theory and scholarship. Both essays acknowledge and explore the broader political
implications of the fact that white supremacy operates through the ideological articulation and legal machinery of multiple racial systems. Both
essays thus call upon LatCrit scholars to focus attention and deepen our
comparative analysis of the various and varied modalities through which
these different racial systems produce the subordination of peoples of
color, both within and beyond the United States.
Professor Mutua's immediate objective is to articulate a theoretical
framework that can effectively ensure that the LatCrit practice of "rotating centers" will trigger meaningful substantive analysis of the different
ways in which white supremacy configures relations of relative privilege
and oppression among different non-white groups and the intergroup
rivalries that are thereby activated - as much by an uncritical embrace
of the privileges conferred on one's own group, at the expense of
another - as by an uncritical emphasis on the oppression endured by
one's own group, but not the other. Focusing specifically on the intergroup tensions between Blacks and Latinas/os, Professor Mutua shows
how the notion of "shifting bottoms" provides the necessary theoretical
framework for linking the practice of "rotating centers" to a careful and
critical analysis of the different racial systems through which Blacks and
Latinas/os are relegated to their respective "bottoms." Once these different racial systems are identified and deconstructed, LatCrit scholars will
be better able to understand the many obstacles confronting our hopes of
achieving genuine intergroup solidarity and justice. These hopes confront profound challenges because Latinas/os, Blacks and Asians are
privileged and oppressed by different racial systems. Dismantling one
racial system, will not necessarily dismantle the others. On the contrary,
it may actually reinscribe the remaining systems and enable their more
virulent entrenchment in American society. Thus non-white groups are
really and always potentially in conflict - absent a genuine and self-
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conscious commitment to anti-essentialist intergroup justice. 24
To this end, Professor Mutua's analysis makes three distinct, yet
interconnected, theoretical moves of particular salience to the future
development of LatCrit theory. The first is to recognize that the practice
of "rotating centers" is not about "celebrating diversity." LatCrit
organizers want to institutionalize the practice of rotating centers
because it offers a valuable lens through which to examine, among other
things, the different ways in which white supremacy configures relations
of privilege and subordination within and between non-white groups.
By articulating the notion of "shifting bottoms" Professor Mutua offers a
valuable guidepost for deciding where the center should rotate next. This
is because, as her analysis suggests, the practice of rotating centers will
maintain its critical edge and effectuate its anti-subordination objectives
only so long as it remains relentlessly committed to seeking and asserting the perspectives of those at the bottom of any particular context in
which white supremacy is present and operative.2 25
Professor Mutua's second move links the notion of "shifting bottoms" to a detailed and comparative analysis of the different racial systems operating in the United States. Through a detailed analysis of these
different systems, Professor Mutua makes a compelling case for concluding that Blacks, Asians and Latinas/os are racialized in different
ways - such that Blacks are raced as "colored," Asians are raced as
"foreign," and "Latino/as when they are not raced as black or white are
'raced' as hybrid (being "raced" both as partially foreign and partially
colored in a way that racializes their ethnicity and many of its components.)"2 2 6 These different racial systems structure intergroup relations
in ways that produce "shifting bottoms" between Blacks, Asians and
Latinas/os, so that "different faces appear at the bottom of the well
depending on the issue analyzed. '227 Thus, while (some) Latinas/os
may be relatively privileged by the "racial mobility" of putative whiteness in the racial system that marks Blacks as colored, (some) Blacks
may be relatively privileged by the presumption of an American national
and cultural identity in the racial system that marks Latinas/os as hybrids
and foreigners.
Her third and final move links the intergroup tensions between
Blacks and Latinas/os, over such issues as language rights, immigration
224. See, e.g., supra notes 46-55 and accompany text (discussing intergroup tensions over

racially restrictive immigration policies).
225. See, e.g., Iglesias, Out of the Shadows, supra note 30, at 374-75 (noting how exclusion of
Japanese Latin-Americans from 1998 reparations paid by U.S. government to Japanese-American
World War II internees reveals a "bottom" not otherwise evident).
226. Mutua, supra note 8, at 1207.
227. Id. at 1178.
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policies and affirmative action, to the shifting configurations of privilege
and oppression created by these different racial systems. The aspiration
underlying the theory and practice of coalitional politics has repeatedly

been cast as a collective struggle to move beyond the divide and conquer
dynamics of inter-group competition within white supremacy to a collaborative project aimed, instead, at eliminating white supremacy
through a politics of intergroup solidarity and a commitment to intergroup justice. Professor Mutua's detailed analysis of the different racial

systems organizing Black and Latina/o subordination furthers this project by revealing how tensions between Blacks and Latinas/os reflect
the different configurations of privilege and oppression visited upon
these different groups by the particular dynamics of different racial systems. Even more importantly, it clearly and powerfully drives home the
point that achieving intergroup justice is not simply a matter of eliminating oppression, but also of giving up privilege. This means that each

group will have to confront and foreswear the privileges conferred on
them by the racial systems that oppress groups other than themselves if there is ever to be genuine solidarity based on a shared commitment to
objective justice. 28
At the same time, however, it is important to recognize the limitations of Professor Mutua's theoretical framework - not so as to undermine or discount the substantial advances it makes in the articulation of
LatCrit coalitional theory, but rather so as to mark future directions for
LatCrit analysis. More specifically, I wonder how the experiences of
Black Haitians, and other immigrant Black identities would be mapped
within and across the various racial systems delimited by Professor
Mutua's framework.229 More generally, I wonder what focusing specifically on marginalized and intersectional identities of Black Latinas/os,
Black Asians, Asian Latinas/os and so on and so forth, would teach us
about the interconnections and disjunctures between the various racial
systems and other racial systems, we have yet to identify and deconstruct. Indeed, in this respect, Professor Mahmud's essay closes this
section as if by design.
Focusing specifically on the various racial systems constructed in
and through the British colonial project in India, Professor Mahmud
illustrates the tremendous mileage to be gained from of a serious LatCrit
encounter with post-colonial theory and discourse. Like Professor
Mutua, his essay offers a detailed analysis of the discourses and practices through which different racial systems were constructed in the past
228. See, e.g., Iglesias, Structures of Subordination, supra note 5 (solidarity must be based on

justice, not sentimental rhetoric).
229. See, e.g., supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
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and are reflected in the present conflicts and tensions among different
racialized groups. By locating this analysis in the particularities of
European colonialism, Professor Mahmud provides a valuable framework for expanding the critical analysis of racialization beyond the territorial boundaries, cultural ideologies and domestic concerns of the
United States. There is no question that his essay marks a future trajectory for LatCrit theory.
B.

InstitutionalizingSolidarity and Practicing Mutual Recognition

The cluster afterword submitted by Professor Montoya in conjunction with her cluster introduction, as well as the essays by Professor
Phillips and by Professors Ortiz and Elrod provide an appropriate occasion to shift the focus of attention from the theoretical foundations and
future trajectories of LatCrit theory to the more concrete and practical
challenges of ensuring the continued institutional and programmatic
evolution of the LatCrit project. Some of the challenges thus far confronted, as well as the various strategies LatCrit organizers have implemented to meet these challenges, are detailed in Professor Valdes'
Afterword.2 30 Nevertheless, these last three essays each raise important
issues concerning (1) the internal dynamics, historical development and
future evolution of LatCrit conferences and the organizational practices
and structures needed to sustain this movement; 231 (2) the relationship
between LatCrit and other networks and organizations of critical scholars; 212 and (3) the overarching necessity of ensuring that these concerns
are mediated in ways that preserve and enhance a common ethic of
authentic human sharing, inclusivity and connection. This last point is
key. The LatCrit community can and should continue to grow and
expand, even as we continue also, rigorously and honestly, to explore
our substantive differences of position and perspective in the spirit and
expectation of lively and lasting friendship based on a shared commit2 33
ment to an anti-essentialist anti-subordination vision and politics.
To these ends, Professor Montoya's cluster afterword features
interviews with two Chicana scholars involved in the National Association for Chicana/Chicano Studies. Through a candid and detailed narrative of the problems confronted in that particular context, these
interviews offer valuable insights into the difficulties any collective project can eventually encounter as its participants confront the consequences of their own success. One such consequence, noted in these
230.
231.
232.
233.

Valdes, "OutCrit" Theories, supra note 7.
Montoya, LatCrit Foundations, supra note 213.
Phillips, supra note 7.
Ortiz & Elrod, Finding "Family," supra note 213.
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interviews, is the activation of an all-too-human tendency to abandon the
ethic of mutual recognition and the aspirations it embodies, and to
jockey instead for positions of individual prominence, whether real or
imagined. This cannot be allowed to happen again. Too much is at stake
in the here and now of this moment of retrenchment and hostility to the
cause of social justice and genuine human interconnection.234
Operationalizing an ethic of mutual recognition, in this context,
means recognizing the efforts and contributions of particular individuals,
rather than attributing current collective achievements to impersonal historical forces or to the heroes (or heroines) of a distant past. Though
there can be no question that the LatCrit movement draws its energy and
substantive value from the many scholars, who have chosen to find, or to
plant, their roots in the LatCrit community, it is also true that the organization of appropriate venues, the construction of appropriate contexts for
performing community and producing a collective learning process and
the negotiation of publication commitments that enable these efforts to
be recorded and broadly disseminated do not happen automatically without the efforts and energy of particular individuals, who at specific
points in time, take up the burdens and challenges of creating the opportunities that enable community. The history of these efforts in the development of LatCrit theory has yet to be told. As Professor Montoya's
afterword suggests, much could be learned from the telling. That history, in its full detail, has much to teach about the meaning and value of
perseverence, solidarity and intellectual, professional and personal generosity. That history, in its full detail, will have to await another
moment and venue, but the lessons embedded in Professor Montoya's
cluster afterword underscore the necessity and value of recorded his23With that in mind, a few notes for the record are highly in order.
tory. 23
Though the future of the LatCrit movement has yet to unfold, its
history began, without question or doubt, in the Critical Race Theory
Workshop. It began there because, in its most proximate and concrete
form, LatCrit began with the vision and efforts of my friend and colleague Francisco Valdes. That vision is reflected in Frank's
234. For a critical discussion of legal scholars and scholarships in this time of backlash
lawmaking, see Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory:
Majoritarianism,Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship, or Legal
Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 DENv. U. L. REv. 1409 (1998) (urging progressive legal
scholars to use our institutional and intellectual positions to blunt the drive to retrenchment).
235. See Montoya, LatCrit Foundations,supra note 213, at 1135 (quoting Cordelia Candelaria:
"Many of the early pioneers in Chicana/o studies have been so used to rolling up our sleeves and
just doing what needed to be done without chronicling the process. We just move on to other
projects. History is lost is one unfortunate consequence. Another is that later on the history is

sometimes re-written in terms of making certain actors look good in ways that are totally
unsupported by the facts.").

1999]
Afterword,

FOREWORD
36

but his many efforts on behalf of the LatCrit community

are not. From the initial gathering of law professors which produced the
first ever Colloquium seeking to locate Latinas/os in the discourse of
Critical Race Theory and, in doing so, gave birth to the "LatCrit" movement,2 37 and ultimately to this LATCRIT III conference, Frank's efforts to
build an inclusive community of scholars and activists, to promote a
theoretically sophisticated and analytically rigorous anti-essentialist critical legal discourse and, above all, to combat the marginalization of
Latina/o communities in American legal culture have been a driving
force behind, and an unselfish source of energy and practical assistance
to, the organization of LatCrit conferences, the publication of LatCrit
scholarship and the consolidation of the LatCrit community. To locate
the roots of LatCrit theory in any other venue, history or project, without
accounting for the efforts of this particular man and the immediate context that inspired these efforts, would be an unfortunate distortion of the
unrecorded history of the LatCrit movement.
Just as Professor Montoya's cluster afterword counsels LatCrit
organizers to negotiate the future growth and the institutionalization of
structures and procedures for the LatCrit project with care and fidelity to
the ethic of mutual recognition, the commitment to unequivocal inclusiveness and the aspirations of collective solidarity and transformative
social justice praxis that initially gave it birth, Professor Phillips's contribution counsels LatCrit organizers and scholars to attend to the needs
and concerns of other networks and organizations of critical legal scholars. Whether her institutional proposal to coordinate LatCrit conferences and Critical Race Theory Workshops through an every-other-year
rotation, or some other appropriate variation, is ultimately adopted, the
objectives, concerns and aspirations that inform her proposal warrant
serious LatCrit attention and consideration. Working out the programmatic and institutional details of the relationship between LatCrit conferences and activities and the Critical Race Theory Workshops, as well as
the details of LatCrit participation in venues like APACrit conferences,
Law and Society, People of Color Conferences, the NAIL and TWAIL
networks focusing on New and Third World Approaches to International
Law, INTEL's International Network on Transformative Employment &
Labor Law and the Critical Legal Studies Network, to name but a few,
are pending matters of increasing importance. Ultimately, taking seriously the commitment to social transformation through law means tak-

236. See Valdes, "OutCrit Theories," supra note 7.
237. See Colloquium, Representing Latinalo Communities: Critical Race Theory and
Practice, supra note 1.
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ing seriously the coordinated synergies that only our collaborative
efforts can produce.
Finally, the essay by Professors Ortiz and Elrod provides a vivid
image of the community spirit, collegiality and cultural ethos the LatCrit
movement must not ever lose. Though the LatCrit project aspires to the
serious objective of producing transformative anti-essentialist legal theory and praxis, it aspires also to the realization of the human need for
genuine community, solidarity and friendship. Whether LatCrit conferences and activities will continue to provide an intellectual and political
home for scholars and activists committed to the project of social justice
depends on the degree to which we continue to structure our gatherings
as spaces where the personal and professional are equally valued and
accommodated.
CONCLUSION

III undoubtedly marked a watershed event in the evolution of the LatCrit movement, both as the most recent intervention in
outsider jurisprudence and as a community of scholars and activists.
This Foreword has sought, in a caring, careful and analytically rigorous
manner, to highlight the advances and engage the problems embedded in
the essays that now constitute the only record of this wonderful event.
Heeding prior calls and applying the methodologies advocated in earlier
LatCrit scholarship, this Foreword has worked to situate the contributions of this symposium within the broader discursive background that
has already been developed through substantial efforts, and at great cost,
by other critical scholars. 238 This positioning, as previously explained
and once again repeated, "requires a broad learning and caring embrace
of outsider jurisprudence and, in particular, of the lessons and limits to
be drawn from its experience, its substance and its methods. 2 39 It also
counsels LatCrit scholars to recognize the importance of critical engagement and mutual recognition. Through our critical and focused engagement in each other's work and ideas, we will ourselves, grow
intellectually and politically, even as we foster each other's growth and
development. Through our commitment to mutual recognition, we will
promote the dissemination of LatCrit anti-essentialist, anti-subordination
theory and, thereby - with a little luck and a lot of hard work - trigger
the paradigm shifts that are imperative for the 2 1st century. The future is
as bright as we make it together.
LATCRIT

238. Iglesias & Valdes, supra note 2, at 584.
239. Id.

